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

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THE

MEMORABILIA OF XENOPHON

BOOK I

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THE MEMORABILIA

OF

XENOPHON

BOOK I

EDITED BY

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PREFACE.

THIS book is constructed on the same plan as my edition of the Second Book of the *Memorabilia*, which was published last year. My obligations to various writers are mentioned as they occur. In the text I have generally followed Walther Gilbert, a much more sober critic than many of the editors of Xenophon. Teachers will find all necessary information on textual matters in his critical preface, and a more succinct account of various readings in Mr Marchant's valuable edition in the *Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*. On the theory of constant and extensive interpolations in the *Memorabilia* Mr Herbert Richards has made some judicious criticisms in the *Classical Review* for June, 1902.

G. M. E.

CAMBRIDGE,
October 28, 1902.

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INTRODUCTION.

I. XENOPHON.

(A) **Xenophon the disciple of Socrates.**

XENOPHON was the son of Gryllus, an Athenian belonging to the rural *deme* (or parish) of Ercheia about twenty miles from the city. Our information about his early life is extremely meagre and uncertain. The date of his birth is a matter of conjecture; the slender evidence available seems to point to the year 435 B.C. The date usually given—444 B.C.—is unquestionably incorrect. While still a boy, Xenophon met in a narrow street one remarkable for his satyr-like physiognomy,—the flat nose, thick lips, and prominent eyes of a Silenus. Stretching out his staff to bar the boy's progress, this strange being proceeded to catechise him, enquiring where various commodities could be purchased. To all these questions Xenophon returned ready answers. But when he was asked *Where are οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*[1] *to be found?*, he shook his head in sore

[1] The following passage from Mr Godley's *Socrates and Athenian Society* (pp. 116, 117) is an excellent commentary on the Greek conception of *καλοκαγαθία* and also on Socrates' way of dealing with the young:—

'In Plato's dialogue called *Charmides* the title-rôle is played by a youth who is receiving the homage which we reserve for female beauty. To us beauty in a man is a matter of small importance. But in Hellas different ideas prevailed; on Socrates' return from the campaign of Potidaea all the talk is of the rising generation of youths; the girls who would now be the reigning belles of a small town are simply left out of account altogether in Plato. All the attention and admiration is for their brothers.

perplexity. To the words which came next *Follow me and learn* he rendered a willing obedience, and became the devoted disciple of his questioner[1].

This was none other than the 'Great Cross-examiner,' Socrates son of Sophroniscus the sculptor. He had retired from his father's profession to take up the mission of making men *accurate talkers* (ἀκριβολόγοι)—according to the sneering, but unconsciously most true description of the satirist Timon—or, in other words, to carry on a crusade against the false conceit of knowledge without the reality. It has been well remarked that Socrates reminded a world filled with intellectual pride and in bondage to phrases that it was better to collect one's thoughts and to enquire, with the help of others and by means of conversation, in which one man corrects another, what was the meaning of all the fine words which every one made use of, and then, after calm reflection on their true significance, to order one's life on a rational basis[2]. A life without cross-examination he held to be no life at all[3]. *If you kill me*, he says in the forcible language of the Platonic Apology, *you will not easily find another like me; for I am a sort of gadfly given to the State by God; and the State is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has given the State, and all day long and in all places*

It was they and not the Attic damsels whom Pheidias chose to represent as the types of the highest human grace....Charmides is the *mould of form* of young Athens. *All gazed at him*, says Socrates, *as at a statue*. Moreover, he is not only perfectly beautiful; he is high-born, a descendant of one of those old families which Athens, for all her democratic institutions, still delighted to honour; and he has the saving grace of σωφροσύνη or steadiness, so especially necessary to an Athenian stripling. Here, as in the *Lysis*, the Platonic Socrates is a picture of the philosopher paying philosophic homage to an outward beauty which, if it is to be perfect, must be accompanied by a corresponding perfection of the mind within. After his first bewilderment at sight of the noble grace of Charmides, his demeanour to the young man is instinct with that kind wisdom (made earnest by the deep reverence of mature age for the bright actuality and brighter possibilities of youth) which is the distinguishing characteristic of all Socrates' intercourse with the young.'

[1] Diogenes Laertius, *Life*, § 2.

[2] Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. II. p. 454.

[3] Plato, *Apology*, 38 A.

am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you[1]. 'For thirty years—for those thirty years which extend through the whole period of the Peloponnesian war, in the crowded streets and squares, when all Attica was congregated within the walls of Athens to escape the Spartan invasions—during the horrors of the plague—amidst the excitements of the various vicissitudes of Pylos, of Syracuse, of the revolution of the Four Hundred, of the tyranny of the Thirty, of the restoration of the democracy, Socrates was ever at his post, by his presence, by his voice, by his example, restraining, attracting, repelling every class of his excitable countrymen. The philosophy of Socrates was in every sense the philosophy of the market-place. Very rarely he might be found under the shade of the plane-tree or the caverned rocks of the Ilissus. But ordinarily, whether in the city, in the dusty road between the Long Walls, or in the busy mart of Peiraeus, his place was amongst men, in every vocation of life, living not for himself, but for them, rejecting all pay, contented in poverty. Amidst the gay life, the beautiful forms, the brilliant colours of an Athenian multitude and an Athenian street, the repulsive features, the unwieldy figure, the bare feet, the rough threadbare attire of the philosopher must have excited every sentiment of astonishment and ridicule which strong contrast can produce. And if to this we add the occasional trance, the eye fixed on vacancy, the total abstraction from outward objects[2]—or again

[1] Plato, *Apology*, 30 E.

[2] 'We are told of Socrates that he would suddenly fall into a reverie, and then remain motionless and regardless of all attempts to interrupt or call him away. On one such occasion, when in the camp at Potidaea, he was observed to stand thus transfixed at the early dawn of a long summer day. One after another the soldiers gathered round him; but he continued in the same posture, undisturbed by their astonishment or by the noon-day heat which had begun to beat upon his head. Evening drew on, and still he was to be seen in the same position; the inquisitive Ionians in the camp took their evening meal by his side, and drew out their pallets from their tents to watch him. And the cold dews of the Thracian night came on, and still he remained unmoved, till at last the sun rose above Mount Athos, and still found him on the same spot where he had been since the previous morning. Then at last he started from his trance, offered his morning prayer to the Sun-god, and retired. Abstraction from the outer world so complete as this would of itself prepare us for the extraordinary disclosures which he has left of his *divine sign*. It is

the momentary outbursts of violent temper—or lastly the sudden irruptions of his wife Xanthippe to carry off her eccentric husband to his forsaken home[1].'

'When Socrates appeared, it was—so his disciples described it—as if one of the marble satyrs, which sat in grotesque attitudes with pipe or flute in the sculptors' shops at Athens, had left his seat of stone and walked into the plane-tree avenue or the gymnastic colonnade. Gradually the crowd gathered round him; at first he spoke of the tanners and the smiths and the drovers who were plying their trades about him; and they shouted with laughter as he poured forth his homely jokes. But soon the magic charm of his voice made itself felt. The peculiar sweetness of its tone had an effect which even the thunder of Pericles failed to produce. The laughter ceased; the crowd thickened; the gay youth, whom nothing else could tame, stood transfixed and awestruck in his presence. There was a solemn thrill in his words, such as his hearers could compare to nothing but the mysterious sensation produced by the clash of drum and cymbal in the worship of the great Mother of the Gods. The head swam, the heart leaped at the sound, tears rushed from their eyes; and they felt that, unless they tore themselves away from that fascinated circle, they would sit down at his feet and grow old in listening to the marvellous music of this second Marsyas[2].'

Brought up under this unique influence Xenophon reached the age for military service while Athens was still suffering severely from the stress of the Peloponnesian War[3]; and the 'military brother of the Socratic family' doubtless took part in the defence of the city down to its capture by Sparta in 404 B.C.

impossible not to be reminded by it of the language in which the Hebrew Prophets are said to have heard in the midnight silence of the sanctuary, or in the mountain cave, or on the outskirts of the desert, the gentle call, the still small whisper, the piercing cry of the Divine Word'—Dean Stanley, *Lecture on Socrates* (included in *Lectures on the Jewish Church*, Series III. pp. 201, 202).

[1] *Ibid.* pp. 205, 206.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 207, a paraphrase of Plato, *Symposium*, p. 215.

[3] The story of his preservation from death by Socrates at the battle of Delium in 424 B.C. is evidently a fiction, like many other legends in Greek literary biography.

He seems to have belonged to the 'Knights.' Several of his books manifest a keen interest in horses and horsemanship. Any one familiar with Aristophanes' picture of the 'Thousand good Knights' and their aristocratic contempt for the demagogue will to some extent appreciate that strange feature in the life of Xenophon, his antipathy to the Athenian democracy and his enthusiastic admiration for Sparta and all things Spartan. Still it is very remarkable that one who evidently owed his success in life mainly to his training in democratic Athens should display a marked preference for the Spartan system of education and government. Before Xenophon left Athens in 401 B.C. he had probably completed the first two books of his *Hellenica* or *History of Greece*, a continuation of the unfinished work of Thucydides. These books describe the closing scenes of the great war, the tyranny of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus in 403 B.C. The extremely interesting essay *on the Athenian Constitution*, ascribed to Xenophon, is the earliest remaining specimen of Attic Prose ; it must have been written when Xenophon was quite a boy, and cannot be his work. It is now generally thought to have been an anonymous publication ; and different critics have suggested Alcibiades, Critias, and even Thucydides as possible authors of the treatise.

Xenophon's departure from Athens was due to the expedition of Cyrus described in the *Anabasis*. Cyrus, the younger and abler of the two surviving sons of Darius II King of Persia and his queen Parysatis, came into prominence in 408 B.C., when at the early age of seventeen he was appointed Satrap, or Viceroy, of Lydia, Phrygia and Cappadocia and Commander-in-chief of the royal troops in those parts. He was thus practically supreme in Asia Minor. In 404 B.C. Darius died before the Queen could obtain from him a declaration in favour of Cyrus on the ground that the elder son Artaxerxes was born before his father's accession,—an argument which in old days Atossa had advanced on behalf of Xerxes. The young prince, nursing the bitterest feelings of hatred and revenge, conceived the brilliant idea of collecting a Greek force, in addition to his large Asiatic

army, to fight Artaxerxes for the throne. The circumstances of the time were highly favourable to this policy; for at the end of the Peloponnesian War began the rise of mercenary troops in the Hellenic world. The general demoralisation caused by a long period of war and the dissolution of family ties hastened the decay of patriotism and kindled the passion for a roving life of profit and adventure.

Cyrus saw his opportunity; despatching his agents in all directions, he drew together to his court at Sardis many Greeks of ruined fortunes. A born leader of men, he dazzled the Greek imagination by his brilliant personality, his youthful enthusiasm, and his open-handed generosity. Hellenic patriotism was practically dead; and here, apparently at the dawn of a new era, was a prince with a great future, having at his disposal 'the gold of Asia and the men of Hellas.' He demanded no sacrifices,—so ran his magnificent invitation to Sparta,—without ample rewards. The soldier who came on foot should receive a horse; he who came on horseback, a chariot and pair. Owners of fields should be made masters of villages; and masters of villages lords of cities. So successful was this policy that early in 401 B.C. Cyrus had concentrated at Sardis a force of 8000 men, whom his Greek officers had collected in the Peloponnese, Thessaly, Ionia, and elsewhere. Among the Greek officers whom Cyrus had attracted to Sardis was the Theban Proxenus, an old friend of Xenophon. From his description of Proxenus as a disciple of the rhetorician Gorgias, and as one who recognised the importance of culture as an element of distinction in public life, we may infer that the bond which united the two friends was of a literary character. Moreover we are told elsewhere that Xenophon, who was a few years older than Proxenus, had acted as his tutor. Hence it appears probable that Cyrus wished to secure, through Proxenus, the services of Xenophon as a *civil* officer to aid him in his ambitious schemes. Xenophon expressly tells us that he joined the expedition *neither as general nor captain nor soldier.* Early in 401 B.C. he received from Proxenus a letter, in which he undertook to introduce him to Cyrus, adding the cynical remark that he considered the friendship of such a patron

was *worth more to himself than his native city*,—a striking illustration of the decay of patriotism during this period.

Xenophon communicated the proposal of Proxenus to his master Socrates, who feared that his young friend might provoke the hostility of the democracy, if he threw in his lot with one who had been the bitter enemy of Athens and had actually furnished Sparta with the means of crushing her. He accordingly advised him to consult the oracle at Delphi. Thither Xenophon repaired. But, instead of asking the god, 'Shall I go to Sardis or shall I forbear?' he put the narrower question: 'Having a journey in view, to which of the gods must I offer prayers and sacrifices in order to make it propitious?' The oracle indicated to him the proper deities. Socrates, however, was displeased with his disciple because he had not submitted the question with perfect frankness. 'Nevertheless,' he added, 'since you have elected to put the question in your own way, you must act on the answer vouchsafed.' So Xenophon set sail after duly performing the necessary rites. Probably he was not sorry to leave his native city; for Athens under the restored democracy cannot have been an agreeable residence for a member of the Knights, the class which had been the chief support of the atrocious tyranny of the Thirty.

(B) **Xenophon and Cyrus.**

Xenophon reached Sardis in the spring of 401 B.C., and found Cyrus and Proxenus preparing to set out on an expedition directed, so it was alleged, against the Pisidians, a refractory robber tribe in a distant part of the prince's satrapy. They both expressed a strong wish that Xenophon should accompany them. He was deceived by their statements, for which, he adds, Proxenus was not responsible; for neither Proxenus nor any other Greek officer except Clearchus, the intimate friend of Cyrus, had at present any suspicion that the expedition was really directed against the King of Persia. Cyrus had completed his preparations. The 8000 Greek troops now concentrated at Sardis he placed under the command of his Spartan

general Clearchus, an outlaw from his native city, having been condemned to death by the Lacedaemonian authorities for disobedience to their orders. The Asiatic troops of Cyrus, numbering 100,000, were commanded by his friend Ariaeus the Persian. Cyrus still told the Greeks that the object of his enterprise was merely to secure the frontiers of his province against the Pisidian freebooters; and, in order to deceive Artaxerxes, he gave out that the Greek force which he had collected was designed for service against his jealous rival, Tissaphernes, Satrap of Caria. But Tissaphernes suspected the real designs of Cyrus, and, when he heard of the magnitude of the prince's army, started with all speed to inform the Great King, who at once began his preparations.

On arriving at the port of Issus Cyrus received further reinforcements brought by his fleet, amongst them 700 Spartan hoplites under the command of Cheirisophus, sent, it was said, by the Lacedaemonian government. The number of his Greek force now reached 14,000. Abrocomas, who was in command of 300,000 men, seems to have been alarmed by the rapid progress of the invader and fled from the Syrian coast into the interior. At Thapsacus, just before crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus at last publicly informed the Greeks that he was leading them to Babylon to fight against the Great King. Hitherto Cyrus had been advancing with overweening self-confidence; for he had been allowed to pass without resistance all the natural obstacles of which the Persians might have taken advantage to bar his progress, and now he seemed to think that victory would be his without a struggle. This feeling was only increased when, three days after leaving Pylae, he found quite undefended the great trench which Artaxerxes had caused to be dug across the plain for a length of 40 miles. It had been abandoned from some unaccountable panic. Cyrus now imagined that the Persians would never face him in the plains of Babylonia. And when one day early in September his troops were about to halt for their morning meal at the village of Cunaxa, it was announced that a vast Persian host of 900,000 men was approaching in order of battle over the open plain. The story of the battle, which

resulted in a Cyreian victory marred by a disastrous loss—the death of Cyrus himself—need not be related here.

On the morning of the day after the battle Clearchus and the other Greek generals supposed Cyrus to be still alive. On learning the disastrous news they were deeply grieved. The one hope of the expedition was gone, and here they were in the heart of the Persian empire entirely destitute of resources and surrounded by treacherous foes. Still, with splendid self-confidence, as conquerors in the battle of Cunaxa, they proceeded to offer their prize of victory, the Persian throne, to Ariaeus, who had commanded the Asiatic troops of Cyrus. He politely declined their invitation; probably he had already made up his mind to seek the favour of Artaxerxes and to betray his brothers in arms. Clearchus seems at first to have placed a blind confidence in Ariaeus, who undertook to conduct the Greeks to the sea by a route different from that by which they had come. Accordingly it was resolved to begin the retreat in his company. The Greeks soon began to suspect that Ariaeus was playing them false; and great distrust arose between the Hellenic and the Persian portion of the Cyreian army. They kept clear of one another both on the march and in their encampments. While resting on the banks of the Greater Zab, Clearchus attempted to put an end to the constant bickerings between the Greek and Asiatic troops; and he consented to a conference with Tissaphernes, who promised that, if the Greek generals would come to his tent, he would give them the name of the treacherous person who was causing all the trouble. On the next day Clearchus went to Tissaphernes accompanied by four generals, twenty captains, and two hundred soldiers. On their arrival the generals were seized and their companions massacred. Four of the generals, Clearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were taken to the Persian court and soon afterwards beheaded. The other general Menon, who was the reputed traitor, was kept alive under torture for a year and then put to death. After the seizure of the generals, Ariaeus summoned the Greeks to surrender; but in an indignant and contemptuous message they declined.

(C) Xenophon as General.

The situation of the Greeks now seemed more desperate than ever; Xenophon speaks of it in most pathetic language. Their spirits were however speedily revived by his own energetic action. During the night after the disaster he awoke from a remarkable dream and at once aroused the captains who had served under Proxenus. In a midnight council of war he urged them with simple and stirring eloquence to take measures for the common safety. They at once recognised his fitness for command and called upon him to fill the place of his friend. At Xenophon's suggestion, the captains of the other divisions were convened, and they nominated four other generals. At daybreak the new generals summoned the soldiers, who met after the fashion of a Greek Ecclesia and proceeded to discuss the future conduct of the expedition and to confirm the appointment of the generals proposed. They had soon risen from the paralysis of despair to a sense of their national greatness. The meetings of the Ten Thousand are an exact reproduction of the citizen-assemblies at home. The army is a wandering political community; and the national characteristics of the race are wonderfully brought out in the narrative of the Retreat.

It is very remarkable that an Athenian should have exercised a commanding influence over the Ten Thousand. For Athens was now unpopular in Greece, especially in the Peloponnese; and a large majority of the soldiers were Peloponnesians, more than half being Arcadians or Achaeans. Xenophon was almost the only Athenian taking part in the expedition, and he had come 'neither as general nor captain nor soldier.' His extraordinary rise to power is doubtless due to the Athenian democratic training, which had given him flexibility and resource and, above all, persuasive eloquence. He displays throughout a marvellous faculty of dealing with mixed multitudes and embarrassing circumstances; and possesses in Athenian perfection the threefold power of thought and speech and action.

'The Athenian alone,' says Curtius, 'possessed that superiority of culture which was necessary for giving order and self-control to the band of warriors barbarised by their selfish life, and for enabling him to serve them in the greatest variety of situations as spokesman, as general, and as negotiator. And to him it was essentially due that, in spite of their unspeakable trials, through hostile tribes and desolate snow-ranges, 8000 Greeks in the end reached the coast.'

'The sea! The sea!' was the triumphant cry of the Greeks, when the Euxine burst upon their view early in March 400 B.C. after five months of weary marching and fighting. In two days they reached the Greek colony of Trapezus, where they rested for a month, fondly imagining that all their troubles were over and that they could easily return to their homes by sea. They were bitterly disappointed. Sparta was supreme in the Grecian world, and her officials on the Euxine refused to provide the Cyreians with means for their return. After great difficulties they at last reached Byzantium. There, owing to their cruel treatment by the Spartan admiral Anaxibius, they resumed their profession of mercenaries, accepting the offer of the Theban Coeratidas, who promised them ample rewards if they would undertake a campaign in Thrace under his leadership. This agreement soon fell to the ground; and in 399 B.C. we find them in the service of the Thracian prince Seuthes, assisting him to subdue some rebel tribes. They fought for two months; but met with cruel injustice as their reward.

Now, however, came a complete change in the policy of Sparta, which determined to support the Greek cities in Asia Minor against the satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. This meant war with Persia. Thimbron, the Spartan general, who was sent into Ionia, finding himself in want of reinforcements, invited to his aid Xenophon and the remnant of the Cyreians, whose numbers had now dwindled away to 6000. Smarting under the treatment they had just received from Seuthes, they obeyed the summons with alacrity. Xenophon crossed over into Asia and conducted his troops over Mount Ida to Pergamus. 'Then,' he says in the last words of the

Anabasis, 'Thimbron took over the army and incorporated it with the rest of his Greek force, and fought against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.' So Tissaphernes, to quote again from Curtius, 'saw before him once more the hated men whom he had assumed on the day of Cunaxa to be doomed to perish hopelessly under the swords of the Carduchi or amid the snow-fields of Armenia.'

(D) Death of Socrates, later life of Xenophon, his Socratic and other writings.

Before Xenophon handed over his troops to Thimbron in the spring of 399 B.C., he was, he tells us, *preparing* to return home; for, he adds, the decree of banishment had *not yet* been passed against him at Athens. These words have an important bearing on the vexed question of the date of his banishment They certainly support the view that the blow came *soon*. He seems to have expected such a disaster for some time past; for he speaks of hoping for an asylum with Seuthes the Thracian prince, and his project of founding a colony of his own on the Euxine was probably due to the same fear. The decree of banishment was passed on the proposition of the orator Eubulus. His alleged offence is differently stated by two authorities. He was banished either (1) 'because he had taken part with Cyrus, the greatest enemy of the Athenian democracy, in an expedition against the Great King their well-wisher,' or (2) 'for *Laconism*,' i.e. for favouring Sparta. But these two statements may be looked upon as practically identical; for taking part with Cyrus, who had shown his friendship for Sparta by providing her with the 'sinews of war' against Athens, might well be looked upon as *Laconism*. This view is strongly supported by the anxiety of Socrates on the subject (see above p. xv). Grote, however, owing to an apparent misunderstanding of a passage in the *Anabasis* (V. iii. 7), places

Xenophon's banishment in 394 B.C. after the battle of Coroneia, when he actually fought for Sparta against his native city.

Xenophon was 'preparing to return.' Whether he actually did return to Greece in 399 B.C. is uncertain. The trial and death of Socrates took place in the summer of this year. We do not know when Xenophon heard the story of the closing scenes of the great Master's life,—those 'scenes which Plato has invested with such surpassing glory. The Hebrew prophet, the Christian martyr, might well have couched their farewells to the audiences before which they, like him, often pleaded in vain, almost in the same words: *The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways. I go to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.* Then ensue the long thirty days which were passed in prison before the execution of the verdict, the playful equanimity and unabated interest in his habitual objects of life amidst the uncontrollable emotions of his companions, after they know of the return of the sacred ship, whose absence had up to that moment suspended his fate. Then follows the gathering in of that solemn evening, when the fading of the sunset on the tops of the Athenian hills was the signal that the last hour was at hand. Then the fatal hemlock enters; we see the immovable countenance, the firm hand, the wonted scowl of stern defiance at the executioner; we hear the burst of frantic lamentation from all his friends, as with his habitual ease and cheerfulness he drained the cup to its dregs; we watch the solemn silence enjoined by himself, the pacing to and fro, the cold palsy of the hemlock creeping from the extremities to the heart, and the gradual torpor ending in death[1].'

At such a time it was not likely that the Athenian democracy would show any tenderness to one of the Socratic brethren; and the decree of banishment against Xenophon was probably passed very soon afterwards. Anyhow, in a few months we find him again in command of his old Cyreian troops in Asia Minor, serving first under Dercyllidas, who succeeded Thimbron in 398 B.C., and then under King Agesilaus, who went out in 396.

[1] Stanley, *l.c.* p. 217.

For Agesilaus he entertained the warmest admiration and became his intimate friend. But the King was not allowed to remain long in Asia Minor; for, on the formation of the confederacy of Athens, Thebes and Corinth against Sparta, he was summoned to fight for his country in Greece. Xenophon and his troops accompanied him into Boeotia and took part in his victory at Coroneia.

When Xenophon's service under Agesilaus was over, the Spartans gave him a house and grounds at Scillus, near Olympia. Soon after Xenophon had settled there he met Megabyzus, High-priest of the Ephesian Artemis, who chanced to have come to the Olympic Games. He paid over to Xenophon a sum of money, which represented a part of the tithe of plunder devoted by the Cyreian army to Artemis and deposited with her priest. With this money Xenophon purchased an estate near his own residence, which he consecrated to the goddess, and built thereon a chapel containing a statue, a copy in miniature of the great Ephesian temple. He appointed himself Conservator of the demesne of Artemis, which consisted largely of wild ground well stocked with game. He was an ardent sportsman; every year he held a hunting festival on a large scale, to which he invited his neighbours and entertained them lavishly at the expense of the Huntress Queen, who, he says, 'provided the fare.'

At Scillus Xenophon was joined by his wife Philesia and his sons Gryllus and Diodorus; and there he lived a happy country life for twenty years, spending his time not only in sport, but in great literary labours, one of which was the composition of the *Anabasis*. Here too he probably wrote the *Memorabilia* of his master Socrates, 'whose loss,' he says, 'the good even now continue to mourn,' with its appendix, the *Apology of Socrates*; and part of books III—VII of the *Hellenica*. We must ascribe to a later time the *Cyropaedeia* or *Education of Cyrus the Great*, a political romance in eight books, 'not historically accurate nor a true picture of Persian thought and manners, but rather an encomium on Socratic principles and Spartan practice, in which Cyrus himself, drawn with some touches from

the young Cyrus whom Xenophon had known, is half a Socrates and half an Agesilaus[1].' Two Socratic dialogues by Xenophon are extant, the *Oeconomicus* and the *Symposium*; also another dialogue called *Hiero* and a treatise on the *Spartan Constitution*. The *Panegyric on Agesilaus*, ascribed to Xenophon, is probably a rhetorical exercise of later date. Three essays on horses and horsemanship are assigned to the time of his residence at Scillus:—(1) the *Cavalry Officer's Manual*, (2) *on Horsemanship*, in which he specially inculcates the duty of kindness to horses, (3) *on Hunting*, the work of a keen sportsman and lover of dogs, treating chiefly of hare-hunting. The hare, in the eyes of Xenophon, is a 'charming creature to hunt.'

In 371 B.C. after the battle of Leuctra, by which the power of Sparta was finally broken, the Eleians expelled Xenophon from Scillus. He then settled at Corinth. When Sparta became the ally of Athens against Thebes, his sentence of banishment was revoked on the motion of the same Eubulus who had proposed it. Xenophon's two sons,—the *Dioscuri* (or Great Twin Brethren) as they were called,—who had been educated at Sparta under the oversight of Agesilaus, fought on the Spartan side against Epameinondas at Mantineia, 362 B.C. The elder son, Gryllus, fell fighting with great bravery in the cavalry engagement at the gates just before the general battle began. From some passages in the essay *on the Athenian Revenues* it appears probable that towards the end of his life he spent some time at Athens. He died at Corinth. The date of his death is not known; but it cannot have been earlier than 355 B.C.

[1] Jebb, *Primer of Greek Literature*, p. 113.

II. THE MEMORABILIA.

(A) The purpose and character of the work.

'Xenophon was the first to give to the world the sayings of Socrates under the title of *Memoirs* (Ἀπομνημονεύματα), basing his work on notes of his conversations.' This is the statement of Diogenes Laertius, and there seems no reason to doubt it. It is quite reasonable to suppose that Xenophon would have taken notes of the conversations of his beloved master, not only of those at which he was himself present, but also of others reported to him by friends. These notes he would have preserved till his first opportunity for literary work after the death of Socrates, i.e. when he had settled down at his delightful country home at Scillus (see p. xxii). He would have thrown his materials, quite provisionally at first, into some sort of literary form (combining with the conversations some biographical details), and now and again he would have taken up the work to retouch it; but evidently it never underwent anything like a final revision. We find in the *Memorabilia* many instances of undue repetition, abruptness, and inferior literary workmanship in the dovetailing together of the various conversations. Some of the alleged faults of the book may doubtless be due to its avowedly informal character; but this will not explain everything. If we are prepared to believe that the work was never finally revised by its author, there is no need to resort to the drastic methods of the Higher Criticism, which 'has laid the unhappy *Memorabilia* on the torture bed of Procrustes, until, through the tender mercies of Krohn and Lincke, a bare torso of seven or even fewer chapters has been left as representing this particular *original source* for Socrates[1].' A supposed posthumous editor—Xenophon's 'grandson executor' —looms very large in the recent criticism of the *Memorabilia*.

[1] H. G. Dakyns on the *Socrates of Xenophon* in the *Classical Review*, vol. vii., p. 259.

Of the witnesses of Socratic talk 'the best known to us,' says Grote, 'are Xenophon and Plato, though there existed in antiquity various dialogues composed, and memoranda put together, by other hearers of Socrates, respecting his conversations and teaching, which are all now lost; e.g. Simon the leather-cutter took memoranda of conversations held by Socrates in his shop, and published several dialogues purporting to be such[1].' Xenophon may certainly be regarded as our best witness for the character and teaching of Socrates. Plato, essentially a poet,—a creator, touches the personality of the Master with a magician's wand and employs him as a spokesman for his own highly-developed philosophy[2]. 'How this young man libels me!' Socrates is said to have exclaimed on hearing Plato read one of his dialogues. Xenophon, on the other hand, eminently simple-minded and unimaginative, and moreover hampered by no philosophic system of his own, may well be supposed to give us genuine examples of Socratic talk. It has been thought by some that the *Memorabilia* is a collection of *Imaginary Conversations*, generalised from many real discourses at which Xenophon had been present. But it may well be questioned whether Xenophon possessed this particular literary gift. In the *Memorabilia* he would appear to be a Boswell rather than a Landor.

On another side it has been urged that many sayings here recorded are too naive and commonplace, and altogether unworthy of the genius of Socrates. To this we may answer that we find similar trivialities ascribed to Socrates even in the dialogues to Plato. As Professor Sidgwick has pointed out, 'in the eyes of Socrates any rational and useful human labour had an interest and value which contrasts strikingly with the contempt commonly felt by cultivated Greeks for base mechanic toil. Xenophon has recorded at length a dialogue with a corslet-maker, in which Socrates gradually draws out the

[1] Chapter lxviii.

[2] 'It would seem that Plato in his idealised portrait gives his hero credit not only for a deeper philosophical insight, but also for a greater urbanity than facts warrant'—H. Jackson, *Socrates*, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. xxii., p. 233.

rationale of corslet-making; and we find out that his talk was ridiculed for its continual reference to the analogies of vulgar trades,—for his perpetual harping on shoemakers and carpenters and braziers and herdsmen. The truth was that—as Plato makes him say in his defence before his judges—the common artisans differed from professional politicians and professors in knowing their business. In the great work of transforming human life into a completely reasoned adaptation of means to definitely known ends, the vulgar arts had led the way and were far in advance; they had learnt a great part of their lesson, while the *royal art* of life and government was still struggling with the rudiments[1].' If this is grasped by readers of the *Memorabilia*, the presence of many seeming trivialities—especially in the later chapters of the Second Book—will be adequately explained.

The *Memorabilia* begins as an apology, but soon passes insensibly into panegyric. *I have often marvelled*, Xenophon says at the outset, *by what arguments the accusers of Socrates could have persuaded the Athenians that he was deserving of death at the hands of the state.* The accusers (*οἱ γραψάμενοι*) here mentioned are evidently the three official accusers at the trial[2]. Later on in the book Xenophon several times mentions *ὁ κατήγορος*, which, we should have supposed, would denote one of the prosecutors (presumably Anytus, the most powerful of the trio) or perhaps 'the prosecution' generally. Cobet, however, has put forward a theory[3], which has met with wide acceptance,

[1] *History of Ethics*, p. 30.

[2] 'In 399 B.C. suddenly, and as it would seem without any previous warnings, Socrates was put on trial for his life. His accuser was Meletus, an insignificant young man, who seems to have been incensed against Socrates by his attacks upon the poets. With him were associated as *συνήγοροι* Anytus and Lycon. Of the last we know nothing except that he was the mouthpiece of the professional rhetoricians. Anytus on the other hand was one of the most powerful and popular Athenians of the day. By profession a tanner, he was a strong supporter of the Athenian democracy. Though nominally only *συνήγορος*, he was in reality the most dangerous of Socrates' accusers; it was mainly due to his influence and exertions that Socrates was condemned'—J. ADAM, Introduction to *Apology*, p. xxvi.

[3] *Novae Lectiones*, p. 622 sqq.

viz. that ὁ κατήγορος is the sophist[1] Polycrates, who wrote a Κατηγορία Σωκράτους, a fictitious harangue put into the mouth of Anytus. This production, which is no longer extant, is mentioned by Quintilian as if it were the actual speech delivered in court. But Isocrates[2] makes it clear that it was only a show scholastic harangue; many such were composed by the rhetoricians of that day. Internal evidence proves that it was written not earlier than 392 B.C., i.e. seven years after the trial of Socrates. Cobet argues with much plausibility that Xenophon wrote the *Memorabilia* as a direct reply to the Κατηγορία of Polycrates.

Hartman has made in his *Analecta Xenophontea* (p. 105 sqq.) what seems a convincing answer to Cobet's contention. An

[1] Readers of the *Memorabilia* must not regard *Sophist* as a necessarily invidious term. The following passage from Prof. Sidgwick's *History of Ethics* (pp. 21, 22) supplies some valuable information on the Sophistic movement: 'This emergence of an art of life with professional teachers cannot thoroughly be understood, unless it is viewed as a crowning result of a general tendency at this stage of Greek civilisation to substitute technical skill for traditional procedure and empirically developed faculty. In the age of the Sophists we find, wherever we turn, the same eager pursuit of knowledge and the same eager effort to apply it directly to practice....The art of music (μουσική) had recently received a great technical development; and a still greater change had been effected in that training of the body (γυμναστική) which, along with music, constituted ordinary Greek education. If bodily vigour was no longer to be left to nature and spontaneous exercise, but was to be obtained by the systematic observance of rules laid down by professional trainers, it was natural to think that the same might be the case with excellences of the soul. The art of Rhetoric again is a specially striking example of the general tendency; and it is important to observe that the profession of Rhetorician was commonly blended with that of Sophist. Indeed throughout the age of Socrates Sophists and Philosophers were commonly regarded, by those who refused to recognise their higher claims, as teaching an *art of words*. It is easy to see how this came about; when the demand for an art of conduct made itself felt, it was natural that the Rhetoricians, skilled as they were in handling the accepted notions and principles of practice, should come forward to furnish the supply. Nor is there any reason for regarding them as conscious charlatans for so doing, any more than the professional journalist of our own day, whose position as a political instructor of mankind is commonly earned by a knack of ready writing rather than by any special depth of political wisdom. As Plato's Protagoras says, the Sophists in professing to teach virtue only claimed to do somewhat better than others what all men are continually doing; and similarly we may say that, when tried by the touchstone of Socrates, they only exhibited somewhat more conspicuously than others the deficiencies which the great questioner found everywhere.'

[2] *Busiris*, 4.

eminently practical man like Xenophon would, he holds, heartily despise the unreal and futile declamations of a scholastic rhetorician. Moreover, the informal, good-natured, and life-like character of the *Memorabilia* militates against Cobet's supposition; an artificial and scientifically arranged harangue would naturally provoke a rejoinder of the same character. Again, only a portion of Xenophon's work could possibly be looked upon as an answer to the thesis of Polycrates that Socrates was justly condemned; and Hartman points out that almost the whole of the Fourth Book and important parts of the earlier Books do not in the least bear on this subject. Finally he comes to a very common-sense conclusion:—(i) that Xenophon's primary object was to hand on his master's memory to posterity, (ii) that, being a practical man, he selected for record chiefly those conversations which taught practical virtue, not altogether neglecting good examples of Socrates' dialectic method, (iii) that in such a work he could not altogether disregard the opponents of Socrates, whether they were his accusers in 399 B.C. or other critics, such as Polycrates, whose Κατηγορία was now in the hands of the public.

Xenophon states the indictment against Socrates as follows:—*ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων, Socrates is a wrong-doer* (1) *in not believing in the gods recognised by the state, and introducing new divinities of his own; also* (2) *in corrupting the young* (I. i. 1). Xenophon has no difficulty in rebutting the first count of this indictment; it was in fact based on a misconception. Socrates used to say *τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν, the divine thing gives me a sign*[1]; and he would constantly recommend his associates to do this or to refrain from doing that on the authority of its warnings.

[1] The *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον* of Socrates is discussed at length by Dr Jackson in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. v., pp. 232—247. He summarises his own conclusion thus:—'My theory is then, in brief, as follows: Socrates was subject to hallucinations of the sense of hearing, which, so far from implying any aberration of his reasoning faculties, were the momentary expressions of the results of rapid deliberation, and derived an extraordinary value from the accuracy and delicacy of his highly cultivated tact' (p. 247).

It was no more an innovation than the art of divination (ἡ μαντική). The 'divine sign' was in no sense a 'new divinity'; it was simply a God-given revelation. Further, no one ever saw Socrates do anything impious or irreverent, though he lived ever in the public eye. On the contrary, so full of reverence was he, that he even eschewed all speculations as to the nature of the Universe. His religious character was further manifested in his obedience to the oracle at Delphi, his prayers and sacrifices, and his firm belief in divine omniscience.

The second count—the really grave element in the indictment—was supported by four distinct allegations:—

(i) That Socrates incited his associates to despise the established institutions of Athens, particularly election by lot. To this charge Xenophon replies that, though Socrates thought it his duty to criticise some Athenian institutions, he was really prepared to yield a ready obedience to all.

(ii) That the teaching of Socrates was responsible for the outrageous misdeeds of Critias and Alcibiades. The gist of Xenophon's answer is that, so long as they associated with Socrates, they continued to be sober-minded under the fascination of his teaching and example; but when parted from their master they were puffed up by wealth and power, and, demoralised by many tempters, they became lawless and overbearing.

(iii) That he taught the young to disobey their parents and to prefer his own authority; that he set them against their kinsfolk and friends. Xenophon replies that Socrates simply intended to teach that folly, even when displayed by a parent or a friend, is undeserving of respect.

(iv) That he used to make questionable citations from Homer and Hesiod to the detriment of morality and democratic institutions. To this flimsy charge Xenophon answers that the quotation of a few lines of poetry ought not to be set against clear evidence of exemplary patriotism; further that

the prosecution might fairly be suspected of misrepresenting Socrates' interpretation of the passages in question[1].

Even in the First Book Xenophon has already passed from apology to panegyric, when he sums up in favour of Socrates as *a friend of the people and a philanthropist* (δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος), shedding lustre on the state, and pouring out his treasures on all who cared to receive them (I. ii. 60, 61); and he urges that both counts of the indictment are absurd in the case of one who was (1) pre-eminently devoted to the service of the gods, and (2) conspicuous for the zeal with which he strove to curb the evil desires of his associates and to foster in them a passion for the most fair and queenly virtue (I. ii. 64). In the later books Xenophon dwells almost exclusively on the edifying and helpful character of Socrates' conversation and example,—a theme evidently much more to his taste than the arraying of arguments to meet specific accusations.

Socrates was, as we have seen, δημοτικός, *a friend of the people.* It is important to realise his missionary attitude towards political life. Xenophon tells us (I. vi. 15) that the sophist Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected to make others into politicians when he did not take part in politics himself. Socrates answered: *I will also ask you a question, Antiphon,—Which would be the more statesmanlike course for me, to engage in politics single-handed or to endeavour to qualify as many others as possible for political life?* Though not a politician, Socrates entertained very high views of the importance of the state and of men's obligations towards it. 'In the *Memorabilia*,' says Zeller[2], 'we see him using every opportunity of impressing able people for political services, of deterring the

[1] 'To the modern reader Xenophon's reply will probably seem sufficient, and more than sufficient. But it must not be forgotten that Athenians of the old school approached the subject from an entirely different point of view....It was because Socrates was an innovator that we, who see in him the founder of philosophical enquiry, regard him as a great man; it was because Socrates was an innovator that the old-fashioned Athenians, who saw in the new-fangled culture the origin of all their recent distresses and disasters, regarded him as a great criminal'—JACKSON, *Socrates, l.c.*, p. 235.

[2] *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 167.

incompetent, of awakening officials to a sense of their duties, and of giving them help in the administration of their offices. He himself expresses the political character of these efforts most tellingly by including all virtues under the conception of the ruling art (βασιλικὴ τέχνη, II. i. 17).'

By playfulness no less than by earnestness was Socrates helpful to his associates (IV. i. 1). No account of Socrates would be complete without some notice of his 'Irony' (εἰρωνεία), the humorous affectation of characteristics the opposite of his own[1]. This quality is far more prominent in the Platonic than in the Xenophontine Socrates; it would not have appealed strongly to the practical, matter-of-fact mind of our author. Dr W. H. Thompson has a very interesting passage on the subject in his edition of Plato's *Phaedrus* (p. 153):—'That this irony was to some extent calculated is more than probable; it disarmed ridicule by anticipating it, it allayed jealousy and propitiated envy; and it possibly procured him admission into gay circles from which a more solemn teacher would have been excluded. But it had for its basis a real greatness of soul, a hearty and unaffected disregard of popular opinion, a perfect disinterestedness, an entire abnegation of self. He made himself a fool that others by his folly might be made wise; he humbled himself to the level of those among whom his work lay that he might raise some few among them to his own level; he was 'all things to all men, if by any means he might win some.' *Of you who are present*, says Alcibiades in the Symposium of Plato, *there is not one who understands Socrates; but I will unfold to you his true character....His ignorance is boundless—he knows absolutely nothing. Yet all this is counterfeit; it is the grotesque Silenus-mask which conceals the features of the god within; for, if you remove the covering, how shall I describe to you, my friends and*

[1] The Irony of Socrates was doubtless considerably heightened by his personal appearance. 'Outwardly,' says Dr Jackson, 'his presence was mean and his countenance grotesque. Short of stature, thick-necked, and somewhat corpulent, with prominent eyes, with nose upturned and nostrils outspread, with large mouth and coarse lips, he seemed the embodiment of sensuality and even stupidity' (*l.c.*, p. 232).

boon-companions, the excellent virtue you will find within?... He spends his whole life dissembling and playing with the rest of mankind. Whether any of you have seen him in his serious mood, when he has thrown aside the mask and disclosed the divine features beneath it, is more than I know. But I have seen them, and I can tell you that they seemed to me glorious and marvellous, and truly godlike is their beauty.'

(B) The Dialectic of Socrates.

Ὁ Σωκράτης ἦν ἐν παντὶ πράγματι καὶ πάντα τρόπον ὠφέλιμος (IV. i. 1). This thought—the *usefulness* of Socrates—runs through the whole of the *Memorabilia*. Xenophon, as a man of action and also as an apologist for his master, was naturally inclined to represent him as a practical and philanthropic educator[1], and to dwell on his positive teaching, especially that part of it which was designed to correct defects in particular individuals. At the same time he indicates quite clearly, though without special emphasis, that the conversation of Socrates often had the negative character which is so prominent in Plato. Thus, after mentioning (I. iv. 1) a current opinion that Socrates was a very powerful stimulus towards virtue, but was not really able to introduce people to it, Xenophon proceeds to minimise the importance of ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχε, *what he did by way of chastisement or discipline in cross-examining those who thought themselves omniscient*, and prefers to dwell on the edifying nature of his ordinary daily conversation. Socrates does indeed wage war against ἀλαζονεία 'imposture' or 'the conceit of knowledge without the reality'; but his object therein is to induce his associates to devote themselves to virtue (I. vii. 1). The Socratic Elenchus (Cross-examination) was without doubt one

[1] 'Socrates was not a *philosopher*, nor yet a *teacher*, but rather an *educator*, having for his function *to rouse, persuade, and rebuke* (Plato *Apology* 30 E)'—JACKSON, *Socrates*, p. 236.

of the causes of the Master's unpopularity[1]; hence his apologist would not care to make it unduly prominent. Further, as has been pointed out[2], Xenophon, being a mere reporter of Socrates' conversations, gives the results and troubles himself little about the steps which led to them.

A simple example of the Socratic dialectic[3] is given in *Memorabilia* IV. vi. 13–15:—*If a disputant with no definite arguments was discussing some subject, and without any attempt at demonstration alleged that so and so was wiser, a better statesman, more courageous, and so on, than another, Socrates would bring back the discussion to its starting-point, thus:—'You affirm that so and so, whom you applaud, is a better citizen than my friend?'—'Yes, I do'—'Then ought we not first to enquire what is the function of a good citizen?'—'By all means'—'To*

[1] 'In truth, the mission of Socrates, as he himself describes it, could not but prove eminently unpopular and obnoxious. To convince a man that, of matters which he felt confident of knowing, and never thought of questioning or even of studying, he is really profoundly ignorant, insomuch that he cannot reply to a few pertinent queries without involving himself in flagrant contradictions—is an operation highly salutary, often necessary to his future improvement; but an operation of painful mental surgery, in which indeed the temporary pain experienced is one of the conditions almost indispensable to the future beneficial results. It is one which few men can endure without hating the operator at the time; although doubtless such hatred would not only disappear, but be exchanged for esteem and admiration, if they persevered until the full ulterior consequences of the operation developed themselves. But we know (from the express statement of Xenophon) that many, who underwent this first pungent thrust of his dialectics, never came near him again. He disregarded them as laggards; but their voices did not the less count in the hostile chorus. What made that chorus the more formidable was the high quality and position of its leaders. For Socrates himself tells us that the men whom he chiefly and expressly sought out to cross-examine were the men of celebrity as statesmen, rhetors, poets, or artisans,—those at once most sensitive to such humiliation and most capable of making their enmity effective'—GROTE, chap. 68.

[2] Jackson, *l.c.*, p. 236.

[3] 'Though he had neither the right nor the power to force his opinions upon another, he might by a systematic interrogatory lead another to substitute a better opinion for a worse, just as a physician by appropriate remedies may enable his patient to substitute a healthy sense of taste for a morbid one. To administer such an interrogatory and thus to be the physician of souls was, Socrates thought, his divinely appointed duty; and when he described himself as a *talker* or *converser*, he not only negatively distinguished himself from those who, whether philosophers or sophists, called themselves *teachers* (διδάσκαλοι), but also positively indicated the method of question and answer (διαλεκτική) which he consistently preferred and habitually practised'—JACKSON, *l.c.*, p. 236.

begin with finance, we shall, I suppose, give the palm to one who increases the resources of the state?'—'Certainly'—'And, in time of war, to one who makes the state superior to her adversaries?'—'Of course'—'In diplomacy, to one who procures her friends instead of foes?'—'Naturally so'—'In debate, to one who allays party spirit and promotes harmony?'—'I suppose so.' By thus bringing back the argument to its starting-point he would make the truth manifest even to the disputants themselves.

'Socrates,' says Xenophon, 'in his discussions handled every one just as he pleased.' We have an excellent example of this wonderful power in the conversations with Euthydemus given in the Fourth Book, which are too lengthy to reproduce here. Socrates there applies his Elenchus in order to break down a false conceit of knowledge and produce a consciousness of ignorance by a series of ἀπορίαι 'perplexities' (chapters ii., vi.). For fuller illustration of Socrates' method we must go to the dialogues of Plato. With his usual irony, Socrates, professing ignorance, would put a question on some subject. Receiving an off-hand reply given without due reflection, he then put fresh questions on the explanation or definition vouchsafed. To these questions, which would generally refer to special cases of the subject under consideration, the respondent would be compelled to return an answer inconsistent with the first, thus proving that the definition was, to say the least, defective. Then would follow attempts on the part of the respondent to amend his answer; but this only landed him in further inconsistencies. The dialogue would end with a purely negative result, the respondent being compelled to acknowledge that he was unable to answer the original question in a way which would satisfy even himself. Thus Euthydemus (in IV. ii. 39), thoroughly driven into a corner by the remorseless Elenchus, and compelled to make an utterly absurd admission, says: *Clearly it is my own stupidity which forces me to make this statement. I fear it is best for me to hold my tongue; for I shall soon be convicted of knowing absolutely nothing.* So, says Xenophon, he departed utterly despondent, despising himself, and persuaded that he was no better than a slave. In such

conversations Socrates would maintain to the end the position of a learner having no positive theory of his own to champion, sometimes expressing disappointment at not gaining the instruction so rashly promised by the interlocutor.

But Xenophon is always anxious to emphasise the moral purpose of the Elenchus: e.g. III. viii. 1:—*Once Aristippus set himself to cross-examine Socrates, just as he had himself been cross-examined by Socrates before. Socrates, only wishing to benefit his associates, gave answers, not like a debater guarding against perversions of his argument, but as one persuaded of the paramount importance of right action.* It is clear, however, not only from Plato, but also from Xenophon, that the negative vein was by far the more prominent in the discourses of Socrates. Several passages in the *Memorabilia*[1] show that its readers would be inclined to believe that Socrates was always reducing his hearers to a humiliating consciousness of ignorance, and never gave straightforward practical advice. Undoubtedly there was a constructive side to his dialectic; for 'if, having been thus convinced of ignorance, the respondent did not shrink from a new effort, Socrates was ready to aid him by further questions of a suggestive sort. Consistent thinking with a view to consistent action being the end of the enquiry, Socrates would direct the respondent's attention to instances analogous to that in hand, and so lead him to frame for himself a generalisation from which the passions and the prejudices of the moment were, as far as might be, excluded. In this constructive process, though the element of surprise was no longer necessary, the interrogative form was studiously preserved, because it secured at each step the conscious and responsible assent of the learner[2].' Such constructive teaching Euthydemus, after leaving the great Cross-examiner utterly crestfallen, returned to receive:—*Many of those who were reduced to this condition by Socrates refused to approach him any more. These he looked upon as dullards. But Euthydemus understood that, if he was to become worthy of account, he must*

[1] Notably I. iv. 1, quoted above.

[2] Jackson, *l.c.*, p. 236.

associate as much as possible with Socrates. So from that time forward, except for some necessity, he never left him; and in certain points he imitated him in his pursuits. Socrates, seeing him so disposed, disturbed him as little as possible, and in the simplest and plainest way taught him everything which he thought necessary to know and important to practise[1].

Aristotle[2] tells us that there are two things which may rightly be attributed to Socrates :—(1) Inductive arguments (*οἱ ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι*) and (2) General definitions (*τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου*)[3]. The following passage (IV. vi. 15) refers to the Inductive method—i.e. an argument from the known to the unknown through a generalisation expressed or implied :—*Whenever Socrates was conducting a discussion, he went step by step through points of general agreement, considering that here lay real security in argument. And so he was more successful in winning the assent of his hearers than any one I know. He said that Homer assigned to Odysseus the character of a safe orator as being capable of leading discussions through commonly accepted opinions.* Good examples of Socratic Induction (crude perhaps in the eyes of a modern logician) will be found in the third chapter of Book II.

With regard to the important subject of Socratic Definitions Xenophon says (I. i. 16) :—*Socrates was incessantly discussing human affairs, for example: What is piety, what impiety? What is the beautiful, what the ugly? What is the just, what the unjust? What is soberness, what madness? What is courage, what cowardice? What is a state, what a statesman? What is a ruler of men?—and other similar questions. Men who had knowledge of these subjects he considered* καλοὶ κἀγαθοί;

1 *Mem.* IV. ii. 40.

2 *Metaphysics*, M. 4

3 'The famous dialectic, by which he brought ignorance home to his interlocutors, at once exhibited the scientific need of exact definitions of general notions, and suggested that these definitions were to be attained by a careful comparison of particulars. Thus we can understand how, in Aristotle's view, the main service of Socrates to philosophy consisted in *introducing induction and definitions*. This description, however, is both too technical for the naive character of the Socratic dialectic, and does not adequately represent its destructive effects'—SIDGWICK, *History of Ethics*, p. 23.

those ignorant of them he thought might justly be called slaves. Again, he writes (IV. v. 12—vi. 1):—*Thus it is, Socrates said, that men become best, happiest, and most capable of discussion* (διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους)—*the term 'discussion' being derived from people coming together and deliberating in common by 'picking out things according to their kinds*[1]*.' A man must therefore prepare himself as carefully as possible for this pursuit, and give it his earnest attention; for thus men are made best, fittest to command, and most potent in dialectic* (διαλεκτικωτάτους). *And now I will endeavour to describe how Socrates made his associates more potent in dialectic. He held that those who knew what each thing was* (τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων) *would be able to communicate this knowledge to others, adding that it was no matter for surprise that those who had not this knowledge should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also. Hence he was never weary of enquiring with the help of his associates what each thing was* (*i.e. asking for definitions*). *It would be a serious labour to go through all his definitions; I will only give sufficient examples to illustrate his method of enquiry.* The first of these passages illustrates the bearing of Socrates' dialectic on Ethical questions. 'Moral error,' says Dr Jackson[2], 'Socrates conceived, is largely due to the misapplication of general terms, which, once affixed to a person or to an act, possibly in a moment of passion or prejudice, too often stand in the way of sober and careful reflection. By requiring a definition and the reference to it of the act or person in question, he sought to secure in the individual at any rate consistency of thought, and, in so far, consistency of action. Accordingly he spent his life in seeking and helping others to seek the definition of the various words by which the moral quality of actions is described, valuing the results thus obtained, not as contributions to knowledge, but as means to right action in the multifarious relations of life.'

[1] Socrates' explanation of διαλέγεσθαι by διαλέγειν κατὰ γένη cannot be regarded as serious; it is a characteristic piece of humour.

[2] *l.c.*, p. 237.

(C) The Ethics of Socrates.

As we have seen, Socrates brought his dialectic—his method of question and answer—to bear on 'human affairs.' This is abundantly illustrated in the *Memorabilia*, where 'we encounter a motley array of materials,—investigations into the essence of virtue, the duties of man, disputes with sophists, advice of the most varied kind given to friends and acquaintances, conversations with generals as to the responsibilities of their office, with artificers and tradesmen as to their arts. Nothing is too small to call for a thorough and methodical examination. Socrates looked upon the life and pursuits of man as the real object of his enquiries and other things only in as far as they affected the conditions and problems of human life. Hence his philosophy, which in point of scientific form was a criticism of what *is* (διαλεκτική), became in its actual application a science of human actions (ἠθική)[1].'

The fundamental ethical doctrine of Socrates is thus stated by Diogenes Laertius:—ἓν μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι—τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ ἓν μόνον κακόν—τὴν ἀμαθίαν (ii. 31). It is important to observe that the word φρόνησις 'practical wisdom'—the only knowledge which Socrates recognised—should strictly have been substituted for ἐπιστήμη 'knowledge.' Thus Aristotle speaks of 'the Socratic doctrine οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως[2].' 'Knowledge' in the strict sense of the word Socrates held to be unattainable; the pre-eminent wisdom which the Delphic oracle attributed to him he held to lie in a unique consciousness of ignorance. 'Himself blessed with a will so powerful that it moved almost without friction, he fell into the error of ignoring its operations, and was thus led to regard knowledge as the sole condition of well-doing. Where there is knowledge—that is to say practical wisdom (φρόνησις), right action, he conceived,

[1] Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 133.

[2] *Eth. Eudem.* vii. 13.

follows of itself; for no one knowingly prefers what is evil; and if there are cases in which men seem to act against knowledge, the inference to be drawn is, not that knowledge and wrong-doing are compatible, but that in the cases in question the supposed knowledge was after all ignorance. Virtue then is knowledge, knowledge at once of end and of means irresistibly realising itself in act. Whence it follows that the several virtues which are commonly distinguished are essentially one. *Piety*, *justice*, *courage*, and *temperance* are the names which *wisdom* bears in different spheres of action. To be pious is to know what is due to the gods; to be just is to know what is due to men; to be courageous is to know what is to be feared and what is not; to be temperate is to know how to use what is good and avoid what is evil[1].' This will explain Xenophon's statement that Socrates drew no distinction between *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* (III. ix. 4).

For the proper understanding of Socrates' ethical views it is essential to notice that 'if the necessity for firmness of purpose, as well as fulness of insight, was not adequately recognised in the Socratic doctrine, the former quality was all the more conspicuously manifested in his life[2].' Personal firmness was necessary in order to carry out such practical convictions as had been attained[3]. Accordingly, we find that Xenophon is fully alive to the importance of considering Socrates' teaching and character together. *By such words*, he says, *and conduct answering to his words, did Socrates mould the minds of his associates, making them both more pious and more virtuous.* Again, he eulogises him as a model of self-control, as above all others patient of winter's cold and summer's heat and toil of every kind,—by his wonderful example implanting in many a passion for virtue and a hope that by careful management of themselves they too would become beautiful and good (I. ii. 1—3).

[1] Jackson, *l.c.*, p. 237.

[2] Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 27.

[3] Similarly Socrates' disciple Antisthenes, the founder of Cynicism, held *αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος* (*Diogenes Laertius*, vi. 11).

When defending his master against the charge of responsibility for the misdeeds of Alcibiades and Critias, Xenophon urges that Socrates showed himself to his associates as a beautiful and good being, reasoning with them most beautifully about virtue and other human concerns. For, as long as these two were companions of Socrates, they continued sober-minded, not surely from fear of punishment at his hands, but because they were for the time convinced that such conduct was best (I. ii. 18).

Whatever was 'beautiful and good' Socrates held that he must necessarily do. But of 'the good' and 'the beautiful' in the abstract he could give no account; all he would say was that he knew of no good 'which was not good for something in particular'; hence in particular cases he was always ready to prove that the good is also useful and that the beautiful is also profitable[1]. He was what we should now call a utilitarian. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὠφέλιμον is his text,—a text abundantly illustrated in the *Memorabilia*, e.g. IV. vi. 8:—*Come now, Euthydemus, ought we to search for the good in this way?—In what way?—Do you think that the same thing is equally useful to all?—No, I do not—You hold that a thing which is useful to one is sometimes*

[1] 'The knowledge of Good at which Socrates aims is misconceived if we think of it as knowledge of Virtue as distinct from Interest. The force of his argument depends upon an inseparable union of the conceptions of Virtue and Interest in the single notion of Good. This union Socrates did not, of course, invent; he found it, as the Sophists did, in the common thought of his age; but it was the primary moral function of his dialectic to draw out and drive home its practical consequences. The kernel of the positive moral teaching which Xenophon attributes to him is his profound conviction of the reality and essential harmony of the different constituents of human good, as commonly recognised; especially his earnest belief in the eminent value for the individual of those *goods of the soul* which—then as now—were more praised than sought by practical men generally. From this conviction, maintained along with an unrealised ideal of the knowledge that would solve all practical problems, springs the singular combination of qualities exhibited both by the teaching and the personality of this unique man, as they are presented to us with incomparable impressiveness in many dialogues of Plato. We seem to see self-sacrifice in the garb of self-regard; a lofty spirituality blended with a homely common-sense; a fervid enthusiasm for excellence of character, and an unreserved devotion to the task of producing it in himself and others, half-veiled by a cool mocking irony; a subtle, intense scepticism playing round a simple and resolute acceptance of customary duties, like a lambent flame that has somehow lost its corrosive qualities'—SIDGWICK, *l.c.*, pp. 26, 27.

harmful to another?—Certainly—And would you say that there is anything else good except what is useful?—Not I—It follows then that the useful is good to whomsoever it is useful. Again, in IV. vii. 8 we are told that Socrates bade his associates beware of profitless study, especially in physics; he would only join them in any discussion *μέχρι τοῦ ὠφελίμου, up to the limit set by utility.* Falling in with one who had been elected a General, he examined the question, What is the virtue of a good leader? *Stripping off all other qualities*, says Xenophon, *Socrates left only the capacity to make happy those whom he leads* (III. ii. 4). Speaking (in IV. i. 2) of the signs by which Socrates detected 'good natures,' Xenophon mentions especially a passion for those studies which tend to good management of household or state; *such persons, he held, need only be educated to become not only happy themselves and happy managers of their households, but also capable of making others—whether individuals or states—happy also.*

Occasionally, even in Xenophon, a higher note is struck. Especially is this the case in the conversations with the sophist Antiphon. But, as a rule, the treatment of ethical questions in the *Memorabilia* is thoroughly conventional. 'In the dialogues of Xenophon,' says Zeller[1], 'Socrates almost always bases his moral precepts on the motive of utility. We should aim at abstinence, because the abstinent man has a more pleasant life than the licentious; we should inure ourselves to hardships, because the hardy man is more healthy, and because he can more easily avoid dangers, and gain honour and glory; we should be modest, because boasting does harm and brings disgrace. We should be on good terms with our relatives, because it is absurd to use for harm what has been given us for our good; we should try to secure good friends, since a good friend is the most useful possession. We should obey the laws, since obedience is productive of the greatest good to ourselves and to the State; and we should abstain from wrong, since

[1] *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 150.

wrong is always punished in the end. We should live virtuously, because virtue carries off the greatest rewards both from God and man. Unless Xenophon is misleading on essential points, we must allow that Socrates was in earnest in explaining the good as the useful.'

ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ
ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΜΑΤΑ.

Α.

I.

The indictment.

Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τίσι ποτὲ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους 1
ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην ὡς ἄξιος εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφὴ κατ' αὐτοῦ τοιάδε τις ἦν· Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

Answer to the charge of impiety.

The religious character of Socrates. His 'divine sign.'

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει 2
θεοὺς ποίῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ

φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν
κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ
ἀφανὴς ἦν. διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ
δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι
δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.
3 ὁ δ' οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι μαν-
τικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ
συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν
οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ
συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ
τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κἀκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν.
4 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοί φασιν ὑπό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ
τῶν ἀπαντώντων ἀποτρέπεσθαί τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι·
Σωκράτης δ' ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὸ δαι-
μόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων
προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ
δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις
αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.
5 καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν αὐτὸν βούλεσθαι μήτ'
ἠλίθιον μήτ' ἀλαζόνα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς συνοῦσιν; ἐδόκει
δ' ἂν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, εἰ προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ
φαινόμενα καὶ ψευδόμενος ἐφαίνετο. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι
οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν· ταῦτα
δὲ τίς ἂν ἄλλῳ πιστεύσειεν ἢ θεῷ; πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς
6 πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ
τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα
συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν, ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂν
πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο
μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν εἰ ποιητέα.

His advice about divination.

καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς 7
οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἰκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα
καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ 8
μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. οὔτε γάρ τοι τῷ καλῶς ἀγρὸν φυτευσαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις καρπώσεται, οὔτε τῷ καλῶς οἰκίαν οἰκοδομησαμένῳ δῆλον ὅστις ἐνοικήσει, οὔτε τῷ στρατηγικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει στρατηγεῖν, οὔτε τῷ πολιτικῷ δῆλον εἰ συμφέρει τῆς πόλεως προστατεῖν, οὔτε τῷ καλὴν γήμαντι ἵν' εὐφραίνηται δῆλον εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀνιάσεται, οὔτε τῷ δυνατοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κηδεστὰς λαβόντι δῆλον εἰ διὰ
τούτους στερήσεται τῆς πόλεως. τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν 9
τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾶν ἔφη· δαιμονᾶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπερωτῴη πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἡνιοχεῖν ἐπὶ ζεῦγος λαβεῖν κρεῖττον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ἢ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν κρεῖττον λαβεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ἢ ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι, τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιτα ποιεῖν ἡγεῖτο. ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μανθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ σημαίνειν.

His reverence. His avoidance of physical speculations.

10 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ·
πρωΐ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ᾔει
καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν
ἀεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι·
καὶ ἔλεγε μὲν ὡς τὸ πολύ, τοῖς δὲ βουλομένοις ἐξῆν
11 ἀκούειν. οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς
οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος
ἤκουσεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ᾗπερ
τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ κα-
λούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφυ καὶ τίσιν
ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
12 φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε. καὶ
πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες
ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπεια εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ
τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες,
τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα
13 πράττειν. ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν
ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν· ἐπεὶ
καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων
λέγειν οὐ ταὐτὰ δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινο-
14 μένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τῶν τε γὰρ
μαινομένων τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδιέναι, τοὺς δὲ
καὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδ' ἐν
ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν,
τοῖς δὲ οὐδ' ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ
τοὺς μὲν οὔθ' ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν θείων
οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα
καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι· τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων
φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν ἓν μόνον τὸ ὂν

εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντα
κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι, καὶ τοῖς
μὲν πάντα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δὲ οὔτ'
ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι. ἐσκόπει 15
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάδε· ἆρ' ὥσπερ οἱ τἀνθρώπεια
μανθάνοντες ἡγοῦνται τοῦθ' ὅ τι ἂν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτῳ ἂν βούλωνται ποιήσειν, οὕτω
καὶ οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδὰν γνῶσιν
αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσειν, ὅταν βούλωνται,
καὶ ἀνέμους καὶ ὕδατα καὶ ὥρας καὶ ὅτου δ' ἂν ἄλλου
δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ τοιοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ'
ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς γνῶναι μόνον ᾗ τῶν τοιούτων
ἕκαστα γίγνεται;

His preference for ethical discussions.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ταῦτα πραγματευομένων τοιαῦτα 16
ἔλεγεν· αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο
σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές, τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί
δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία,
τί δειλία, τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί
ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν
εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας
ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι.

His uprightness. His simple faith in the gods.

ὅσα μὲν οὖν μὴ φανερὸς ἦν ὅπως ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὐδὲν 17
θαυμαστὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων περὶ αὐτοῦ παραγνῶναι τοὺς
δικαστάς· ὅσα δὲ πάντες ᾔδεσαν, οὐ θαυμαστὸν εἰ μὴ
τούτων ἐνεθυμήθησαν; βουλεύσας γάρ ποτε καὶ τὸν 18
βουλευτικὸν ὅρκον ὀμόσας, ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους
βουλεύσειν, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμή-

σαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς
μιᾷ ψήφῳ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον καὶ Ἐρασινίδην
ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, ὀργι-
ζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν
ἀπειλούντων· ἀλλὰ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο εὐορκεῖν
ἢ χαρίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ φυλάξασθαι
19 τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντας. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν
ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν· οὗτοι
μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι τὰ δ' οὐκ
εἰδέναι· Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι,
τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευό-
μενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
20 ποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων. θαυμάζω οὖν ὅπως
ποτὲ ἐπείσθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Σωκράτην περὶ θεοὺς μὴ
σωφρονεῖν, τὸν ἀσεβὲς μὲν οὐδέν ποτε περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
οὔτ' εἰπόντα οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λέγοντα καὶ
πράττοντα περὶ θεῶν οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων
εἴη τε καὶ νομίζοιτο εὐσεβέστατος.

II.

Answer to the charge of demoralizing the young.

The good example of Socrates.

1 Θαυμαστὸν δὲ φαίνεταί μοι καὶ τὸ πεισθῆναί τινας
ὡς Σωκράτης τοὺς νέους διέφθειρεν, ὃς πρὸς τοῖς εἰρη-
μένοις πρῶτον μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος
ἦν, εἶτα πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος καὶ πάντας πόνους

καρτερικώτατος, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι πεπαιδευμένος οὕτως ὥστε πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα. πῶς οὖν αὐτὸς ὢν τοιοῦτος 2
ἄλλους ἂν ἢ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ παρανόμους ἢ λίχνους ἢ ἀκρατεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακοὺς ἐποίησεν; ἀλλ' ἔπαυσε μὲν τούτων πολλούς, ἀρετῆς ποιήσας ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἐλπίδας παρασχών, ἂν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελῶνται, καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι. καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος 3
εἶναι τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῷ φανερὸς εἶναι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τοὺς συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκεῖνον τοιούτους γενήσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ 4
σώματος αὐτός τε οὐκ ἠμέλει τούς τ' ἀμελοῦντας οὐκ ἐπῄνει. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τὸ δέ, ὅσα ἡδέως ἡ ψυχὴ δέχεται, ταῦτα ἱκανῶς ἐκπονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε· ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν ὑγιεινήν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη. ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν θρυπτικός γε οὐδὲ ἀλαζονικὸς ἦν 5
οὔτ' ἀμπεχόνῃ οὔθ' ὑποδέσει οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ διαίτῃ. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐρασιχρημάτους γε τοὺς συνόντας ἐποίει. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔπαυε, τοὺς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐκ ἐπράττετο χρήματα. τούτου δ' ἀπεχόμενος 6
ἐνόμιζεν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ λαμβάνοντας τῆς ὁμιλίας μισθὸν ἀνδραποδιστὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι παρ' ὧν ἂν λάβοιεν τὸν μισθόν. ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἴ τις ἀρετὴν ἐπαγ- 7
γελλόμενος ἀργύριον πράττοιτο καὶ μὴ νομίζοι τὸ μέγιστον κέρδος ἕξειν φίλον ἀγαθὸν κτησάμενος, ἀλλὰ φοβοῖτο μὴ ὁ γενόμενος καλὸς κἀγαθὸς τῷ τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν ἕξοι. Σωκράτης 8
δὲ ἐπηγγείλατο μὲν οὐδενὶ πώποτε τοιοῦτον οὐδέν, ἐπίστευε δὲ τῶν συνόντων ἑαυτῷ τοὺς ἀποδεξαμένους

ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἐδοκίμαζεν εἰς τὸν πάντα βίον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείροι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν.

He did not teach contempt for the institutions of Athens.

9 ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν
καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας λέγων ὡς μῶρον εἴη
τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθιστάναι,
κυβερνήτῃ δὲ μηδένα θέλειν χρῆσθαι κυαμευτῷ μηδὲ
τέκτονι μηδ᾽ αὐλητῇ μηδ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ἃ πολλῷ
ἐλάττονας βλάβας ἁμαρτανόμενα ποιεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν
πόλιν ἁμαρτανομένων· τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαι-
ρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώσης
10 πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἶμαι τοὺς
φρόνησιν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ νομίζοντας ἱκανοὺς ἔσεσθαι τὰ
συμφέροντα διδάσκειν τοὺς πολίτας ἥκιστα γίγνεσθαι
βιαίους, εἰδότας ὅτι τῇ μὲν βίᾳ πρόσεισιν ἔχθραι καὶ
κίνδυνοι, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πείθειν ἀκινδύνως τε καὶ μετὰ
φιλίας ταὐτὰ γίγνεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ βιασθέντες ὡς
ἀφαιρεθέντες μισοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες ὡς κεχαρισμένοι
φιλοῦσιν. οὔκουν τῶν φρόνησιν ἀσκούντων τὸ βία-
ζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ γνώμης ἐχόντων τὰ
11 τοιαῦτα πράττειν ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ συμμάχων ὁ
μὲν βιάζεσθαι τολμῶν δέοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ὀλίγων, ὁ δὲ
πείθειν δυνάμενος οὐδενός· καὶ γὰρ μόνος ἡγοῖτ᾽ ἂν
δύνασθαι πείθειν. καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις
ἥκιστα συμβαίνει· τίς γὰρ ἀποκτεῖναί τινα βούλοιτ᾽
ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι πειθομένῳ χρῆσθαι;

Was he responsible for the misdeeds of Critias and Alcibiades?

ἀλλ᾽ ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος· Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενο- 12
μένω Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν
πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρ-
χίᾳ πάντων πλεονεκτίστατός τε καὶ βιαιότατος ἐγένετο,
Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων
ἀκρατέστατός τε καὶ ὑβριστότατος. ἐγὼ δ᾽, εἰ μέν τι
κακὸν ἐκείνω τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην, οὐκ ἀπολογήσο- 13
μαι· τὴν δὲ πρὸς Σωκράτην συνουσίαν αὐτοῖν ὡς
ἐγένετο διηγήσομαι. ἐγενέσθην μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὼ ἄνδρε 14
τούτω φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω πάντων Ἀθηναίων, βουλο-
μένω τε πάντα δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν πράττεσθαι καὶ πάντων
ὀνομαστοτάτω γενέσθαι. ᾔδεσαν δὲ Σωκράτην ἀπ᾽ ἐλα-
χίστων μὲν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα, τῶν ἡδονῶν
δὲ πασῶν ἐγκρατέστατον ὄντα, τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις
αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως βούλοιτο.
ταῦτα δὲ ὁρῶντε καὶ ὄντε οἵω προειρήσθον, πότερόν τις 15
αὐτὼ φῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμήσαντε καὶ τῆς
σωφροσύνης, ἣν ἐκεῖνος εἶχεν, ὀρέξασθαι τῆς ὁμιλίας
αὐτοῦ, ἢ νομίσαντε εἰ ὁμιλησαίτην ἐκείνῳ γενέσθαι ἂν
ἱκανωτάτω λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ 16
ἡγοῦμαι, θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτοῖν ἢ ζῆν ὅλον τὸν βίον
ὥσπερ ζῶντα Σωκράτην ἑώρων ἢ τεθνάναι, ἑλέσθαι ἂν
μᾶλλον αὐτὼ τεθνάναι. δήλω δ᾽ ἐγενέσθην ἐξ ὧν
ἐπραξάτην· ὡς γὰρ τάχιστα κρείττονε τῶν συγγιγνο-
μένων ἡγησάσθην εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἀποπηδήσαντε Σωκράτους
ἐπραττέτην τὰ πολιτικὰ ὧνπερ ἕνεκα Σωκράτους ὠρεχ-
θήτην. ἴσως οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα ὅτι ἐχρῆν 17
τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς

συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω· πάντας δὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς δεικνύντας τε τοῖς μανθάνουσιν ᾗπερ αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν
18 *ἃ διδάσκουσι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας. οἶδα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δεικνύντα τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἑαυτὸν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα καὶ διαλεγόμενον κάλλιστα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρωπείων. οἶδα δὲ κἀκείνω σωφρονοῦντε, ἔστε Σωκράτει συνήστην, οὐ φοβουμένω μὴ ζημιοῖντο ἢ παίοιντο ὑπὸ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ' οἰομένω τότε κράτιστον εἶναι τοῦτο πράττειν.*

Can the just become unjust, or the sober intemperate?

19 *ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σώφρων ὑβριστής, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν μάθησίς ἐστιν ὁ μαθὼν ἀνεπιστήμων ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω· ὁρῶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔργα τοὺς μὴ τὰ σώματα ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους ποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τοὺς μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους· οὔτε γὰρ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν οὔτε ὧν δεῖ ἀπέχεσθαι δύνανται.*
20 *διὸ καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς οἱ πατέρες, κἂν ὦσι σώφρονες, ὅμως ἀπὸ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴργουσιν, ὡς τὴν μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν ὁμιλίαν ἄσκησιν οὖσαν τῆς ἀρετῆς, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν κατάλυσιν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅ τε λέγων·*

Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσι
συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον

καὶ ὁ λέγων·

Αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακὸς ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός.

κἀγὼ δὲ μαρτυρῶ τούτοις· ὁρῶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τῶν ἐν 21
μέτρῳ πεποιημένων ἐπῶν τοὺς μὴ μελετῶντας ἐπιλανθανομένους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διδασκαλικῶν λόγων τοῖς ἀμελοῦσι λήθην ἐγγιγνομένην. ὅταν δὲ τῶν νουθετικῶν λόγων ἐπιλάθηταί τις, ἐπιλέλησται καὶ ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ πάσχουσα τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπεθύμει· τούτων δ' ἐπιλαθόμενον οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπιλαθέσθαι. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς εἰς φιλοποσίαν προαχ- 22
θέντας καὶ τοὺς εἰς ἔρωτας ἐγκυλισθέντας ἧττον δυναμένους τῶν τε δεόντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν μὴ δεόντων ἀπέχεσθαι. πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμενοι φείδεσθαι, πρὶν ἐρᾶν, ἐρασθέντες οὐκέτι δύνανται· καὶ τὰ χρήματα καταναλώσαντες, ὧν πρόσθεν ἀπείχοντο κερδῶν, αἰσχρὰ νομίζοντες εἶναι, τούτων οὐκ ἀπέχονται. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται σωφρονήσαντα 23
πρόσθεν αὖθις μὴ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δίκαια δυνηθέντα πράττειν αὖθις ἀδυνατεῖν; πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι, οὐκ ἥκιστα δὲ σωφροσύνη. ἐν τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ σώματι συμπεφυτευμέναι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἡδοναὶ πείθουσιν αὐτὴν μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην ἑαυταῖς τε καὶ τῷ σώματι χαρίζεσθαι.

Characters of Critias and Alcibiades. Were they due to the influence of Socrates?

καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκρά- 24
τει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαγέντε, Κριτίας μὲν φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις, Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, διὰ δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐν

τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δυνατῶν
κολακεύειν ἀνθρώπων διαθρυπτόμενος, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ
δήμου τιμώμενος καὶ ῥᾳδίως πρωτεύων, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν
γυμνικῶν ἀγώνων ἀθληταὶ ῥᾳδίως πρωτεύοντες ἀμε-
λοῦσι τῆς ἀσκήσεως, οὕτω κἀκεῖνος ἠμέλησεν αὑτοῦ.
25 τοιούτων δὲ συμβάντων αὐτοῖν, καὶ ὠγκωμένω μὲν ἐπὶ
γένει, ἐπηρμένω δ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ, πεφυσημένω δ' ἐπὶ
δυνάμει, διατεθρυμμένω δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων,
ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις διεφθαρμένω καὶ πολὺν χρόνον
ἀπὸ Σωκράτους γεγονότε, τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ ὑπερηφάνω
26 ἐγενέσθην; εἶτα, εἰ μέν τι ἐπλημμελησάτην, τούτου
Σωκράτην ὁ κατήγορος αἰτιᾶται; ὅτι δὲ νέω ὄντε αὐτώ,
ἡνίκα καὶ ἀγνωμονεστάτω καὶ ἀκρατεστάτω εἰκὸς εἶναι,
Σωκράτης παρέσχε σώφρονε, οὐδενὸς ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ
27 τῷ κατηγόρῳ ἄξιος εἶναι; οὐ μὴν τά γε ἄλλα οὕτω
κρίνεται. τίς μὲν γὰρ αὐλητής, τίς δὲ κιθαριστής, τίς
δὲ ἄλλος διδάσκαλος ἱκανοὺς ποιήσας τοὺς μαθητάς,
ἐὰν πρὸς ἄλλους ἐλθόντες χείρους φανῶσιν, αἰτίαν
ἔχει τούτου; τίς δὲ πατήρ, ἐὰν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ συνδια-
τρίβων τῳ σωφρονῇ ὕστερον δὲ ἄλλῳ τῳ συγγενόμε-
νος πονηρὸς γένηται, τὸν πρόσθεν αἰτιᾶται, ἀλλ' οὐχ,
ὅσῳ ἂν παρὰ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χείρων φαίνηται, τοσούτῳ
μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖ τὸν πρότερον; ἀλλ' οἵ γε πατέρες αὐ-
τοὶ συνόντες τοῖς υἱέσι, τῶν παίδων πλημμελούντων,
28 οὐκ αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοὶ σωφρονῶσιν. οὕτω δὲ
καὶ Σωκράτην δίκαιον ἦν κρίνειν· εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐποίει
τι φαῦλον, εἰκότως ἂν ἐδόκει πονηρὸς εἶναι· εἰ δ'
αὐτὸς σωφρονῶν διετέλει, πῶς ἂν δικαίως τῆς οὐκ
29 ἐνούσης αὐτῷ κακίας αἰτίαν ἔχοι; ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μηδὲν
αὐτὸς πονηρὸν ποιῶν ἐκείνους φαῦλα πράττοντας ὁρῶν
ἐπῄνει, δικαίως ἂν ἐπιτιμῷτο.

How Critias treated Socrates.

ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐμίσει τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ Κριτίας, ὥστε 31
καὶ ὅτε τῶν τριάκοντα ὢν νομοθέτης μετὰ Χαρικλέους
ἐγένετο, ἀπεμνημόνευσεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε
λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν, ἐπηρεάζων ἐκείνῳ καὶ οὐκ
ἔχων ὅπῃ ἐπιλάβοιτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ καὶ δια-
βάλλων πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε οὔτ'
αὐτὸς τοῦτο πώποτε Σωκράτους ἤκουσα οὔτ' ἄλλου
φάσκοντος ἀκηκοέναι ᾐσθόμην. ἐδήλωσε δέ· ἐπεὶ 32
γὰρ οἱ τριάκοντα πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ οὐ
τοὺς χειρίστους ἀπέκτεινον, πολλοὺς δὲ προετρέποντο
ἀδικεῖν, εἶπέ που ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοίη
εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς
ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολογοίη κακὸς
βουκόλος εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ τις προστάτης
γενόμενος πόλεως καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους τε
καὶ χείρους μὴ αἰσχύνεται μηδ' οἴεται κακὸς εἶναι
προστάτης τῆς πόλεως. ἀπαγγελθέντος δὲ αὐτοῖς 33
τούτου, καλέσαντες ὅ τε Κριτίας καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς τὸν
Σωκράτην τόν τε νόμον ἐδεικνύτην αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς νέοις
ἀπειπέτην μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἐπήρετο
αὐτὼ εἰ ἐξείη πυνθάνεσθαι εἴ τι ἀγνοοῖτο τῶν προαγο-
ρευομένων. τὼ δ' ἐφάτην. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, παρε- 34
σκεύασμαι μὲν πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις· ὅπως δὲ μὴ δι'
ἄγνοιαν λάθω τι παρανομήσας, τοῦτο βούλομαι σαφῶς
μαθεῖν παρ' ὑμῶν, πότερον τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην σὺν
τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζοντες ἢ σὺν τοῖς μὴ
ὀρθῶς ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτῆς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ σὺν τοῖς
ὀρθῶς, δῆλον ὅτι ἀφεκτέον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν· εἰ

δὲ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς, δῆλον ὅτι πειρατέον ὀρθῶς
35 λέγειν. καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς ὀργισθεὶς αὐτῷ, Ἐπειδή, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγνοεῖς, τάδε σοι εὐμαθέστερα ὄντα προαγορεύομεν, τοῖς νέοις ὅλως μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἵνα τοίνυν, ἔφη, μὴ ἀμφίβολον ᾖ ὡς ἄλλο τι ποιῶ ἢ τὰ προηγορευμένα, ὁρίσατέ μοι μέχρι πόσων ἐτῶν δεῖ νομίζειν νέους εἶναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς, Ὅσουπερ, εἶπε, χρόνου βουλεύειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ὡς οὔπω φρονίμοις οὖσι· μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγου
36 νεωτέροις τριάκοντα ἐτῶν. Μηδ' ἐάν τι ὠνῶμαι, ἔφη, ἢν πωλῇ νεώτερος τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, ἔρωμαι ὁπόσου πωλεῖ; Ναὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς· ἀλλά τοι σύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴωθας εἰδὼς πῶς ἔχει τὰ πλεῖστα ἐρωτᾶν· ταῦτα οὖν μὴ ἐρώτα. Μηδ' ἀποκρίνωμαι οὖν, ἔφη, ἄν τίς με ἐρωτᾷ νέος, ἐὰν εἰδῶ, οἷον ποῦ οἰκεῖ Χαρικλῆς ἢ ποῦ ἐστι Κριτίας; Ναὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα,
37 ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς. ὁ δὲ Κριτίας, Ἀλλὰ τῶνδέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατατετρῖφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων τούτοις, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων; Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε· εἰ δὲ μή, φυλάττου ὅπως μὴ καὶ σὺ
38 ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσεις. ἔνθα καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι ἀπαγγελθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ περὶ τῶν βοῶν λόγου ὠργίζοντο τῷ Σωκράτει.

Alcibiades converses with Pericles on Law.

οἵα μὲν οὖν ἡ συνουσία ἐγεγόνει Κριτίᾳ πρὸς
39 Σωκράτην καὶ ὡς εἶχον πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἴρηται. φαίην

*δ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγε μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ
μὴ ἀρέσκοντος.* Κριτίας *δὲ καὶ* Ἀλκιβιάδης *οὐκ ἀρέ-
σκοντος αὐτοῖς* Σωκράτους *ὡμιλησάτην ὃν χρόνον ὡμι-
λείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι
τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι γὰρ* Σωκράτει *συνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις
τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα
πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά. λέγεται γὰρ* Ἀλκιβιάδην, 40
πρὶν εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι, Περικλεῖ *ἐπιτρόπῳ μὲν ὄντι
ἑαυτοῦ προστάτῃ δὲ τῆς πόλεως τοιάδε διαλεχθῆναι
περὶ νόμων·* Εἰπέ *μοι, φάναι, ὦ* Περίκλεις, *ἔχοις ἄν με* 41
διδάξαι τί ἐστι νόμος; Πάντως *δήπου, φάναι τὸν*
Περικλέα. Δίδαξον *δὴ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, φάναι τὸν*
Ἀλκιβιάδην· *ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούων τινῶν ἐπαινουμένων ὅτι
νόμιμοι ἄνδρες εἰσίν, οἶμαι μὴ ἂν δικαίως τούτου
τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐπαίνου τὸν μὴ εἰδότα τί ἐστι νόμος.* Ἀλλ᾽ 42
οὐδέν τι χαλεποῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμεῖς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη,
φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, *βουλόμενος γνῶναι τί ἐστι νόμος·
πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελ-
θὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν
καὶ ἃ μή.* Πότερον *δὲ τἀγαθὰ νομίσαν δεῖν ποιεῖν ἢ
τὰ κακά;* Τἀγαθὰ *νὴ* Δία, *φάναι, ὦ μειράκιον, τὰ δὲ
κακὰ οὔ.* Ἐὰν *δὲ μὴ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ὅπου* 43
*ὀλιγαρχία ἐστίν, ὀλίγοι συνελθόντες γράψωσιν ὅ τι χρὴ
ποιεῖν, ταῦτα τί ἐστι;* Πάντα, *φάναι, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρα-
τοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν γράψῃ,
νόμος καλεῖται.* Καὶ *ἂν τύραννος οὖν κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως
γράψῃ τοῖς πολίταις ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος
ἐστί;* Καὶ *ὅσα τύραννος ἄρχων, φάναι, γράφει, καὶ
ταῦτα νόμος καλεῖται.* Βία *δέ, φάναι, καὶ ἀνομία τί* 44
ἐστιν, ὦ Περίκλεις; *ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὅταν ὁ κρείττων τὸν ἥττω
μὴ πείσας, ἀλλὰ βιασάμενος, ἀναγκάσῃ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν*

αὐτῷ δοκῇ; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα. Καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τύραννος μὴ πείσας τοὺς πολίτας ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν γράφων, ἀνομία ἐστί; Δοκεῖ μοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα· ἀνατίθεμαι γὰρ τὸ ὅσα τύραννος μὴ πείσας
45 *γράφει νόμον εἶναι. Ὅσα δὲ οἱ ὀλίγοι τοὺς πολλοὺς μὴ πείσαντες ἀλλὰ κρατοῦντες γράφουσι, πότερον βίαν φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι; Πάντα μοι δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὅσα τις μὴ πείσας ἀναγκάζει τινὰ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γράφων εἴτε μή, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος εἶναι. Καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος κρατοῦν τῶν τὰ χρήματα ἐχόντων*
46 *γράφει μὴ πεῖσαν, βία μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος ἂν εἴη; Μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ἡμεῖς τηλικοῦτοι ὄντες δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἦμεν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ ἐσοφιζόμεθα οἷάπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς μελετᾶν. τὸν δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδην φάναι· Εἴθε σοι, ὦ Περίκλεις, τότε συνεγενόμην ὅτε δεινότατος ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτα ἦσθα.*

The true Socratic circle.

47 *ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκέτι προσῇσαν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν, εἴ τε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσῆλθον.*
48 *ἀλλὰ Κρίτων τε Σωκράτους ἦν ὁμιλητὴς καὶ Χαιρεφῶν καὶ Χαιρεκράτης καὶ Ἑρμογένης καὶ Σιμμίας καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδας καὶ ἄλλοι, οἳ ἐκείνῳ συνῆσαν, οὐχ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένοιντο, ἀλλ' ἵνα καλοί τε κἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆ-*

σθαι. καὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς οὔτε νεώτερος οὔτε πρεσβύτερος ὢν οὔτ' ἐποίησε κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτ' αἰτίαν ἔσχεν.

Socrates did not teach contempt for parents.

ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γ', ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, τοὺς πατέρας 49
προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε, πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἑλόντι καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, ὡς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἴη δεδέσθαι. Σωκράτης 50
δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀμαθίας ἕνεκα δεσμεύοντα δικαίως ἂν καὶ αὐτὸν ᾤετο δεδέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισταμένων ἃ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐπίσταται· καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα πολλάκις ἐσκόπει τί διαφέρει μανίας ἀμαθία· καὶ τοὺς μὲν μαινομένους ᾤετο συμφερόντως ἂν δεδέσθαι καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένους τὰ δέοντα δικαίως ἂν μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων. ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, 51
ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, οὐ μόνον τοὺς πατέρας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὔτε τοὺς κάμνοντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἰατροί, τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ 52
περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὔνους εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους· ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτὸς εἴη σοφώτατός τε καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ἐγὼ δ' αὐτὸν οἶδα μὲν καὶ περὶ πατέρων 53

τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν τε καὶ περὶ φίλων ταῦτα λέγοντα· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δὴ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ᾗ μόνῃ γίγνεται φρόνησις, τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οἰκειοτάτου ἀνθρώπου τὴν ταχίστην ἐξενεγκόντες ἀφα-
54 νίζουσιν. ἔλεγε δ' ὅτι καὶ ζῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ ὃ πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος ὅ τι ἂν ἀχρεῖον ᾖ καὶ ἀνωφελές, αὐτός τε ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἄλλῳ παρέχει. αὐτοί τέ γε αὑτῶν ὄνυχάς τε καὶ τρίχας καὶ τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς παρέχουσι μετὰ πόνων τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ἀποτέμνειν καὶ ἀποκαίειν καὶ τούτων χάριν οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ μισθὸν τίνειν· καὶ τὸ σίαλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἀποπτύουσιν ὡς δύνανται πορρωτάτω, διότι ὠφελεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐνόν, βλάπτει
55 δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον. ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν οὐ τὸν μὲν πατέρα ζῶντα κατορύττειν διδάσκων, ἑαυτὸν δὲ κατατέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύων ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι, παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐάν τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἐάν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἐάν τε ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῇ, ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται, ὑφ' ὧν ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

Socrates' employment of quotations from the poets.

56 ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικούς, Ἡσιόδου μὲν τὸ

Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος·

τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύει μηδενὸς ἔργου μήτ' ἀδίκου μήτ' αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ

ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει. Σωκράτης δ' ἐπεὶ διομο- 57
λογήσαιτο τὸ μὲν ἐργάτην εἶναι ὠφέλιμόν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀργὸν βλαβερόν τε καὶ κακόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀργεῖν κακόν, τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦντας ἐργάζεσθαί τε ἔφη καὶ ἐργάτας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κυβεύοντας ἤ τι ἄλλο πονηρὸν καὶ ἐπιζήμιον ποιοῦντας ἀργοὺς ἀπεκάλει. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸ

Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.

τὸ δὲ Ὁμήρου ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτὸν λέγειν, 58
ὅτι Ὀδυσσεὺς

Ὅντινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη,
τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς·
δαιμόνι', οὔ σε ἔοικε κακὸν ὣς δειδίσσεσθαι,
ἀλλ' αὐτός τε κάθησο καὶ ἄλλους ἵδρυε λαούς.
ὃν δ' αὖ δήμου τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι,
τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ·
δαιμόνι', ἀτρέμας ἧσο, καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε,
οἳ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι· σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἄναλκις,
οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ.

ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς ἐπαινοίη
παίεσθαι τοὺς δημότας καὶ πένητας. Σωκράτης δ' οὐ 59
ταῦτ' ἔλεγε· καὶ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὕτω γ' ἂν ᾤετο δεῖν παίεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἔφη δεῖν τοὺς μήτε λόγῳ μήτ' ἔργῳ ὠφελίμους ὄντας μήτε στρατεύματι μήτε πόλει μήτε αὐτῷ τῷ δήμῳ, εἴ τι δέοι, βοηθεῖν ἱκανούς, ἄλλως τ' ἐὰν πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ θρασεῖς ὦσι, πάντα τρόπον κωλύεσθαι, κἂν πάνυ πλούσιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες.
ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε τἀναντία τούτων φανερὸς ἦν καὶ 60
δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὤν. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ πολλοὺς

ἐπιθυμητὰς καὶ ἀστοὺς καὶ ξένους λαβὼν οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ· ὧν τινες μικρὰ μέρη παρ᾽ ἐκείνου προῖκα λαβόντες πολλοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος δημοτικοί. τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι
61 χρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἤθελον διαλέγεσθαι. ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κόσμον τῇ πόλει παρεῖχε πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ Λίχας τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὃς ὀνομαστὸς ἐπὶ τούτῳ γέγονε. Λίχας μὲν γὰρ ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ξένους ἐδείπνιζε, Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου τὰ ἑαυτοῦ δαπανῶν τὰ μέγιστα πάντας τοὺς βουλομένους ὠφέλει· βελτίους γὰρ ποιῶν τοὺς συγγιγνομένους ἀπέπεμπεν.

Xenophon sums up in favour of Socrates.

62 ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ Σωκράτης τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐδόκει τιμῆς ἄξιος εἶναι τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ θανάτου. καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δὲ σκοπῶν ἄν τις τοῦθ᾽ εὕροι. κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους, ἐάν τις φανερὸς γένηται κλέπτων ἢ λωποδυτῶν ἢ βαλλαντιοτομῶν ἢ τοιχωρυχῶν ἢ ἀνδραποδιζόμενος ἢ ἱεροσυλῶν, τούτοις θάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ζημία·
63 ὧν ἐκεῖνος πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῖστον ἀπεῖχεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῇ πόλει γε οὔτε πολέμου κακῶς συμβάντος οὔτε στάσεως οὔτε προδοσίας οὔτε ἄλλου κακοῦ οὐδενὸς πώποτε αἴτιος ἐγένετο· οὐδὲ μὴν ἰδίᾳ γε οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστέρησεν οὔτε κακοῖς περιέβαλεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αἰτίαν τῶν εἰρημένων οὐ-
64 δενὸς πώποτ᾽ ἔσχε. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔνοχος εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεούς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐγέγραπτο, φανερὸς ἦν θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα

πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους, ὃ δὴ ὁ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν ᾐτιᾶτο, φανερὸς ἦν τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας τούτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ᾗ πόλεις τε καὶ οἶκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν· ταῦτα δὲ πράττων πῶς οὐ μεγάλης ἄξιος ἦν τιμῆς τῇ πόλει;

III.

The good influence of Socrates.

His religious observances.

Ὡς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν ἐδόκει μοι τοὺς συνόντας τὰ 1
μὲν ἔργῳ δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἷος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος, τούτων δὴ γράψω ὁπόσα ἂν διαμνημονεύσω. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων ᾗπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων· ἥ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρῄνει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. καὶ ηὔχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἁπλῶς 2
τἀγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὁποῖα ἀγαθά ἐστι· τοὺς δ᾽ εὐχομένους χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν διάφορον ἐνόμιζεν εὔχεσθαι ἢ εἰ κυβείαν ἢ μάχην ἢ ἄλλο τι

3 *εὔχοιντο τῶν φανερῶς ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο. θυσίας
δὲ θύων μικρὰς ἀπὸ μικρῶν οὐδὲν ἡγεῖτο μειοῦσθαι τῶν
ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα θυόντων.
οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔφη καλῶς ἔχειν εἰ ταῖς μεγάλαις
θυσίαις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς μικραῖς ἔχαιρον· πολλάκις γὰρ
ἂν αὐτοῖς τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παρὰ
τῶν χρηστῶν εἶναι κεχαρισμένα· οὔτ' ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, εἰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον
ἦν κεχαρισμένα τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν·
ἀλλ' ἐνόμιζε τοὺς θεοὺς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων
τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν. ἐπαινέτης δ' ἦν καὶ τοῦ
ἔπους τούτου·*

Καδδύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἱέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι·

*καὶ πρὸς φίλους δὲ καὶ ξένους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην
δίαιταν καλὴν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι τὴν* ΚΑΔΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ
4 ἔΡΔΕΙΝ. *εἰ δέ τι δόξειεν αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν
θεῶν, ἧττον ἂν ἐπείσθη παρὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα ποιῆσαι
ἢ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἔπειθεν ὁδοῦ λαβεῖν ἡγεμόνα τυφλὸν
καὶ μὴ εἰδότα τὴν ὁδὸν ἀντὶ βλέποντος καὶ εἰδότος·
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ μωρίαν κατηγόρει, οἵτινες παρὰ τὰ
ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν σημαινόμενα ποιοῦσί τι φυλαττόμενοι
τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδοξίαν· αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα
τἀνθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμ-
βουλίαν.*

His self-control.

5 *διαίτῃ δὲ τήν τε ψυχὴν ἐπαίδευσε καὶ τὸ σῶμα ᾗ
χρώμενος ἄν τις, εἰ μή τι δαιμόνιον εἴη, θαρραλέως
καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διάγοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσειε τοσαύτης
δαπάνης. οὕτω γὰρ εὐτελὴς ἦν, ὥστ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις
οὕτως ἂν ὀλίγα ἐργάζοιτο ὥστε μὴ λαμβάνειν τὰ*

Σωκράτει ἀρκοῦντα. σίτῳ μὲν γὰρ τοσούτῳ ἐχρῆτο, ὅσον ἡδέως ἤσθιε· καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ᾔει ὥστε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου ὄψον αὐτῷ εἶναι· ποτὸν δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ ἦν αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ μὴ πίνειν, εἰ μὴ
διψῴη. εἰ δέ ποτε κληθεὶς ἐθελήσειεν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον 6
ἐλθεῖν, ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις ἐργωδέστατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε φυλάξασθαι τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν κόρον ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τοῦτο ῥᾳδίως πάνυ ἐφυλάττετο. τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις τοῦτο ποιεῖν συνεβούλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὰ ἀναπείθοντα μὴ πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν μηδὲ διψῶντας πίνειν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λυμαινόμενα γαστέρας καὶ κεφαλὰς καὶ ψυχὰς ταῦτ'
ἔφη εἶναι· οἴεσθαι δ' ἔφη ἐπισκώπτων καὶ τὴν Κίρκην 7
ὗς ποιεῖν τοιούτοις πολλοῖς δειπνίζουσαν· τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσέα Ἑρμοῦ τε ὑποθημοσύνῃ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐγκρατῆ ὄντα καὶ ἀποσχόμενον τοῦ ὑπὲρ τὸν κόρον τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα οὐ γενέσθαι ὗν. τοιαῦτα μὲν περὶ τούτων ἔπαιζεν ἅμα σπουδάζων.

IV.

Socrates and Aristodemus.

Various arguments to prove the existence of the gods.

Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, οἷς ἔνιοι γράφουσί 1
τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν, σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους

εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι, δοκιμαζόντων εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους
2 ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. λέξω δὲ πρῶτον ἅ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγομένου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν Μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον. καταμαθὼν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς οὔτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, ἔστιν οὕστινας ἀνθρώπους
3 τεθαύμακας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. καὶ ὅς, Λέξον ἡμῖν, ἔφη, τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπῶν ποιήσει Ὅμηρον ἔγωγε μάλιστα τεθαύμακα, ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππίδην, ἐπὶ δὲ τραγῳδίᾳ Σοφοκλέα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ἐπὶ δὲ ζωγραφίᾳ
4 Ζεῦξιν. Πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἴδωλα ἄφρονά τε καὶ ἀκίνητα ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι ἢ οἱ ζῷα ἔμφρονά τε καὶ ἐνεργά; Πολὺ νὴ Δία οἱ ζῷα, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχῃ τινί, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γίγνεται. Τῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων ὅτου ἕνεκά ἐστι καὶ τῶν φανερῶς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότερα τύχης καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; Πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ
5 γιγνόμενα γνώμης εἶναι ἔργα. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς δι' ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν ὥσθ' ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ὦτα δὲ ὥστ' ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά; ὀσμῶν γε μήν, εἰ μὴ ῥῖνες προσετέθησαν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ὄφελος ἦν; τίς δ' ἂν αἴσθησις ἦν γλυκέων καὶ δριμέων καὶ πάντων τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων, εἰ μὴ γλῶττα τούτων γνώμων
6 ἐνειργάσθη; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ τάδε προνοίας ἔργοις ἐοικέναι, τὸ ἐπεὶ ἀσθενὴς μὲν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις βλεφάροις αὐτὴν θυρῶσαι, ἅ, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῇ χρῆσθαί τι δέῃ, ἀναπετάννυται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ συγ-

κλείεται, ὡς δ᾽ ἂν μηδὲ ἄνεμοι βλάπτωσιν, ἠθμὸν βλεφαρίδας ἐμφῦσαι, ὀφρύσι τε ἀπογεισῶσαι τὰ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὡς μηδ᾽ ὁ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἱδρὼς κακουργῇ· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν δέχεσθαι μὲν πάσας φωνὰς ἐμπίμπλασθαι δὲ μήποτε· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρόσθεν ὀδόντας πᾶσι ζῴοις οἵους τέμνειν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους οἵους παρὰ τούτων δεξαμένους λεαίνειν· καὶ στόμα μέν, δι᾽ οὗ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ τὰ ζῷα εἰσπέμπεται, πλησίον ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ῥινῶν καταθεῖναι· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἀποχωροῦντα δυσχερῆ, ἀποστρέψαι τοὺς τούτων ὀχετοὺς ᾗ δυνατὸν προσωτάτω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτα οὕτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα ἀπορεῖς πότερα τύχης ἢ γνώμης ἔργα ἐστίν; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί᾽, ἔφη, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω γε 7
σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζῴου τεχνήματι. Τὸ δὲ ἐμφῦσαι μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφῦσαι δὲ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, τοῖς δὲ τραφεῖσι μέγιστον μὲν πόθον τοῦ ζῆν, μέγιστον δὲ φόβον τοῦ θανάτου; Ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῷα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου. Σὺ δ᾽ ἐν σαυτῷ φρόνιμόν τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν; Ἐρώτα γοῦν 8
καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα δι᾽ ἀφροσύνην τινὰ οὕτως οἴει εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; Μὰ Δί᾽· οὐ γὰρ ὁρῶ τοὺς κυρίους, ὥσπερ τῶν 9
ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων τοὺς δημιουργούς. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σαυτοῦ σύ γε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἣ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν·

ὥστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν ὅτι οὐδὲν γνώμῃ,
ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις.

Additional arguments.

10 καὶ ὁ Ἀριστόδημος, Οὔτοι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον
ἡγοῦμαι ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι. Οὐκοῦν,
ἔφη, ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ὂν ἀξιοῖ σὲ θεραπεύειν,
11 τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτό. Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ
νομίζοιμι θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμε-
λοίην αὐτῶν. Ἔπειτ' οὐκ οἴει φροντίζειν; οἳ πρῶτον
μὲν μόνον τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπον ὀρθὸν ἀνέστησαν· ἡ δὲ
ὀρθότης καὶ προορᾶν πλέον ποιεῖ δύνασθαι καὶ τὰ
ὕπερθεν μᾶλλον θεᾶσθαι καὶ ἧττον κακοπαθεῖν· καὶ
ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ στόμα ἐνεποίησαν· ἔπειτα τοῖς
μὲν ἄλλοις ἑρπετοῖς πόδας ἔδωκαν, οἳ τὸ πορεύεσθαι
μόνον παρέχουσιν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ χεῖρας προσέθεσαν,
αἳ τὰ πλεῖστα οἷς εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων ἐσμὲν ἐξερ-
12 γάζονται. καὶ μὴν γλῶττάν γε πάντων τῶν ζῴων
ἐχόντων, μόνην τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησαν οἵαν
ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχῇ ψαύουσαν τοῦ στόματος ἀρθροῦν τε
τὴν φωνὴν καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἃ βουλόμεθα.
13 οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε τῷ θεῷ τοῦ σώματος ἐπι-
μεληθῆναι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου
ζῴου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ
κάλλιστα συνταξάντων ᾔσθηται ὅτι εἰσί; τί δὲ φῦλον
ἄλλο ἢ ἄνθρωποι θεοὺς θεραπεύουσι; ποία δὲ ψυχὴ
τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμὸν ἢ
δίψος ἢ ψύχη ἢ θάλπη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην
ἀσκῆσαι, ἢ πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, ἢ ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ

ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ ἱκανωτέρα ἐστὶ διαμεμνῆσθαι; οὐ γὰρ 14
πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τἄλλα ζῷα ὥσπερ θεοὶ
ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ
ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γὰρ βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα,
ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην ἐδύνατ' ἂν πράττειν ἃ ἐβούλετο,
οὔθ' ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δ' ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει.
σὺ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκὼς οὐκ
οἴει σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι,
νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν; Ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ 15
σοὶ σὺ φῂς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρὴ
ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. Ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυν-
θανομένοις τι διὰ μαντικῆς φράζωσιν, οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς
φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδ' ὅταν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τέρατα πέμ-
ποντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδ' ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις,
ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται;
οἴει δ' ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι ὡς 16
ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, καὶ
ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατωμένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτ'
ἂν αἰσθέσθαι; οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολυχρονιώτατα καὶ
σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, θεοσε-
βέστατά ἐστι, καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικίαι θεῶν ἐπι-
μελέσταται; ὠγαθέ, ἔφη, κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς 17
ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται.
οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ
πάντα, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ
σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι,
τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα
ὁρᾶν, μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντί-
ζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα
πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ἢν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους 18

θεραπεύων γιγνώσκεις τοὺς ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας καὶ χαριζόμενος τοὺς ἀντιχαριζομένους καὶ συμβουλευόμενος καταμανθάνεις τοὺς φρονίμους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνῃς θεραπεύων, εἴ τί σοι θελήσουσι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώποις συμβουλεύειν, γνώσει τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ
19 ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτούς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων οὐ μόνον τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν, ὁπότε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρῷντο, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπότε ἐν ἐρημίᾳ εἶεν, ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἄν ποτε ὧν πράττοιεν θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν.

V.

Socrates on self-control.

1 Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα εἴ τι προυβίβαζεν εἰς ταύτην λέγων τοιάδε· Ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ πολέμου ἡμῖν γενομένου βουλοίμεθα ἑλέσθαι ἄνδρα, ὑφ' οὗ μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν σῴζοίμεθα, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους χειροίμεθα, ἆρ' ὅντινα αἰσθανοίμεθα ἥττω γαστρὸς ἢ οἴνου ἢ πόνου ἢ ὕπνου, τοῦτον ἂν αἱροίμεθα; καὶ πῶς ἂν οἰηθείημεν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἡμᾶς σῶσαι ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι;
2 εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου γενόμενοι βουλοίμεθά τῳ ἐπιτρέψαι ἢ παῖδας ἄρρενας παιδεῦσαι ἢ θυγατέρας παρθένους διαφυλάξαι ἢ χρήματα διασῶσαι, ἆρ' ἀξιό-

*πιστον εἰς ταῦθ' ἡγησόμεθα τὸν ἀκρατῆ; δούλῳ δ'
ἀκρατεῖ ἐπιτρέψαιμεν ἂν ἢ βοσκήματα ἢ ταμιεῖα ἢ
ἔργων ἐπιστασίαν; διάκονον δὲ καὶ ἀγοραστὴν τοιοῦτον
ἐθελήσαιμεν ἂν προῖκα λαβεῖν; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ* 3
*δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε
φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ὥσπερ οἱ
πλεονέκται τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιρούμενοι χρήματα ἑαυτοὺς
δοκοῦσι πλουτίζειν, οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις
βλαβερός, ἑαυτῷ δ' ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακοῦργος μὲν τῶν
ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακουργότερος, εἴ γε κακουργό-
τατόν ἐστι μὴ μόνον τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθείρειν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐν συνουσίᾳ δὲ* 4
*τίς ἂν ἡσθείη τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃν εἰδείη τῷ ὄψῳ τε καὶ τῷ
οἴνῳ χαίροντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις; ἆρά γε οὐ χρὴ
πάντα ἄνδρα, ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι
κρηπῖδα, ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάσασθαι;
τίς γὰρ ἂν ἄνευ ταύτης ἢ μάθοι τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ μελετήσειεν* 5
*ἀξιολόγως; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων αἰσχρῶς
διατεθείη καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ
νὴ τὴν* Ἥραν *ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνδρὶ εὐκτὸν εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν
δούλου τοιούτου, δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς
ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν· οὕτω
γὰρ ἂν μόνως ὁ τοιοῦτος σωθείη. τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων* 6
*ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτὸν
ἐπεδείκνυεν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν
ἐκράτει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν χρημάτων, νομίζων τὸν
παρὰ τοῦ τυχόντος χρήματα λαμβάνοντα δεσπότην
ἑαυτοῦ καθιστάναι καὶ δουλεύειν δουλείαν οὐδεμιᾶς
ἧττον αἰσχράν.*

VI.

Socrates and Antiphon the sophist.

First conversation.

1 Ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἃ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφι-
στὴν διελέχθη μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε
βουλόμενος τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελέσθαι προσ-
ελθὼν τῷ Σωκράτει παρόντων αὐτῶν ἔλεξε τάδε·
2 Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ᾤμην τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐ-
δαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίγνεσθαι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς
τἀναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελαυκέναι. ζῇς γοῦν
οὕτως ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότῃ διαιτώμενος
μείνειε· σιτία τε σιτεῖ καὶ ποτὰ πίνεις τὰ φαυλότατα
καὶ ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ
θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων
3 διατελεῖς. καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ἃ καὶ
κτωμένους εὐφραίνει καὶ κεκτημένους ἐλευθεριώτερόν
τε καὶ ἥδιον ποιεῖ ζῆν. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τοὺς μαθητὰς μιμητὰς ἑαυτῶν
ἀποδεικνύουσιν, οὕτω καὶ σὺ τοὺς συνόντας διαθήσεις,
4 νόμιζε κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος εἶναι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης
πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε· Δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὑπειληφέναι
με οὕτως ἀνιαρῶς ζῆν, ὥστε πέπεισμαι σὲ μᾶλλον ἀποθα-
νεῖν ἂν ἑλέσθαι ἢ ζῆν ὥσπερ ἐγώ. ἴθι οὖν ἐπισκεψώ-
5 μεθα τί χαλεπὸν ᾔσθησαι τοὐμοῦ βίου. πότερον ὅτι
τοῖς μὲν λαμβάνουσιν ἀργύριον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀπερ-
γάζεσθαι τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ ἂν μισθὸν λαμβάνωσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ
λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι;
ἢ τὴν δίαιτάν μου φαυλίζεις ὡς ἧττον μὲν ὑγιεινὰ

ἐσθίοντος ἐμοῦ ἢ σοῦ, ἧττον δὲ ἰσχὺν παρέχοντα; ἢ ὡς χαλεπώτερα πορίσασθαι τὰ ἐμὰ διαιτήματα τῶν σῶν διὰ τὸ σπανιώτερά τε καὶ πολυτελέστερα εἶναι; ἢ ὡς ἡδίω σοι ἃ σὺ παρασκευάζει ὄντα ἢ ἐμοὶ ἃ ἐγώ; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἥδιστα ἐσθίων ἥκιστα ὄψου δεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἥδιστα πίνων ἥκιστα τοῦ μὴ παρόντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ποτοῦ; τά γε μὴν ἱμάτια οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ μεταβαλλόμενοι 6
ψύχους καὶ θάλπους ἕνεκα μεταβάλλονται, καὶ ὑποδήματα ὑποδοῦνται ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὰ λυποῦντα τοὺς πόδας κωλύωνται πορεύεσθαι· ἤδη οὖν ποτε ᾔσθου ἐμὲ ἢ διὰ ψῦχος μᾶλλόν του ἔνδον μένοντα ἢ διὰ θάλπος μαχόμενόν τῳ περὶ σκιᾶς ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τοὺς πόδας οὐ βαδίζοντα ὅπου ἂν βούλωμαι; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ 7
φύσει ἀσθενέστατοι τῷ σώματι μελετήσαντες τῶν ἰσχυροτάτων ἀμελησάντων κρείττους τε γίγνονται πρὸς ἃ ἂν μελετῶσι καὶ ῥᾷον αὐτὰ φέρουσιν; ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οἴει τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶντι καρτερεῖν πάντα ῥᾷον φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος; τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μηδ' ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ 8
οἴει τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχειν τούτων ἡδίω, ἃ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλπίδας παρέχοντα ὠφελήσειν ἀεί; καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ μέν οἰόμενοι μηδὲν εὖ πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἡγούμενοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ γεωργίαν ἢ ναυκληρίαν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ὡς εὖ πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται. 9
οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; ἐγὼ τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα νομίζων. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ φίλους ἢ πόλιν ὠφελεῖν δέῃ, ποτέρῳ ἡ πλείων σχολὴ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῷ

ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ἢ τῷ ὡς σὺ μακαρίζεις διαιτωμένῳ; στρα-
τεύοιτο δὲ πότερος ἂν ῥᾷον, ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνευ
πολυτελοῦς διαίτης ζῆν ἢ ᾧ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκοίη; ἐκ-
πολιορκηθείη δὲ πότερος ἂν θᾶττον, ὁ τῶν χαλεπωτά-
των εὑρεῖν δεόμενος, ἢ ὁ τοῖς ῥᾴστοις ἐντυγχάνειν
10 ἀρκούντως χρώμενος; ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαι-
μονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ
δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δέεσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ'
ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον
κράτιστον, τὸ δ' ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ
κρατίστου.

Second conversation.

11 πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σω-
κράτει· Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ τοι σὲ δίκαιον μὲν νομίζω,
σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς
τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον
πράττει. καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο
τι ὧν κέκτησαι νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι οὐδενὶ
ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας
12 λαβών. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ᾤου τινὸς
ἀξίαν εἶναι, καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας
ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης ὅτι οὐκ
ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν μηδενός γε
13 ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν·
Ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν
σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρῶς δια-
τίθεσθαι εἶναι. καὶ τὴν σοφίαν τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ
βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις
δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν
φίλον ποιεῖται τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ

πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν. ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτός, 14
ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς· καὶ ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ' ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν. καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι καὶ ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐκλεγόμεθα καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις φίλοι γιγνώμεθα. ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούοντι ἐδόκει αὐτός τε μακάριος εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν ἄγειν.

Third conversation.

καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ἐρομένου αὐτόν, 15
πῶς ἄλλους μὲν ἡγεῖται πολιτικοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς δ' οὐ πράττει τὰ πολιτικά, εἴπερ ἐπίσταται, Ποτέρως δ' ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττοιμι, εἰ μόνος αὐτὰ πράττοιμι ἢ εἰ ἐπιμελοίμην τοῦ ὡς πλείστους ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά;

VII.

Socrates on imposture.

Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὲ εἰ καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων 1
τοὺς συνόντας ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπεν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔλεγεν ὡς οὐκ εἴη καλλίων ὁδὸς ἐπ' εὐδοξίαν ἢ δι' ἧς ἄν τις ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὃ καὶ δοκεῖν βούλοιτο. ὅτι δ' ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν, ὧδ' ἐδίδασκεν· Ἐνθυ- 2

μώμεθα γάρ, ἔφη, εἴ τις μὴ ὢν ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς δοκεῖν βούλοιτο, τί ἂν αὐτῷ ποιητέον εἴη. ἆρ᾽ οὐ τὰ ἔξω τῆς τέχνης μιμητέον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητάς; καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι σκεύη τε καλὰ κέκτηνται καὶ ἀκολούθους πολλοὺς περιάγονται, καὶ τούτῳ ταῦτα ποιητέον· ἔπειτα, ὅτι ἐκείνους πολλοὶ ἐπαινοῦσι, καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐπαινέτας παρασκευαστέον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔργον γε οὐδαμοῦ ληπτέον, ἢ εὐθὺς ἐλεγχθήσεται γελοῖος ὢν καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐλητὴς κακός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών. καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν δαπανῶν, μηδὲν δ᾽ ὠφελούμενος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κακοδοξῶν πῶς οὐκ ἐπιπόνως
3 τε καὶ ἀλυσιτελῶς καὶ καταγελάστως βιώσεται; ὣς δ᾽ αὔτως εἴ τις βούλοιτο στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς μὴ ὢν φαίνεσθαι ἢ κυβερνήτης, ἐννοῶμεν τί ἂν αὐτῷ συμβαίνοι. ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὲν ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα πράττειν μὴ δύναιτο πείθειν, τοῦτ᾽ εἴη λυπηρόν, εἰ δὲ πείσειεν, ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κυβερνᾶν κατασταθεὶς ὁ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ἢ στρατηγεῖν ἀπολέσειεν ἂν οὓς ἥκιστα βούλοιτο καὶ αὐτὸς αἰσχρῶς ἂν καὶ
4 κακῶς ἀπαλλάξειεν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ πλούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν μὴ ὄντα δοκεῖν ἀλυσιτελὲς ἀπέφαινε· προστάττεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔφη μείζω ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν, καὶ μὴ δυναμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν, δοκοῦντας
5 ἱκανοὺς εἶναι, συγγνώμης οὐκ ἂν τυγχάνειν. ἀπατεῶνα δ᾽ ἐκάλει οὐ μικρὸν μὲν οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις ἀργύριον ἢ σκεῦος παρά του πειθοῖ λαβὼν ἀποστεροίη, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ὅστις μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὢν ἐξηπατήκοι πείθων ὡς ἱκανὸς εἴη τῆς πόλεως ἡγεῖσθαι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει καὶ τοῦ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι ἀποτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας τοιάδε διαλεγόμενος.

NOTES.

I.

1. **πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα.** We, as we look back at the history of the time and at the political sensitiveness of the Athenians, cannot share Xenophon's surprise; see Introduction, p. xxx (note 1). The only wonder is that Socrates was allowed to continue his office of 'Cross-examining Missionary' till he was 70 years of age. Amid the first enthusiasm for the Restored Democracy, his enemies took advantage of the recollection that the Reign of Terror—the awful eight months of the tyranny of the Thirty—was mainly due to Critias, a former disciple of Socrates, just as previous troubles might be laid at the door of another pupil, viz. Alcibiades.

Ἀθηναίους, i.e. the 281 members of the jury (out of 501), who voted for the condemnation of Socrates.

οἱ γραψάμενοι. For their names see Introduction, p. xxvi. This use of *γράφεσθαι* 'to indict' is an instance of the causal use of the middle, lit. 'to get written down,' the name of the accused person being written by the Archon or his clerk. Contrast the active *γράφειν* in the sense of 'propose a motion,' i.e. to write it out oneself.

τῇ πόλει, dative of person concerned; Socrates' life being regarded as forfeit *to the State*.

ἡ γραφή, in its narrower sense, denoting the actual words of the indictment. Usually the word denotes a 'public action'; e.g. in Socrates' case the process was a *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας*. This *γραφή* could be directed against (i) breaches of the ceremonial law, (ii) cases of heterodoxy or heresy, as here and in the prosecution of Anaxagoras for attacking the received opinions about the sun, like Galileo.

τοιάδε τις, 'something of this sort.' Xenophon does not pledge himself to the exact words of the indictment. Diogenes Laertius

(ii. 40) gives the following version of it:—*τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν. ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.* The document was posted on the wall of the Portico of the King Archon (*ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως στοά*)—'that ancient vestige of primeval usage, which long preserved at Athens the recollection of the Gate of Judgment, in which the Kings of the East presided over the trial of their subjects, from the Porch of Solomon down to the Sublime Porte at Constantinople and the Tower of Justice in the Alhambra' (A. P. Stanley).

οὓς—νομίζων, 'not counting as gods those recognised by the State.' For this use of *νομίζω* cf. § 3 *μαντικὴν νομίζοντες*. Mr Adam points out that 'it is clear that the religious accusation was introduced only to give a foothold to the graver charges of corrupting the youth; i.e. the religious charge was ancillary to the social and political. At the same time it should be remembered that, owing to the constitution of the ancient state, heterodoxy was equivalent to treason.'

2. θύων—οἴκοι, i.e. on the altar of *Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος*, which stood in the middle of the *αὐλή* or open court-yard of the Greek house. Such an altar was found in 1884, when the foundations of some ancient houses in the Peiraeus were exposed to view.

πολλάκις μὲν—πολλάκις δέ, a trick of style of which Xenophon is very fond; cf. vi. 13.

τὸ δαιμόνιον—σημαίνειν, lit. 'that the divine thing gave him a sign.' Cf. Plato *Republic* 496 C *τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*, *Euthyphro* 3 B *ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι.* Cicero (*de divin.* i. 122) rightly represents *δαιμόνιον* by *divinum quiddam* 'a divine something.' His whole statement is useful:—*divinum quiddam*, *quod δαιμόνιον appellat*, *cui semper ipse paruerit*, *nunquam impellenti*, *saepe revocanti*. See Introduction, p. xi (note 2) and xxviii (note 1).

The following statements of Zeller (*Socrates*, p. 85, sqq.) will be useful to the student:—(i) 'By the *δαιμόνιον* no genius, no separate and distinct person can be understood, but only indefinitely some heavenly voice or divine revelation. The very indefiniteness of the expressions of Plato and Xenophon proves clearly enough that neither Socrates nor his pupils had any very clear notion on the subject.' (ii) 'The *δαιμόνιον* is not the voice of conscience. For conscience refers to the moral value of an action, whereas the heavenly sign of Socrates always bears reference to the consequences of actions. Therein Plato, no less than Xenophon, sees a peculiar kind of prophecy.' (iii) 'The *δαιμόνιον*

has been rightly called *the inner voice of individual tact*, i.e. a general sense of propriety as exemplified in the most varied relations of life in small things as well as in great. This sense Socrates early noticed in himself as unusually strong, and subsequently, by his peculiarly keen and unwearied observation of himself and other men, he developed it to such a pitch of accuracy that it was never, as he believed, at fault.'

ὅθεν δή—εἰσφέρειν. 'This, it seems to me, was really the chief ground for the accusation against him of introducing new divinities.' By *τὸ δαιμόνιον* Socrates meant a divine agency. The prosecution, probably dishonestly, represented it as denoting a divine being. In the Platonic Apology (31 D) Socrates represents this as an intentional caricature of his meaning (*ἐπικωμῳδῶν*); for *δαιμόνια* with him meant *δαιμόνια πράγματα*. Cf. other expressions in the *Apology*:—*τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον*—*τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον*—*ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται*—*ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη.*

3. τῶν ἄλλων, a condensed expression for *ἢ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι εἰσέφερον.*

οἰωνοῖς, omens drawn from the flight or sounds of birds. The word is sometimes used for omens generally.

φήμαις, 'utterances,' omens given by the voice. So Aristophanes (*Birds* 720) says comically, 'A voice (*φήμη*) to you is a bird (i.e. an omen).' A good instance is given by Cicero (*de div.* ii. 84). When Crassus was embarking on his unlucky expedition to Parthia, a man in the harbour was selling figs from Caunus with the cry *Cauneas*. This sounded like *cave ne eas* and was taken to be a bad omen.

συμβόλοις, 'tokens,' i.e. omens drawn from chance meetings or occurrences generally; cf. *τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας* below.

θυσίαις. The omens from sacrifices include (i) the omens drawn from the appearance of the intestines, especially as to their colour and smoothness, (ii) those drawn from the manner in which the victim approached the altar. If the victim came voluntarily to the altar or even bowed its head, this was a good sign. Resistance or an attempt to escape was regarded as unlucky.

μαντευομένοις, not 'consulting oracles,' but 'employing divination (*μαντική*)'; cf. *μαντικὴν νομίζοντες* above and § 6 below.

κἀκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. Some luminous remarks of Mr Riddell (Appendix to Plato's *Apology*, p. 108) form an excellent commentary on this passage:—'It (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) was Socrates' substitute for *μαντική* (divination). This implies that, in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in

many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.'

κἀκεῖνος δέ, 'And he also,'—a favourite collocation of particles in Xenophon; cf. § 15 *καὶ ὅτου δέ*.

4. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν—σημαίνειν, 'But, whereas the generality of men say that they are turned aside or urged on by birds or those they meet, Socrates adapted his language to his belief, saying simply, *The divine thing gives me a sign*.' In Plato the technical expression for the operation of the *δαιμόνιον* is simpler still, viz. *γίγνεσθαι*, e.g. in the passages from the *Euthyphro* and *Apology* quoted above.

ἐγίγνωσκεν. This verb is frequently used in the sense of *think, judge, decide*; cf. i. 17 and ii. 19 *οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω*.

τῶν συνόντων, 'his associates.' Socrates would not admit that he had any pupils; he was not a teacher (Plato, *Apology* 33 A); cf. the frequent phrases *κοινῇ ζητεῖν, κοινῇ σκοπεῖν* and the like, used to denote his procedure. He represents his union with his associates as a sort of Eros, the result of which was to be the production of pure and noble thoughts.

τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν—προσημαίνοντος, 'to do some things and to refrain from doing others, on the ground of the warnings of his divine sign.' Here we have the *δαιμόνιον* represented as recommending a course of action; so also in IV. iii. 12, where Euthydemus says to Socrates:— 'The gods seem to treat you in a more friendly way than the rest of men, if, not waiting to be enquired of by you, they signify beforehand what you must and what you must not do.' But in Plato its revelations always take the form of prohibitions; cf. *Apology* 31 D *ἀποτρέπει—προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε*. And this applies to all the definite instances of its intervention given both by Plato and Xenophon. Zeller (*Socrates*, p. 87) harmonises the two statements thus. The *δαιμόνιον* only indirectly points out what should be done, as virtually approving what it does not forbid. Similarly it indirectly enables Socrates to advise his friends by not hindering him from approving their schemes. Plato is clearly more accurate. Xenophon aimed before all things at proving that Socrates' 'divination' was the same as other divinations, and so defending his master from the charge of religious innovation.

5. μήτ' ἠλίθιον μήτ' ἀλαζόνα. We should say 'neither knave

nor fool.' For Socrates' views on *ἀλαζονεία* 'imposture,' 'quackery' see Chapter vii.

ἐδόκει—ἐφαίνετο, 'He would have appeared to be both knave and fool, if when giving out things as God-given revelations he had been convicted of actual (*καί*) falsehood.' Mark the use of the imperfect indicative in a conditional sentence, denoting repeated acts in past time, here and in the next sentence. Contrast *τίς ἂν—πιστεύσειεν*, which follows.

ταῦτα, accusative of reference,—'in these matters.'

6. ἐποίει—ἐπιτηδείους, 'his dealings with his intimate friends had also the following characteristic.'

τὰ μὲν γὰρ—πραχθῆναι, 'In the sphere of the determined, he advised them to act in the way which he believed would be best.' So Mr Dakyns would interpret, if we are to keep the MSS. reading *ἐνόμιζεν*. There is no need to adopt Weiske's correction *νομίζοιεν*. Socrates would say:—'This course seems best to me under the circumstances; so I advise you to follow it.'

τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, 'things with necessary, certain results'; cf. *Hellenica* I. vii. 36 *τὰ ἐκ θεοῦ ἀναγκαῖα*, Eur. *Hecuba* 584 *θεῶν ἀναγκαῖον τόδε*.

καὶ πράττειν. For the idiomatic *καί* cf. Thuc. ii. 93 *ὡς δὲ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐχώρουν εὐθύς*.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων—ποιητέα, 'But in regard to matters whose issues are uncertain he directed them to employ divination as to whether the thing in question should be done.' Cf. Plato *Euthyphro* 3 E *τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν*. Note, however, that Plato had not such a high opinion of *μαντική* as Socrates had. He classed diviners along with slaves and artisans, and called their art 'the gift of God to human folly.'

ἀποβήσοιτο. Observe that the future optative is only used in *oratio obliqua* or virtual *oratio obliqua*; cf. ii. 7 *ἕξοι*.

7. οἰκήσειν, 'manage'; contrast the use of the word in ii. 64.

προσδεῖσθαι, 'need besides,' i.e. in addition to ordinary human efforts.

τεκτονικὸν—εἶναι, 'For to be skilled in carpentry..., or to be able to criticise such processes, or to be acquainted with arithmetic, domestic economy, or strategy,—all such things he considered were subjects of learning and could be mastered by human intelligence.'

μαθήματα. Cobet and Dindorf read *μαθητά*. But, as Gilbert points out, the change is unnecessary; for *μαθήματα* is a predicate and means the same as *μαθητά*.

8. τὰ δὲ μέγιστα—ἀνθρώποις, 'Yet the most important features in these pursuits he said the gods reserve to themselves, none of which are, he held, manifest to men.' *τῶν ἐν τούτοις* means strictly 'of the matters concerned with these pursuits.'

εἰ—ἀνιάσεται. In English we should insert a negative,—'whether thanks to her he will *not* be pained.'

9. τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν—διακρίνειν, well rendered by Mr Dakyns:—'To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human judgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural folly. Nor was it less extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven on questions which it is given us to decide by dint of learning.'

δαιμονᾶν, 'to be possessed by a *δαίμων*'; cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 566 *δαιμονᾷ δόμος κακοῖς* 'the house is haunted by ills.'

οἷον—κρείττον, 'for instance, if we were to ask whether it is better to engage as coachman one skilled in driving.'

ἐπὶ ζεῦγος λαβεῖν, lit. 'to take for a pair'; contrast *ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν λαβεῖν* 'to take for *one's* ship.'

ἃ ἔξεστιν—εἰδέναι, 'all that it is open to us to know by numbering, measuring, or weighing.'

στήσαντας. The explanation of this use is found in Herod. ii. 65 *ἱστᾶσι σταθμῷ πρὸς ἀργύριον τὰς τρίχας* and Plato *Protagoras* 356 B *στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ* 'having placed in the scales.'

ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα—ἐστί. The *μή* is used because the clause is really conditional.

10. ἀεὶ ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ. See Introduction, pp. xi, xii.

περιπάτους, 'covered promenades,' 'colonnades'; cf. the phrase *οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου* used of Aristotle and his school, because he taught walking about in a *περίπατος* of the Lyceum. Cf. also Aristoph. *Frogs* 942, 953, where *περίπατος* is used for a 'discussion during a walk.'

γυμνάσια. There were three principal gymnasia at Athens, the Lyceum, the Academy, and the Cynosarges. Their management was entrusted to a magistrate called the gymnasiarch. He had the power of removing the sophists, teachers, and loafers who thronged them, whenever he thought they had a bad influence over the young. The conduct of the youths in the gymnasia was under the supervision of ten *σωφρονισταί*, whose duty was to inspire them with the love of *σωφροσύνη*.

πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς, 'when the market-place was filling.' What time is thus denoted? Some say 'the forenoon,' others 'noon.' Prof. Ridgeway (*Cambridge Philological Transactions*, vol. i., p. 301) tries to show that it means 9 A.M.; for Herod. iii. 104 seems to show that

διάλυσις ἀγορᾶς is 11 A.M., and Herod. iv. 181 that *ἀγορὰ πλήθουσα* is 9 A.M. Cf. also ii. 173, where Amasis causes offence by giving himself up to joviality at *ἀγορὰ πλήθουσα*. Note that *πρωΐ* above denotes an earlier time, i.e. *ὄρθρον*.

μέλλοι, optative of frequency; not suboblique, as Kühner thinks.

ἔλεγε—ἀκούειν, 'he talked for the most part, and any who liked might listen.'

11. πράττοντος εἶδεν. The genitive after a verb of seeing is quite unusual. Here it may be due to the attraction of *λέγοντος ἤκουσεν*. Or we may regard *οὐδὲν* as really the direct object of *εἶδεν*.

τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως. 'He was the first who turned his thoughts and discussions distinctly to the subject of ethics. With the philosophers who preceded him the subject of examination had been Nature or the Kosmos as one undistinguishable whole. All set before themselves this vast and undefined problem.... Socrates desired to confine the studies of his hearers to *human* matters as distinguished from *divine*, the latter comprehending astronomy and physics.... Such was the capital innovation made by Socrates in regard to the subject of Athenian study, bringing down philosophy (to use the expression of Cicero) from the heavens to the earth' (Grote).

σοφιστῶν. See Introduction, p. xxvii. As Grote points out, the word is used in a very wide sense. 'Thus Solon and Pythagoras are both called Sophists; Thamyras the skilful bard is called a Sophist; Socrates is so denominated, not merely by Aristophanes, but by Aeschines; Aristotle himself calls Aristippus, and Xenophon calls Antisthenes, both of them disciples of Socrates, by that name; Xenophon, in describing a collection of instructive books, calls them *the writings of the old poets and Sophists*, meaning by the latter word prose-writers generally; Plato is alluded to as a Sophist even by Isocrates.' In our passage the early physicists are referred to, and we may translate the word 'savants' here.

κόσμος, properly 'order,' as often in Homer, first used for the Universe (from its orderly arrangement as opposed to the *indigesta moles* of Chaos) in the philosophy of Pythagoras. Cf. the doctrine of Anaxagoras, *πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα ὁ νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε.*

τίσιν ἀνάγκαις...οὐρανίων, 'by what laws each group of celestial phenomena arises.'

φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'troubling about such matters,'—an un-

usual construction; cf. IV. vii. 6 *μεριμνᾶν τι.* The ordinary construction of *φροντίζω* may be seen in the next section.

12. αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει, 'he examined with regard to them,'—genitive of connexion. Plato is fond of such genitives; thus he writes *σκόπει δὴ τόδε αὐτῶν—τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει;— τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν;* Such uses take us back to an earlier stage of the language when there were no prepositions. Below in § 15 Xenophon inserts the preposition, *ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τόδε.*

τἀνθρώπεια. Socrates held that 'the proper study of mankind is man'; see especially § 16.

ἢ τὰ μὲν—πράττειν, 'or do they consider they are doing their duty by neglecting human concerns and studying things divine?'

13. ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ, the ordinary Greek idiom. We say 'he wondered that....' Cf. § 17 *οὐ θαυμαστὸν εἰ.*

ἐπεὶ καὶ—ἀλλήλους, 'For even those who prided themselves most on their discussion of physical subjects did not, he observed, agree with one another, but differed like so many lunatics.'

14. τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων, answered by *τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως....*

τοῖς δὲ—δοκεῖν, 'while others think that they must not even go abroad amongst men.' They suffer from *agoraphobia*, as a modern doctor would say.

ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα, 'any chance blocks of wood'; cf. v. 6, also III. ix. 10 *οἱ τυχόντες* 'the vulgar,' and Plato's phrase *οὐχ ὁ τυχὼν λόγος* 'no ordinary discourse.'

μεριμνώντων. Cf. Arist. *Clouds* 101 *μεριμνοφροντισταὶ καλοί τε κἀγαθοί.*

ἓν μόνον τὸ ὂν εἶναι, 'that Being is one and indivisible.' This is the doctrine of the Eleatic school, in which the leading names are Xenophanes (*floruit* 530 B.C.), Parmenides (495), Zeno (460), and Melissus (445).

ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος, 'that Being is infinite in number,' referring to the Atomists, Leucippus (445) and Democritus (420). Thus Aristotle says that Leucippus held *εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον* (i.e. *τὸ ὄν*) *οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων.*

ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, 'that all things are in perpetual flux,' the doctrine of Heracleitus (505), who said *πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει.*

οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι, 'that nothing could ever be moved.' This was the doctrine of Zeno the Eleatic mentioned above.

πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, 'that all things come into being and perish,' the Heracleitean doctrine again.

οὔτ' ἂν—ἀπολέσθαι, another statement of the Eleatic doctrine.

15. ἆρ' ὥσπερ—γίγνεται. The meaning is well reproduced in Mr Dakyns' version:—'The student of human learning expects, he said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope that, when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons? Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? Or has no such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content simply to know how such things come into existence?'

καὶ ὅτου δ'. Cf. § 3 *κἀκεῖνος δέ.*

16. περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο. See Introduction, pp. xxxvi and xxxviii.

τί ἀρχὴ—ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, 'what is government and what is a governing character?'

καλοὺς κἀγαθούς. See Introduction, pp. ix and xl.

ἂν—κεκλῆσθαι, a rare use, representing *κεκλημένοι ἂν εἶεν* of *oratio recta.*

17. ὅσα μὲν οὖν—δικαστάς, 'In so far then as his views were not open to the world, it is no wonder that in respect of these the jury formed an incorrect estimate of him.'

ὅσα—μὴ φανερὸς ἦν. See note on § 9.

ἐγιγνώσκεν. For the meaning of the word here, i.e. 'judge,' cf. *παραγνῶναι* in the next line, and i. 4, ii. 19.

παραγνῶναι. For this meaning of *παρά* cf. *παρακούω*, 'I hear wrongly.'

τούτων ἐνεθυμήθησαν, 'paid attention to these,'—a genitive of connexion similar to that noticed in § 12. Cf. Thuc. i. 42 *ὧν ἐνθυμηθέντες.*

18. βουλεύσας, 'having become a member of the *Boule*,' i.e. the Council of 500, whose chief duty was to prepare measures (*προβουλεύματα*) for the consideration of the Ecclesia. Cf. ii. 35.

ἐν ᾧ—βουλεύσειν, 'in which there was a clause to the effect that he would act as a member of that house in accordance with the laws.'

ἐπιστάτης, 'president,' explained by Aristotle *'Αθ. πολ.* 43:—'The Council of 500 is elected by lot, 50 from each tribe. Each tribe holds the office of *πρυτάνεις* in turn, the order being determined by lot. The first four bodies of *πρυτάνεις* serve for 36 days each, the last six for 35 (i.e. each for a tenth of the year). The *πρυτάνεις* for the time being mess together in the *θόλος* or *Rotunda* and receive their maintenance

from the state. They convene the meetings of the Council and the Assembly. They draw up the *agenda* for both bodies. There is a single *ἐπιστάτης* or President of the *πρυτάνεις*, who presides for a night and a day. Whenever the *πρυτάνεις* convene a meeting of the Council or Assembly, he appoints by lot nine *πρόεδροι*, one from each tribe except that which holds the office of *πρυτάνεις* for the time being; and out of these nine he similarly appoints one as President, and hands over the programme of the meeting to them. They take it and see to the preservation of order and put forward the subjects to be considered, decide the results of the votings, and direct the proceedings generally.'

ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, i.e. in the Ecclesia. This was in November 406 B.C. after the battle of Arginusae.

παρὰ τοὺς νόμους. Cf. Plato, *Apology* 32 B, where Socrates says:— 'The only office of state which I ever held was that of Senator. The tribe of Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the Generals who had not taken up the drowning crews after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a body, which was illegal, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytaneis who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you' (Jowett's Translation,—except that I have substituted *drowning crews* for *bodies of the slain*, which is incorrect; for Plato's *τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας*, viewed in the light of Xenophon's narrative in *Hellenica* I. vii., must at least include living men). With reference to a recent attempt to show that the charge against the Generals referred only to the neglect of the *ἀναίρεσις τῶν νεκρῶν*, Holm admits that this particular point constituted the offence against religion.

ἐννέα στρατηγούς. This is incorrect. Eight generals only were put on their trial, and the six who returned to Athens were put to death; the other two declined to come. Conon was not present at the battle, as he was blockaded in the harbour of Mytilene, and Archestratus died at Mytilene. There is no need to bracket the two words, as some do; for several ancient writers have blundered about the number of generals brought to trial.

μιᾷ ψήφῳ. Separate trial was a fundamental maxim of Attic jurisprudence and was not specially guaranteed by the decree of Cannonus, as some think. This is made clear by Thirlwall.

τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον, 'Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and their colleagues.'

οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐπιψηφίσαι, 'refused to put the question.' Cf. *Hellenica* I. vii. 15 *οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις φοβηθέντες ὡμολόγουν πάντες προθήσειν πλὴν Σωκράτους τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου· οὗτος δ' οὐκ ἔφη ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ νόμον*

πάντα ποιήσειν. This really means that Socrates protested at the deliberations of the Prytaneis before the question was put.

ἀπειλούντων, especially Callixenus.

19. ὃν τρόπον. For the adverbial accusative cf. ii. 23 *τὴν ταχίστην*.

20. περὶ θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, 'was not sober-minded in judging of the gods.' '*σωφροσύνη*, Temperance, a peculiarly Greek notion, which may be also rendered Moderation, Modesty, Discretion, Wisdom, without completely exhausting by all these terms the various associations of the word' (Jowett).

II.

1. πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος, e.g. walking barefoot over the snows of Thrace, and wearing the same scanty clothing in winter and summer.

πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος. Cf. the beautiful expression in Plato *Apology* 23 B *ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν*. Elsewhere Xenophon represents Socrates as estimating his whole property, including his cottage, at five minae.

ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα, 'he found that little sufficient.'

2. ἔπαυσε—τούτων, 'checked from such vices.'

3. οὐδεπώποτε—διδάσκαλος, well illustrated by the statement of the Platonic Socrates in the *Apology* 33 A *ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα*. Cf. Zeller, *Socrates*, p. 67, 'Nor would he appear as a public teacher after the manner of the Sophists. He not only took no pay, but he gave no methodical course, not professing to teach, but only to learn in common with others; not to force his convictions upon them, but to examine theirs; not to pass the truth that came to hand like a coin fresh from the mint, but to awaken a taste for truth and virtue.'

τῷ—τοιοῦτος ὤν, 'by showing himself to be of such a character,' i.e. *καλὸς κἀγαθός*. Cf. *τοιούτους* below.

ἐκεῖνον is noteworthy, referring to the same person as *ἑαυτοῦ*. This pronoun is used not unfrequently when *αὐτός* or *ἑαυτοῦ* have preceded; cf. *Hellenica* I. vi. 14 *οὐκ ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι*. 2 Timothy ii. 26 *ἐζωγρημένοι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου θέλημα*. In such cases the writer expresses himself from his own point of view.

4. τὸ μὲν οὖν—ἐδοκίμαζε, 'Excessive eating combined with excessive toil he used to discountenance; but he approved of the adequate working off of all that the heart (i.e. the appetite) readily takes.' Xenophon alludes to the huge meals often taken by athletes during training. Mr Archibald Maclaren in his book on *Training* (p. 83) writes:—'I have known many men and still know some, who believed and believe that the whole art and secret of training is, to use their own phrase, *to stuff as much beef and mutton into them as ever they can and then go on the water to work it into them!*'

ἕξιν, 'condition,' 'state,' a very favourite word of Aristotle.

ψυχῆς, curiously used in a different sense from *ψυχή* in the last sentence. Translate:—'did not hinder the cultivation of the spirit.' For the lower sense of *ψυχή* cf. *Cyropaedeia* VIII. vii. 4 *ἡ ψυχὴ σῖτον οὐ προσίετο.*

5. ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν—διαίτῃ, 'However, he was no dandy or swaggerer in fine cloaks or foot-gear, or in his general way of life.'

οὐ μὴν οὐδέ, a strong collocation of particles,—'no, nor....'

τοὺς δὲ—χρήματα, 'he did not exact fees from those who had a passion for his society.' Note the double accusative after a verb of *asking*.

6. τούτου δ'—ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, 'By abstaining from the taking of fees he held that he was consulting (his own) freedom.'

ἀνδραποδιστὰς—ἀπεκάλει, 'he nicknamed them enslavers of themselves,'—*ἀποκαλεῖν*, as usual, in a bad sense.

παρ' ὧν ἂν λάβοιεν. Notice (1) the omission of the antecedent,—'because they were obliged, as he said, to converse with those who...'; (2) the *ἄν* with optative in *oratio obliqua*. '"Αν is occasionally retained with relatives and temporal particles in sentences of this kind, even when the subjunctive to which they belonged has been changed to the optative: e.g. Xen. *Hellen.* II. iv. 18 *παρήγγειλεν αὐτοῖς μὴ πρότερον ἐπιτίθεσθαι πρὶν ἂν τῶν σφετέρων ἢ πέσοι τις ἢ τρωθείη*' (Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 702).

7. ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἴ τις. For the idiom cf. i. 13.

φοβοῖτο μὴ—μή, for the more usual *μὴ...οὐ*,—'feared that he would not feel the greatest gratitude.'

ἕξοι. For the use of the future optative see note on i. 6 *ἀποβήσοιτο.*

8. τῶν συνόντων, partitive genitive.

εἰ μὴ ἄρα, Latin *nisi forte*. The *ἄρα* gives a tinge of irony.

9. ὁ κατήγορος. Some think this refers to Polycrates. See Introduction, p. xxvii.

ἀπὸ κυάμου καθιστάναι, 'to appoint by the bean,' i.e. by lot; cf. Thuc. viii. 66 *βουλὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου*. '*κυαμεύειν* is synonymous with *κληροῦν*, the *κύαμος* or bean being employed in the process of appointment by lot. The procedure was as follows. Two jars were set up; in one of these was placed a number of white and coloured beans; in the other the small tablets with the names of the candidates. Then a tablet and a bean were drawn simultaneously, and the candidate whose name came out along with the white bean was nominated' (Sandys on Arist. *Ἀθ. πολ.* viii. 1).

ἁμαρτανόμενα, 'if wrongly carried out.'

10. διὰ δὲ τοῦ πείθειν—ταὐτὰ γίγνεται, 'by means of persuasion the same results (i.e. the good of the state) are brought about without peril or discord.'

οἱ μὲν γὰρ—πράττειν ἐστίν. The meaning is well brought out by Mr Dakyns:—'The victim of violence hates with vindictiveness as one from whom something precious has been stolen, while the willing subject of persuasion is ready to kiss the hand which has done him a service. Hence compulsion is not the method of him who makes wisdom his study, but of him who wields power untempered by reflection.'

11. καὶ συμμάχων, emphatic,—'allies also,' i.e. as well as his own violence.

ζῶντι πειθομένῳ χρῆσθαι, 'to avail himself of the obedient service of the living.'

12. ἔφη γε, emphatic,—'he *said*,' whatever may have been his real opinion.

Κριτίας. 'His family, the Medontidae, belonged to the liberal party, to which he also had devoted his energies. His conduct after the establishment of the Thirty must be explained by the fact that he was a renegade, and, as people of this kind usually do, now championed his new convictions with all the more violence. His command of all the resources of the culture of his age materially facilitated his task' (Holm).

τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ, i.e. the Thirty. See note on § 31.

14. ᾔδεσαν δὲ Σωκράτην. This idea is well worked out by Grote:—'We may readily believe Xenophon when he tells us that Alcibiades, like the oligarchical Critias, was attracted to Socrates by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation—his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers—his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations—his power of seeing beforehand the end of a long cross-

examination—his ironical affectation of ignorance. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack from Socrates. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided; especially Alcibiades, who not only owed his life to the generous valour of Socrates at Potidaea, but had also learnt in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armour, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship. But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Socrates with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life.'

αὐταρκέστατα. *αὐτάρκης* means 'self-sufficing,' 'independent of others,' the opposite of *πολλῶν ἐνδεής* (Plato *Republ.* 369 B). It is a very important word in the philosophy of the Cynics, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics. In the *Ethics* of Aristotle *αὐτάρκεια* is one of the characteristics of the Highest Good.

πᾶσι χρώμενον—ὅπως βούλοιτο. See Introduction, p. xxxiv.

15. ὄντε οἵω προειρήσθον, 'being of the character described above.'

φῇ, deliberative subjunctive,—'is one to say?'

16. θεοῦ διδόντος, conditional,—'if God offered.'

ἐπραξάτην. Note the aorist referring to the particular action mentioned in the next sentence, and contrast *ἐπραττέτην* below.

ὡς γὰρ τάχιστα—ὠρεχθήτην, 'For as soon as they felt their superiority to their associates, they at once broke loose from Socrates and took part in the political life, with an eye to which they had desired the society of the master.' For the expressive *ἀποπηδήσαντε* 'having bounded away from' cf. Plato *leges* 720 C *αὐθαδῶς οἴχεται ἀποπηδήσας πρὸς ἄλλον.*

17. ἐγὼ δὲ—προσβιβάζοντας, 'For my part, though I do not dispute this allegation, I observe all teachers showing to their pupils how they themselves carry out their own instructions and bringing them over by argument.'

ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς δεικνύντας—ᾗπερ. For the construction cf. § 13 *τὴν συνουσίαν ὡς ἐγένετο διηγήσομαι.* These are instances of the 'anticipatory accusative.'

18. κἀκείνω, 'Alcibiades and Critias as well' (as Socrates).

οὐ φοβουμένω, causal use of the participle,—'not because they feared.'

τότε, 'for the time' (of their association with Socrates).

19. τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν, 'of those who profess to be philosophers.'

ἄλλο οὐδέν, accusative after the verbal adjective *ἀνεπιστήμων*. Cf. *Cyropaedeia* III. iii. 9 *ἐπιστήμονες ἦσαν τὰ προσήκοντα*. Translate:—'and one who had learnt any other subject of knowledge could never become ignorant of it.'

οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω, 'this is not my view.' For *γιγνώσκω* in the sense of 'decide' cf. i. 4, 17.

ὁρῶ γὰρ—δύνανται. The meaning is well brought out by Mr Dakyns:—'It is with the workings of the soul as with those of the body; want of exercise of the organ leads to inability of function, here bodily, there spiritual, so that we can neither do the things that we should nor abstain from the things we should not.'

ἀπέχεσθαι, to be taken both with *δεῖ* and with *δύνανται*.

20. ὡς τὴν μὲν—κατάλυσιν, accusative absolute with *ὡς*, conveying, as usual, the meaning 'on the ground that...,' 'with the idea that....' Translate:—'on the ground that the society of the good is training in virtue and that of the wicked its dissolution.' Cf. iii. 2, vi. 5.

τῶν ποιητῶν ὅ τε λέγων, i.e. Theognis, 'a Greek elegiac poet, born about 540 B.C., of a rich and noble family in Megara. He lived at a time when bitter feuds had broken out in his native town between the nobles and the other citizens. On the fall of his party, he was driven into exile. It was not until many years later that he was allowed to return, and he was probably still alive at the time of the Persian Wars. From the remains of his elegies, which are mostly addressed in a hortatory form to the noble youth Cycnus, it may be seen that they were closely connected with the political fortunes of the poet. They exhibit the pride and rancour of the aristocrat, in whose eyes all his own party are *good* and *noble*, as contrasted with the adherents of the popular party, who are denounced as *base* and *cowardly*' (Seyffert).

καὶ ὁ λέγων. The name of this poet is unknown.

21. ὅταν δὲ—ἐπεθύμει, 'when a man forgets the words of warning, he forgets also the condition in which his soul was when it yearned after sobriety.'

ὧν—πάσχουσα, i.e. *ἐκείνων ἃ—πάσχουσα*. The emphasis is on the participle; cf. the phrase *τί παθὼν τοῦτο ποιεῖ;* 'what has happened to him that he does this?' Cf. also § 61.

22. καὶ χρημάτων, 'money as well (as love).'

23. ἐν τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ—χαρίζεσθαι, 'In one and the same bodily

frame pleasures are planted and spring up side by side with the soul and keep whispering in her ear, *Have done with self-restraint, make haste to gratify us and the body*' (Dakyns).

τὴν ταχίστην, sc. *ὁδόν*, cognate accusative used adverbially.

24. ἀπαλλαγέντε, Κριτίας μὲν—'Αλκιβιάδης δέ, a good instance of 'partitive apposition.'

φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν. 'We know,' says Grote, 'neither the cause nor the date of his exile, except so far as that he was not in banishment immediately after the revolution of the Four Hundred, and that he *was* in banishment at the time when the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusae. He had passed the time, or a part of the time, of his exile in Thessaly, where he took an active part in the sanguinary feuds carried on among the oligarchical parties of that lawless country. He is said to have embraced, along with a leader named or surnamed Prometheus, what passed for the democratical side in Thessaly, arming the Penestae or serfs against their masters. What the conduct and dispositions of Critias had been before this period we are unable to say. But he brought with him, on returning from exile, not merely an unmeasured and unprincipled lust of power, but also a rancorous impulse towards spoliation and bloodshed, which outran even his ambition and ultimately ruined both his party and himself.'

ὑπὸ πολλῶν—διαθρυπτόμενος, 'spoilt by many adepts in flattery'; cf. *Cyropaedeia* VII. ii. 23 *ὑπὸ πλούτου διαθρυπτόμενος—καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων*.

ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου—πρωτεύων, i.e. he was *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*. 'The Athenians, in spite of their morbid fear of tyranny, were ready to submit to a legalized dictatorship, and the position won by Pericles was open to any man of sufficient ability and popularity. This possibility seems to offer a key to the career of Alcibiades. I believe that throughout his public life he was emulating Pericles, and that the position held by the latter formed his constant ideal' (Whibley, *Parties at Athens*, p. 56).

25. ὠγκωμένω ἐπὶ γένει, 'puffed up with the pride of high birth.'

ἀπὸ Σωκράτους γεγονότε, 'separated from Socrates.'

26. ἐπλημμελησάτην, 'transgressed,' lit. 'struck a false note' (*πλήν, μέλος*); cf. Plato *Critias* 106 B *τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν*.

ἀγνωμονεστάτω, 'most unfeeling'; cf. II. viii. 5 *ἀγνώμων κριτής* 'a harsh critic.'

27. ἀλλ' οὐχ—πρότερον; 'Does he not rather praise the former teacher more highly, in proportion as his son turns out worse with the latter?'

29. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ—ἐπιτιμῷτο, 'But, if though doing no wrong himself he saw the evil deeds of others with approval, he would be worthy of censure.'

31. τῶν τριάκοντα. They were not called 'the Thirty Tyrants' till later. Diodorus is the first writer to employ the term. Observe that the Thirty at Athens answer to the *decarchies* set up by Lysander in other Greek towns. The Thirty were appointed in May 404 B.C., and were deposed after a rule of eight months.

νομοθέτης, not one of the ordinary Athenian *Nomothetae*; but apparently appointed, along with Charicles, to draw up laws on behalf of the Thirty. This was to be the special business of that body; but it was never really carried out, as Xenophon tells us in *Hellenica* II. iii. 11. Our passage shows that *some* laws were made.

αὐτῷ, *dativus incommodi*. Translate:—'he remembered it against him.'

λόγων τέχνην. An 'art of words' would include the Dialectic of Socrates. Cf. Introduction, p. xxvii (note 1).

ἐπηρεάζων—ἐπιλάβοιτο, 'because he had a spite against him and knew not how to lay hold of him.'

τὸ κοινῇ—ἐπιτιμώμενον, i.e. the charge that they made the worse argument appear the better.

οὔτ' ἄλλου—ᾐσθόμην, 'and I feel sure I never heard it from the lips of another.'

32. ἐδήλωσε, 'he made it clear,' as is explained in the next sentence. There is no need to take the word impersonally, as some do.

οὐ τοὺς χειρίστους, notably Theramenes. The atrocities of the Thirty were mainly due to Critias. Holm gives an interesting explanation of his conduct:—'Critias behaved like Robespierre, who was of opinion that it is mere sentimentality to attach importance to the lives of individuals when principles are at stake, and that sentimentalists of this stamp are the most dangerous of men in critical times, men who must be removed at all hazards. This was the fate of Danton, whose protests were silenced by the minions of the men in power, just like those of Theramenes. Not that Theramenes is to be compared with Danton in personal character; Danton's nature was a passionate one, that of Theramenes calculating and egoistic. But Critias and Robespierre have many points of resemblance; both were cruel from a spirit of doctrinaire fanaticism.'

33. καλέσαντες—ἐδεικνύτην. For the combination of dual and plural cf. § 14 *ἐγενέσθην—ᾔδεσαν*.

ἐπήρετο—προαγορευομένων, 'asked them whether it was open to him to make enquiries about any point in their proclamations which he failed to understand.'

ἐφάτην, 'they said, yes'; cf. *οὐκ ἔφη* 'he said, no' and § 45.

34. ὅπως δὲ—τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν, 'But to prevent my unwittingly transgressing any provision of your laws through ignorance, I want clear information from you. When you bid me abstain from the art of words, is that because you consider that it favours correct statement or incorrect? If the former, then clearly we should have to abstain from speaking correctly.'

35. ὅλως μὴ διαλέγεσθαι, 'not to converse at all.'

ἵνα τοίνυν—ἀνθρώπους, 'That there may be no doubt that I am doing something else than what is enjoined in your proclamation, kindly define for me up to what age people should be considered young.'

ὅσουπερ. The construction is carried on from *μέχρι πόσων ἐτῶν* above. Translate :—'for so long as they are not allowed to be members of the Council,' i.e. up to the age of thirty.

βουλεύειν. See note on i. 18.

36. μηδ' ἐάν—πωλεῖ, 'Suppose I am purchasing something and the seller is under thirty, may I not even ask the price of the article?'

ὁπόσου, genitive of price,—lit. 'for how much he sells.'

ναὶ τά γε τοιαῦτα, 'Yes, of course you may ask questions like that.'

ἀλλά τοι—ἐρωτᾶν, 'But you know (*τοι*) you have a way of asking most of your questions, when you really know how the matter stands.'

37. τῶν σκυτέων—χαλκέων. Cf. Plato *Gorgias* 491 A *ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει*, and Zeller, *Socrates*, p. 78 'Even from an outward point of view, the Silenus-like appearance of Socrates must rather have concealed than exposed the presence of genius to the eye of a Greek. But more than this, a certain amount of intellectual stiffness and an indifference to what is sensibly beautiful is unmistakable in his speech and behaviour. There appears in him a certain want of imagination,—a prosiness which clashes with the poetry of Grecian life and the refined taste of an Athenian. Even Plato's Alcibiades allows that at first sight the discourses of Socrates appear ridiculous and rude, dealing as they invariably do with beasts of burden, smiths, tailors, and tanners.' See also Introduction, pp. xii and xxvi.

κατατετρῖφθαι—ὑπὸ σοῦ, 'These must be pretty well trodden out at heel by this time, considering the circulation you have given them' (Dakyns).

καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων τούτοις, 'Must I also keep clear of the subjects connected with these?,' i.e. the subjects in which they occur as illustrations.

φυλάττου—ποιήσεις, 'take care that you too do not diminish the herd,' i.e. by being put to death by the Thirty.

39. φαίην δ' ἄν—μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι. The regular negative particle of the infinitive in *oratio obliqua* is *οὐ*. But verbs of *hoping*, *promising*, *swearing*, and a few others, take *μή* with the infinitive. And sometimes, as here, the infinitive has *μή* even after verbs which are most regularly followed by *οὐ*, i.e. verbs of *saying* and *thinking*. Cf. § 41 *οἶμαι μὴ ἂν—τυχεῖν*, iv. 19 *ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἂν—διαλαθεῖν*.

'This use carries with it the emphasis of the witness on oath, so to speak the emphasis of desire' (Gildersleeve).

40. εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν, genitive of amount; cf. Demosth. p. 814 *ἐμὲ πέντ' ἐτῶν ὄντα.*

προστάτῃ τῆς πόλεως. How did Pericles become *προστάτης τῆς πόλεως* 'First Citizen' (Latin *princeps civitatis*)? The answer is given by Mr Whibley (*Parties at Athens*, p. 55): 'The first essentials for this autocracy were the favour of the people and the command of the Assembly, which were implied in the position of *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*. The holder of this position (which was purely unofficial) acquired the requisite official power by becoming *πρύτανις τῶν στρατηγῶν* (President of the Generals). To establish his authority firmly, nothing was needed but continuity; and this element was ensured by the habitual practice of re-electing the generals. This combination of influence and power made the holder first and permanent minister of the state, as well as leading demagogue. Such an autocracy was established by Pericles during the period subsequent to the ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias.' Cf. Thuc. ii. 65 *ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.*

41. φάναι, depending on **λέγεται** in the last sentence.

τί ἐστι νόμος; Cf. § 43 *ταῦτα νόμος ἐστί.*

νόμιμοι, 'law-abiding.'

42. οὐδέν τι, cognate accusative with *χαλεποῦ*,—'not at all hard.'

πάντες οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, by attraction for *πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι νόμοι.* Contrast § 41 *τί ἐστι νόμος;*

συνελθὸν—ἔγραψε, 'having met together, approved and enacted.'

νομίσαν. Supply *τὸ πλῆθος ἔγραψε.*

44. μὴ πείσας. The *μή* is used because the sentence is really conditional. Cf. i. 9.

ἀνατίθεμαι, 'retract,' properly 'withdraw a move' at some game like draughts; cf. II. iv. 4 *τούτους ἀνατίθεσθαι* 'to retract their names,' Plato, *Hipparchus* 229 E *ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅ τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων.* Translate our passage: 'I withdraw my statement that measures enacted by a despot, without persuading his subjects, are law.'

45. φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν; 'Are we to say yes or no?' *μή* is the regular negative with the deliberative subjunctive; cf. § 36 *μηδ' ἀποκρίνωμαι;*

46. τηλικοῦτοι ὄντες, 'at your age.'

δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'clever at such things,' i.e. at dialectic. For the cognate accusative with an adjective cf. § 42 and vii. 1 *ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο.*

εἴθε—ἦσθα, 'Would that I had associated with you when you were at your cleverest in these matters.' For the idiom cf. Herod. ii. 8 *αὐτὸ ἑωυτοῦ ἐστι μακρότατον* 'is at its greatest length,' v. 28 *ἡ Μίλητος αὐτὴ ἑωυτῆς μάλιστα τότε ἀκμάσασα.* Thucydides prefers the comparative, e.g. i. 8 *πλουσιώτεροι ἑαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι.*

ἑαυτοῦ, for *σεαυτοῦ*, occurs again in II. vi. 35, *Cyropaedeia* v. iv. 37, VI. iii. 27, *Hellenica* IV. i. 35.

47. ὑπέλαβον, i.e. Alcibiades and Critias.

ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο. On the painful character of the Socratic Elenchus see Introduction, p. xxxiii (note 1).

48. Κρίτων. 'Crito was the oldest and dearest friend of Socrates, a man of wealth and position and high character. His sympathy with Socrates was probably much more personal than intellectual. Plato's picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentleman, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote in Plato's *Euthydemus* (304 D) has any foundation in fact, Crito may have sometimes remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities. Diogenes Laertius however (ii. 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as *περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι, τί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.* We can hardly suppose that they contributed much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true interest of the man when he says, *Crito was most affectionately disposed towards Socrates and tended him with such care as never to leave any of his wants unsupplied*' (Archer-Hind, Introduction to *Phaedo*, p. 42). To Crito Socrates addressed his last words, *Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; pay the debt and by no means neglect it*, meaning thereby that death would restore his soul to purity and health, and that therefore the customary sacrifice was due to the God of Healing.

Χαιρεφῶν καὶ Χαιρεκράτης, brothers. In II. iii. Socrates rebukes Chaerecrates for lack of brotherly love. They are mentioned in Plato's *Apology* 21 A, where Socrates says:—'You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the democracy and returned with you (i.e. under Thrasybulus in 403 B.C.). He was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether there was any one wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.' In Plato's *Charmides* 153 B Chaerephon's enthusiasm is again alluded to; he is there called *μανικός* 'a bit of a madman.' From Arist. *Clouds* 501—3 we gather that he was a devoted student; hence he was pale and thin, and Aristophanes speaks of him elsewhere as a *Child of Night* and *Chaerephon the Bat*.

Ἑρμογένης, an Athenian, son of Hipponicus. We learn from the *Phaedo* that he was with Socrates at the last. He is also introduced in the *Cratylus* of Plato. In II. x. 3 he is described as *οὐκ ἀγνώμων* 'not heartless.'

Σιμμίας καὶ Κέβης, both Thebans. They offered money to secure the release of Socrates (Plato, *Crito* 45 B). Diogenes Laertius tells us that Simmias wrote twenty-three dialogues and Cebes three. The extant Π*ίναξ* of Cebes is undoubtedly spurious. Mr Archer-Hind in his Introduction to the *Phaedo* (p. 41) writes:—'This Theban pair, little as is known of their lives, will always be full of interest in our eyes, because of the important part they play in this dialogue. Both evidently enjoyed the esteem of Plato in a high degree; but we cannot read the *Phaedo* without being conscious of a marked difference in their temperament. Simmias is somewhat dreamy and prone to mysticism. But the intellect of Cebes is bright and keen as a sword; he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point and making straight towards it; he possesses the invaluable quality of always knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any haziness of thought in others.'

Φαιδώνδας, a Theban. Plato tells us that he was with Socrates in the prison.

49. τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν. Cf. the celebrated scene in Arist. *Clouds*, where Pheidippides, the pupil of Socrates, asserts his right to punish his father Strepsiades (1321 sqq.).

παρανοίας ἑλόντι, 'having convicted him of mental derangement.' Cf. Arist. *Clouds* 845—7:—

> *οἴμοι τί δράσω παραφρονοῦντος τοῦ πατρός;*
> *πότερον παρανοίας αὐτὸν εἰσαγαγὼν ἕλω,*
> *ἢ τοῖς σοροπηγοῖς τὴν μανίαν αὐτοῦ φράσω;*

Cf. also for the genitive of the *charge* the phrases *γράφεσθαι παρανόμων*, *φεύγειν ἀσεβείας*, *ἁλῶναι κλοπῆς*.

καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, 'to put even one's father in confinement,' i.e. as a lunatic.

τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, 'employing this as a proof.' For the predicative use of the substantive cf. § 56 *τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον*.

51. τοὺς δικαζομένους, here passive, not middle, i.e. 'those put on their trial,' not simply 'litigants'; for *συνδικεῖν* which follows means regularly 'to defend an accused person.' For *δικάζεσθαι* as a passive cf. *Cyropaedeia* I. ii. 7 and Lysias' phrase *αἰσχρὰς δίκας δικάζεσθαι* 'to have disgraceful actions brought against one.'

52. τοὺς—ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους, 'who know what is right and have the power of explaining it'; cf. Thuc. ii. 60, where Pericles says:—*οὐδενὸς οἶμαι ἥσσων εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα.*

ἀναπείθοντα, an invidious term,—'over-persuading.' Cf. iii. 6.

οὕτω διατιθέναι—πρὸς ἑαυτόν, 'he reduced his associates to such a condition that the rest of the world were nowhere in their estimation when compared with himself.' Cf. Plato *Gorgias* 456 C *οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν.*

53. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δή, 'Yes and besides surely,' i.e. 'I am ready to admit this also.' Cf. § 37.

τὴν ταχίστην. Cf. § 23.

ἐξενεγκόντες. *ἐκφέρειν* is the technical word for 'to carry out for burial'; so *efferre* in Latin.

54. καὶ ζῶν—παρέχει, 'even in life each of us is ready to part with any portion of his best possession—to wit, his own body—if it be useless and unprofitable; he will remove it himself or suffer another to do so in his stead' (Dakyns).

ἑαυτοῦ—τοῦ σώματος, both partitive genitives; cf. III. xi. 1 *ἑαυτῆς ὅσα καλῶς ἔχοι.*

παρέχει. This verb is often used absolutely, generally as a medical term, 'to put oneself in the power of a surgeon.' If anything is to be 'understood,' it must be *τὸ σῶμα* or a part of it, as can easily be done

in this and the following sentence. Practically, however, it is usually a neuter verb in this sense. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 475 D *τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου* and (in a general sense) Soph. *Ajax* 1145 *πατεῖν παρεῖχε τῷ θέλοντι ναυτίλων* 'suffered any of the sailors to walk over him at will.'

αὐτοί τέ γε. The *τε* is answered by *καί* before *τοῖς ἰατροῖς*, and the *γε* 'at any rate' introduces a special example of a general statement,—a function generally performed by *γοῦν* (cf. vi. 2).

τοῖς ἰατροῖς παρέχουσι—ἀποκαίειν, an excellent illustration of the datival origin of the infinitive (of which philology tells us), lit. 'they submit to surgeons *for cutting or burning*,' i.e. 'to the knife or cautery.' Cf. v. 2, vi. 9.

55. **ὅπως—πειρᾶται**, 'so that, whether he wishes for the respect of father or brother or any one else, he should not be indifferent to them, relying on the mere fact of relationship, but should try....'

56. **Ἡσιόδου.** Hesiod was born at Ascra in Boeotia. His chief work is the *Ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι*, the oldest specimen of Greek didactic poetry. It is full of ethical and economical precepts, the latter dealing especially with agriculture, also with commerce and navigation. The poem also includes two famous legends, *Pandora's Box* and the *Four Ages of the World*. The line here quoted is *Works and Days* 311.

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος. This is perversely taken both by Socrates and his critics to mean 'no work is a disgrace.' Hesiod meant 'work—especially *agricultural* work—is no disgrace,' as may be seen from the context, 298 sqq.:—

ἀλλὰ σύ γ' ἡμετέρης μεμνημένος αἰὲν ἐφετμῆς
ἐργάζευ, Πέρση, δῖον γένος, ὄφρα σε Λιμὸς
ἐχθαίρῃ, φιλέῃ δέ σ' ἐϋστέφανος Δημήτηρ
αἰδοίη, βιότου δὲ τεὴν πιμπλῆσι καλιήν....
ἐξ ἔργων δ' ἄνδρες πολύμηλοί τ' ἀφνειοί τε·
καὶ ἐργαζόμενος πολὺ φίλτερος ἀθανάτοισιν
ἔσσεαι ἠδὲ βροτοῖς· μάλα γὰρ στυγέουσιν ἀεργούς.
ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.

ἀεργίη δέ τε. This is the 'generalising *τε*' very frequent in Homer and Hesiod in gnomic and general statements. It must be neglected in translation and regarded simply as a sign-post.

ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει, 'on the basis of gain,' i.e. 'with a view to gain.'

57. **ἐκ τούτων**, 'starting from this,' i.e. 'with this qualification.'

58. **τὸ δὲ Ὁμήρου.** The passage quoted is from *Iliad* ii. 108, sqq.

Ὀδυσσεύς, here represented as polite to the chiefs, and insulting to men of the people.

ὅντινα μέν, answered, not by *τὸν δ'* (an example of *δέ in apodosi*), but by *ὃν δ' αὖ* in the fifth line.

βασιλῆα, here 'chief captain' rather than 'king.' In Homer the word includes chiefs of different relative ranks. Agamemnon, the suzerain, is *βασιλεύτατος* (*Iliad* ix. 69).

κιχείη, optative of frequency,—'whomsoever he came upon.'

ἐρητύσασκε. The termination denotes frequency,—'he would restrain.' Cf. *ἐλάσασκεν* and *ὁμοκλήσασκε* below.

δαιμόνιε. This frequent Homeric address generally implies a certain amount of remonstrance, denoting 'thou that art possessed by a *δαίμων*'; cf. our phrase 'what possesses you?' The degree of remonstrance depends on the tone of the speaker. Here it is very slight, and we may translate 'Good sir.' In the seventh line it is more severe,—'Sirrah!'

οὔ σε—δειδίσσεσθαι, 'It is not meet to threaten thee as a churl.' The common interpretation—'it is not becoming for you to be terrified'—has much less point and appropriateness. Odysseus is far too polite to make a direct charge of cowardice. Moreover *δειδίσσεσθαι* is always transitive (Monro). Leaf gives another interpretation:—'Odysseus actually *terrifies* the common sort into the assembly; but will not employ more than persuasion to the chiefs.'

ἄλλους, in its idiomatic sense of 'as well.'

δήμου τ' ἄνδρα. '*δήμου ἄνδρα* best MSS. The *τ'* is probably inserted only to avoid hiatus. We should rather read *δήμοι'*. If *τε* be retained, it must connect *ἴδοι* with *ἐφεύροι*' (Leaf). Translate:—'Whatever man of the people he saw and found bawling.'

59. ἄλλως τ' ἐὰν—ὦσι, lit. 'and moreover if in addition to this they are also boastful,' i.e. 'if to incapacity they add effrontery' (Dakyns). Ernesti would read *ἄλλως τε κἄν*. But the change is unnecessary; cf. Soph. *O. T.* 1114 (Jebb's note), where it is made clear that *ἄλλως* can mean 'moreover.'

πάντα τρόπον, adverbial accusative (cf. i. 19); so also *τἀναντία* in the next section, with which compare the more common *πᾶν τοὐναντίον*.

60. οὐδένα—μισθόν, double accusative,—'he did not exact a fee from any one'; cf. § 5.

τῆς συνουσίας, 'for his society'; cf. the genitive with verbs of *barter and exchange* and the ordinary genitive of *price*, e.g. *πολλοῦ—ἐπώλουν* in this section.

ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ, 'he furnished from his store.' The genitive is one of *material*, a subdivision of the partitive; cf. the Homeric *χαριζομένη παρεόντων* 'lavishing from her store.'

61. πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, 'extending to the rest,' i.e. 'in the eyes of the rest of the world.'

ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις, dative of time,—'at the Gymnopaediae' (a Spartan festival similar to the Lupercalia at Rome), at which naked youths went through dances in the Agora in honour of Apollo and other deities. The Spartans who fell at Thyrea were specially commemorated at this festival. It gradually developed into a great musical and gymnastic entertainment, celebrated with great merriment and attracting many strangers. It was these who were feasted by Lichas.

τὰ μέγιστα, cognate accusative with *ὠφέλει*.

ποιῶν—ἀπέπεμπεν. The stress of the sentence is on the participle, as often in Greek. Translate:—'He did not let his associates go without improving them.' Cf. § 21.

62. τῇ πόλει, dative of person concerned,—'at the hands of the city.' Cf. i. 1.

καὶ—δέ. Cf. i. 3 *κἀκεῖνος δέ*.

λωποδυτῶν, 'being a footpad,' properly 'clothes-stealer,' lit. 'one who slips on another's clothes' (*λώπη* 'robe' and *δύω*), specially applicable to those who frequented the baths in order to steal the clothes of the bathers, but used as a general term for 'highwaymen,' 'footpads,' etc.

βαλλαντιοτομῶν, 'being a cut-purse,' Latin *sector zonarius*.

τοιχωρυχῶν. The Greeks called burglars 'wall-diggers,' because their houses generally had mud walls; and it was easier to effect an entrance through these than through doors or windows.

ἀνδραποδιζόμενος. Cf. § 6.

τούτοις, after *τις*, a *sense* construction; cf. iv. 18 *το θεῖον* followed by *αὐτούς*.

63. πολέμου κακῶς συμβάντος—αἴτιος, 'the cause of the disastrous result of any war,'—quite an unusual construction in Greek, which generally employs the articular infinitive in such cases, i.e. *τοῦ πόλεμόν τινα κακῶς συμβῆναι*. Cf. Plato *Symposium* 198 B *μετὰ καλὸν οὕτω καὶ παντοδαπὸν λόγον ῥηθέντα* and the Latin *post urbem conditam*. Several editors bracket *κακῶς συμβάντος*. But this is not really necessary.

64. ὅς, 'inasmuch as he,' 'for he.' In this causal sense we generally find *ὅς γε* or *ὅστις*. Cf. iv. 11.

ὁ- -αὐτὸν ᾐτιᾶτο. For this double accusative cf. Arist. *Ach.* 514 *αἰτιώμεθα ταῦτα τοὺς Λάκωνας.*

εὖ οἰκοῦσι, 'are well administered.'

III.

1. καὶ ὠφελεῖν. Mark the force of *καί.* Not only may Socrates be absolved from the charge of demoralizing the young; but he actually had an excellent influence over them.

δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἷος ἦν. For the anticipatory accusative cf. ii. 13.

τούτων, partitive genitive depending on *ὁπόσα.* Cf. ii. 54.

ὁπόσα ἂν διαμνημονεύσω, an excellent description of the informal, unscientific character of Xenophon's *Recollections*; see Introduction, p. xxiv.

ἡ Πυθία. 'The Delphic Oracle was a cleft in the ground in the innermost sanctuary of the temple, from which arose cold vapours, which had the power of producing ecstasy. Over the cleft stood a lofty gilded tripod of wood. On this was a circular slab, upon which the seat of the prophetess, called Pythia, was placed. In the earliest times the Pythia ascended the tripod only once a year, on the birthday of Apollo. But in later years she prophesied every day, if the day itself and the sacrifices were favourable. These sacrifices were offered by the suppliants, adorned with laurel wreaths and fillets of wood. She drank of the water of the fountain Cassotis which flowed into the shrine and tasted the fruit of the old bay-tree before taking her seat. No one was present but a priest, called *προφήτης*, who explained the words she uttered in her ecstasy, and put them into metrical form. In later times the votaries were contented with answers in prose' (Seyffert).

προγόνων θεραπείας, 'respect for ancestors,' e.g. especially by making offerings at their tombs; cf. Thuc. iii. 58, where the Plataeans say:—'Cast your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honoured by a yearly public offering of garments and other customary gifts. We were their friends and we gave them the firstfruits in their season of that friendly land in which they rest.'

ἀναιρεῖ, 'replies,'—the technical word for the delivery of an oracle.

ποιοῦντας, conditional use of the participle. The Pythia would say:—'if you act....'

2. ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς—εἰδότας. For the accusative absolute cf. ii. 20, vi. 5.

κυβείαν ἢ μάχην, cognate accusatives,—'a throw of the dice or a battle' being the subject-matter of the prayer.

ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο. See note on i. 6.

3. **ἀπὸ μικρῶν—ἀπὸ πολλῶν**. Cf. ii. 14 and St Luke xxi. 1—4.

μειοῦσθαι τῶν—θυόντων, 'to come off worse than those sacrificing.' Cf. the genitive after comparative adjectives, and *Anabasis* III. ii. 23 *ἡττᾶσθαί τινος εὖ ποιοῦντος*.

καλῶς ἔχειν εἰ—ἔχαιρον, for *καλῶς ἔχει εἰ—χαίρουσι* of *oratio recta*. Goodwin (*M.T.* § 691) quotes this as an instance of the imperfect indicative standing *irregularly* in a dependent clause of *oratio obliqua* after a secondary tense, to represent a present indicative, which would *regularly be retained or changed to the present optative*. Cf. Thuc. iii. 32 *ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν* (i.e. *οὐ καλῶς ἐλευθεροῖς, εἰ διαφθείρεις*).

τοῦ ἔπους τούτου. The quotation is from Hesiod *Works and Days* 336.

καδδύναμιν, for *κατὰ δύναμιν*. For the cutting off of the vowel, combined with assimilation of a consonant, cf. the Homeric *καππεδίον* for *κατὰ πεδίον* and *κάββαλε* for *κατέβαλε*.

ἔρδειν, 'to do,' often in the special sense of 'to offer (sacrifice)'; cf. the similar use of *facere* and *operari* in Latin.

πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν, 'with regard to life generally.'

τὴν—ἔρδειν. The article, which would naturally be *τό*, is attracted into the gender of *παραίνεσιν*.

4. **εἰ—δόξειεν**, followed by *ἂν ἐπείσθη*, need cause no trouble; for *εἰ δόξειεν* is not a hypothetical clause, but simply temporal, being equivalent to *ὁπότε δόξειεν*. Cf. § 6 *εἰ δέ ποτε ἐθελήσειεν*. The optatives are frequentative.

ἧττον—συμβουλίαν, 'Nothing would have induced him to go against the heavenly warning; he would as soon have been persuaded to accept the guidance of a blind man ignorant of the path to lead him on a journey, in place of one who knew the road and could see. And so he denounced the folly of others, who do things contrary to the warnings of God, in order to avoid some disrepute among men. For himself he despised all human aids by comparison with counsel from above' (Dakyns). *ἔπειθεν* is imperfect of the attempt,—'tried to persuade.'

5. **εἰ μή τι δαιμόνιον εἴη**, 'but for some visitation from heaven.' Cf. *Cyropaedeia* I. vi. 18 *ἢν μή τις θεὸς βλάπτῃ*. Contrast the use of *τὸ δαιμόνιον* in i. 2.

οὐκ ἂν—δαπάνης, 'would never fail to have so much to spend.'

λαμβάνειν—ἀρκοῦντα, 'to earn the pittance that sufficed for Socrates.'

τοσούτῳ, '*just* so much.'

τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου ὄψον. The proverb *Hunger is the best sauce* appears in Xenophon under several forms; cf. vi. 5 *ὁ ἥδιστα ἐσθίων ἥκιστα ὄψου δεῖται*, *Cyropaedeia* I. v. 12 *λιμῷ ὅσαπερ ὄψῳ διαχρῆσθε*, VII. v. 80 *οἱ πόνοι ὄψον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*.

ὄψον, 'relish,' originally 'boiled food' (*ἕψω*) as opposed to bread. With the Greeks bread was the staff of life, and other kinds of food were regarded chiefly as giving a relish. The chief forms of *ὄψον* were fish, cheese, olives, onions, and other vegetables. At Athens fish was the chief dainty and came to be the *ὄψον par excellence*, and the fish-market was called *τὸ ὄψον*. In III. xiv. 2—4 Socrates comments on the daintiness of a young man at a dinner-party who eats *ὄψα* only and no bread. He gives him the name of *ὀψοφάγος* 'epicure.'

6. ὃ—ὥστε φυλάξασθαι, 'what is very difficult for most people, viz. to beware of....' For the redundant *ὥστε* cf. III. xiii. 3 *ψυχρὸν ὥστε λούσασθαι*, *Cyropaedeia* VI. iii. 19 *πάνυ μοι ἐμέλησεν ὥστε εἰδέναι*. Goodwin (*M.T.* § 588) points out that *ὥστε* in such cases seems to have no more meaning than our *to* with the infinitive, which in some cases we can use or omit at pleasure; and that the examples show that there is hardly a construction in which the simple infinitive was used where *ὥστε* is not occasionally prefixed to it.

7. τὴν Κίρκην ὗς ποιεῖν, as described in Homer, *Od.* x. 229—242.

ἐγκρατῆ ὄντα καὶ ἀποσχόμενον. The participles are causal, co-ordinate with the causal dative *ὑποθημοσύνῃ*,—'by the inspiration of Hermes and by his own self-control and abstinence.'

ὑποθημοσύνῃ, not an Attic word, occurs in *Il.* xv. 412 and *Od.* xvi. 233. The advice of Hermes is given in *Od.* x. 281—301.

ἔπαιζεν ἅμα σπουδάζων. See Introduction, p. xxxi.

IV.

1. οἷς—τεκμαιρόμενοι, 'judging by the views maintained by some in conversation and writing about him.' This does not refer to the statements and writings of pupils of Socrates, as is generally thought, but to the views of opponents (Zeller).

προτρέψασθαι, 'to stimulate' by means of his method of question and answer; see Introduction, p. xxxii, sqq.

προαγαγεῖν, more positive, 'actually to introduce' to virtue,—referring to the constructive side of Socrates' teaching, which Xenophon is constantly anxious to emphasise; see Introduction, p. xxxv.

ἅ, cognate accusative with *ἤλεγχεν*,—'what he effected in refutation.'

κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα, 'by way of discipline.' For the painful character of the Socratic Elenchus cf. Introduction, p. xxxiii (note 1).

δοκιμαζόντων, imperative,—'let them decide.'

2. περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου, 'on the subject of divinity.' Cf. § 10 where *τὸ δαιμόνιον* is 'the deity,' and contrast the special use of the term in i. 2, and yet another use in iii. 5.

'Αριστόδημον. Cf. Plato *Symposium* 173 B *'Αριστόδημος ἦν—σμικρός, ἀνυπόδητος ἀεί· παραγεγόνει δ' ἐν τῇ συνουσίᾳ Σωκράτους ἐραστὴς ὢν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν τότε.*

ἐπικαλούμενον, 'nicknamed,' as usual; cf. *Hellenica* II. iii. 30 *κόθορνος ἐπικαλεῖται.*

ἔστιν οὕστινας, 'are there any whom...?' Cf. II. iii. 6 *ἔστιν οἷς καὶ πάνυ ἀρέσκει.* Shilleto points out that *ἔστιν οἵ, ἔστιν αἵ* never occur, but always *εἰσὶν οἵ, εἰσὶν αἵ*, and that the bold Grecism *est quibus* in Propertius IV. ix. 17 would hardly justify the use of *est qui* (plural); though some retain in Plautus *Pseudolus* 245 *est conloqui qui volunt.*

ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, 'on the ground of wisdom'; cf. several instances of the same use in the next section, and ii. 56 *ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει.*

3. καὶ ὅς, 'and he.' Observe that *ὅς* here has its original demonstrative force, which is common in Homer and is found in the Platonic *ἦ δ' ὅς* 'said he.' There are several other instances of the use in the *Memorabilia*, e.g. III. i. 5.

ἐπὶ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππίδην. The original dithyramb 'was a hymn sung at the festivals of Dionysus to the accompaniment of a flute and a dance round the altar. The hymn celebrated the sufferings and actions of the god in a style corresponding to the passionate character of his worship. In the course of time it developed into a special class of Greek lyric poetry. It was in Corinth that it first received anything like a definite artistic form, and this at the hands of Arion....In the form which it assumed after the Peloponnesian War the dithyramb did violence to the older taste. A continuous and rapid change of rhythm was accompanied by an extraordinary boldness of diction, in keeping with the wild character of the composition. The dithyramb was gradually transformed into a kind of opera....Melanippides of Melos is generally held responsible for the degeneracy of the dithyramb, and the excess of instrumental music' (Seyffert). Melanippides, who flourished

about 440 B.C., lived for some time at the court of Perdiccas. Plutarch ranks him among the most notable masters of music. Some fragments of his poetry are given in Bergk's *Lyrici Graeci.*

Πολύκλειτον. Polycleitus, one of the most celebrated of Greek sculptors, was a younger contemporary of Pheidias. He was the head of the schools of Argos and Sicyon. His *δορυφόρος* (spear-bearer) went by the name of the *κανών*, i.e. the standard of perfection in the representation of the human figure. His chryselephantine statue of Hera was also very celebrated. Polycleitus was further famed as an architect and as an artist in *τορευτική* (relief-work).

Ζεῦξιν. Zeuxis, the celebrated painter, was a native of Heracleia, and came to Athens soon after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He also spent some time in Macedonia at the court of Archelaus, and in Magna Graecia. At Croton he painted his masterpiece, the picture of Helen. His rivalry with Parrhasius is well known through the story of the bunch of grapes and the curtain; *Zeuxis,* as he acknowledged, *deceived the birds, but Parrhasius an artist.*

4. οἱ ζῷα. Supply *ἀπεργαζόμενοι.*

εἴπερ γε, 'if that is,' Latin *si quidem.* No doubt is implied. Cf. vi. 12.

τῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως, 'Of things which give no sign as to their object, and of things which are clearly for a useful purpose—which do you hold to be the result of chance, which of design?'

πρέπει μέν. Mark the 'solitary *μέν*,' as grammarians call it. It implies a suppressed *δέ* clause meaning that another view is possible.

5. ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι. Here we have the 'teleological argument,' i.e. the argument from design, the view of nature as the sphere of the realisation of final causes (*τέλη*). This view forms the basis of the philosophy of Bishop Butler.

γνώμων, 'judge,'—to be distinguished from *γνωμῶν.*

6. ὡς ἂν—βλάπτωσιν. Observe that *ὡς* and *ὡς ἄν* in final clauses are hardly ever found in Attic Prose except in Xenophon, who is very partial to the use.

ἠθμὸν—ἐμφῦσαι, 'the planting of the eyelashes as a sieve.'

ὀφρύσι—ἀπογεισῶσαι, 'to furnish with a cornice of eyebrows.' For the word *γεῖσον* 'cornice' cf. Eurip. *Orestes* 1570 *παλαιὰ γεῖσα τεκτόνων πόνον*, and for the metaphor Pollux ii. 49 *γεῖσα ὀφρύων.*

οἵους τέμνειν. The infinitive after *τοιοῦτος οἷος* depends on the idea of *ability* or *fitness* expressed in this phrase. The antecedent may be omitted, leaving *οἷος* with the infinitive in the sense of *able* or *fit*

(Goodwin, *M.T.* § 759). Cf. *Cyropaedeia* I. ii. 3 *τοιοῦτοι οἷοι πονηροῦ τινὸς ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι*, *Anabasis* II. iii. 13 *ὥρα οἷα τὸ πεδίον ἄρδειν* 'a season such as to irrigate the plain.' Cf. also the more common *οἷός τε* in the sense of 'able.'

7. σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ. On Socrates' idea of a Creator, Zeller has some valuable remarks (*Socrates*, pp. 175—177):—'Socrates speaks of Gods in a popular way as many, no doubt thinking, in the first place, of the Gods of the popular faith. Out of this multiplicity the idea of the oneness of God, an idea not unknown to the Greek religion, rises with him into prominence. In one passage (IV. iii. 13) he draws a curious distinction between the Creator and Ruler of the universe and the rest of the Gods. Have we not here that union of polytheism and monotheism, so readily suggested to a Greek by his mythology, which consisted in reducing the many Gods to be the many instruments of the One Supreme God? In so far as Socrates was led to the notion of One Supreme Being by the reasonable arrangement of the world, the idea which he formed to himself of this Being was as the reason of the world, which he conceives of as holding the same relation to the world that the soul does to the body. Herewith are most closely connected his high and pure ideas of God as a being invisible, all-wise, all-powerful, present everywhere. As the soul, without being visible, produces visible effects in the body, so does God in the world. As the soul is present in all parts of its body, so God is present throughout the Universe.'

γειναμέναις, a poetical form.

ἀμέλει, 'doubtless,' lit. 'never mind'; cf. Arist. *Clouds* 488 where the question *πῶς οὖν δυνήσει μανθάνειν;* is answered by *ἀμέλει καλῶς*.

ζῷα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου, 'who planned that living creatures should exist.'

8. ἐρώτα—ἀποκρινοῦμαι. *Aristodemus quid velit Socrates nondum perspiciens dicit: 'explora me; iam respondendo et disputando me prudentem esse demonstrabo'* (Gilbert).

γοῦν must here be resolved into its elements, *γε οὖν* 'yes—then,' 'well, then'; cf. III. iii. 5 *δεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη.* Sauppe prints *γ' οὖν* here.

καὶ ταῦτ' εἰδώς, 'and that too though you know....' Note that *καὶ ταῦτα* is often used without any proper construction, merely as a particle; cf. Arist. *Wasps* 550 *τί γὰρ εὔδαιμον μᾶλλον νῦν ἐστὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ταῦτα γέροντος;* So *idque* is used in Latin.

γῆς—εὐτάκτως ἔχειν, very well rendered by Mr Dakyns:—'You have in your body a tiny fragment only of the mighty earth, a little drop

of the great waters, and of the other elements vast in their extent, you got, I presume, a particle of each towards the compacting of your bodily frame? Mind alone, it would seem, which is nowhere to be found, you had the lucky chance to snatch up and make off with, you cannot tell how. And these things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in number, owe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity of wit.'

τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι. The *σοι* is dative of *person concerned*; cf. the Latin *pater ei moritur.*

ἄρα, 'it seems,'—ironical as often; cf. ii. 8.

συναρπάσαι. Cf. Cic. *de nat. deorum* ii. 18 *unde enim hanc* (*mentem*) *homo arripuit, ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates?*

πλῆθος ἄπειρα. Cf. i. 14.

9. μὰ Δί', strictly 'no, by Zeus,' must refer back to *ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ.*

οὐ γὰρ—δημιουργούς. 'For I cannot see the sovereign agents of these, as I do the artificers of things made on earth.'

γιγνομένων. Note that *γίγνομαι* is frequently used as the passive of *ποιέω.*

κατά γε τοῦτο, 'anyhow as far as that goes.'

10. ὡς—προσδεῖσθαι, 'so as to need besides.' Xenophon, alone of Attic Prose writers, uses *ὡς* with the infinitive. 'In their original use *ὡς* and *ὥς τε* are related precisely as *ὅς* and *ὅς τε* in Homer. But in consecutive sentences *ὥστε* gradually gained almost exclusive control, so that *ὡς* here became very rare. *ὡς* occurs chiefly in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Herodotus, and Xenophon, where it is used in the same sense as *ὥστε*' (Goodwin, *M.T.* § 608).

ὅσῳ—θεραπεύειν, 'the more magnificent the power which deigns to care for you.'

11. οἵ—ἀνέστησαν, 'inasmuch as they set him upright.' For the causal use of the relative cf. ii. 64.

ἑρπετοῖς, a poetical word.

οἷς, instrumental. The antecedent is *ἐκείνων* understood.

12. καὶ μὴν—γε, not adversative as generally in Xenophon (cf. vi. 3), but 'and moreover.'

οἵαν—ἀρθροῦν. For the construction see note on § 6. Translate:—'able by touching different parts of the mouth at different times to make articulate speech.'

13. κρατίστην, predicative, more emphatic than *τὴν κρατίστην ψυχήν.*

θεῶν—ᾔσθηται ὅτι εἰσί, lit. 'has perceived with regard to the gods that they exist.' For this genitive see note on i. 12.

πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, 'to labour with a view to learning.'

14. παρὰ τἄλλα ζῷα, 'compared with all other living creatures.'

ἄνθρωποι. The emendation *ἄνθρωποι*, adopted by several editors, is tempting, but quite unnecessary.

φύσει, dative of manner, 'by nature.' Cf. iii. 1 *νόμῳ πόλεως*.

σώματι—ψυχῇ, local datives,—'in body...in soul.'

βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα. The subject is *ἄνθρωπος*, understood from the previous sentence. Note the double *ἄν* in this sentence. Goodwin (*M.T.* § 224) points out that a participle representing a protasis, as *ἔχων* does here, is especially apt to have an *ἄν* near it. The protasis implied in the participle is merely emphasised by *ἄν*, which belongs to *ἐδύνατο* and is repeated with it. Cf. *Cyropaedeia* I. vi. 18 *ἀγῶνας ἄν τίς μοι δοκεῖ προειπὼν—μάλιστ' ἂν ποιεῖν.*

οὔθ' ὅσα—ἔχει, 'just as the possession of hands, divorced from human wit, is profitless' (Dakyns).

ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι. So in Latin we may have an interrogative in a subordinate clause,—*quid cum fecerint, deos te curare putabis?* In English we must say: 'what must they do to make you think that they care for you?'

15. μαντικῆς. Cf. i. 3.

σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες, 'making an exception of you.'

17. τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν, 'the Intelligence immanent in the Universe.' Cf. the dictum of Anaxagoras quoted in the note on i. 11 and the Stoic doctrine of the *anima mundi*. Cf. also Plato *Philebus* 30 B ΣΩ. *τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;* ΠΡΩ. *δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.* ΣΩ. *πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε;*

καὶ μὴ—πάντα ὁρᾶν, 'and do not think that, whereas your sight can reach over many miles, yet the eye of God cannot see all things at a glance.'

18. οὕτω καὶ—θελήσουσι, 'if in the same way you make trial of the gods, by serving them, to see whether they will be willing....'

αὐτούς, sense-construction, after *τὸ θεῖον*. Cf. ii. 62 *τις—τούτοις*.

19. ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο, 'since they thought,'—certainly not optative of *frequency* like the other optatives in this section, nor yet caused by *attraction* as Kühner suggests; but due to *oratio obliqua*. See Goodwin, *M.T.* §§ 713, 714:—'Causal sentences regularly take the indicative, after both primary and secondary tenses. When, however, the speaker

implies that a cause was assigned by some other person, the principle of indirect discourse, after past tenses, allows the verb to stand in the optative.'

V.

1. εἴ τι προυβίβαζεν, 'whether he helped them forward at all,'—*τι* cognate accusative.

ὄντινα αἰσθανοίμεθα. This so-called 'attracted' optative is in reality conditional,—'if we saw any one,' corresponding quite properly to the apodosis *ἂν αἱροίμεθα*. Goodwin (*M.T.* § 531) formulates this rule for the use:—'when the relative clause expresses a future condition of the less vivid form, and the antecedent clause contains an optative referring to the future, the relative takes the optative (without *ἄν*).' Cf. § 4 *τίς ἂν ἡσθείη—ὃν εἰδείη...;*

ἥττω γαστρός, 'a slave to appetite.' Xenophon has *ἥττους τῶν πόνων* (*Hipparch.* i. 3), Sophocles *ἥσσων ἔρωτος*, and Aristophanes *ἥττων κέρδους*.

καὶ πῶς, 'why, how...?,'—*καί* before an interrogative denoting *surprise*, as usual.

σῶσαι—κρατῆσαι. These words have given unnecessary trouble to the critics, some of whom read *σώσειν—κρατήσειν*, while others say that the aorist here is used in a future sense. In reality they are gnomic aorists,—'that such an one *ever yet saved* us....' This is made quite clear by the passages quoted by Goodwin (*M.T.* § 159).

2. τῳ—παιδεῦσαι, really a double dative,—'to entrust to any one *for education*'; see notes on ii. 54, vi. 9.

ἔργων ἐπιστασίαν, 'superintendence of works'; cf. II. v. 2 *ἐπιστάτην εἰς τἀργύρεια*.

ἀγοραστήν, 'butler,' properly the slave who bought provisions for the house, Latin *obsonator*.

3. εἴ γε μηδὲ—δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, a very unusual form of protasis. Goodwin (*M.T.* § 506) writes:—'A potential optative with *ἄν* in the protasis may express a present condition:—*if we would not take even a slave who was intemperate, how can it be other than fitting to guard oneself against becoming so?*' He compares Plato *Prot.* 329 B *καὶ ἐγώ, εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καί σοι πείθομαι* 'and I, if I could trust any man, trust you.' In our passage we must notice the difference between the supposition *we should not take if we could* and the ordinary *εἰ μὴ δεξαίμεθα supposing us not to take.*'

τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δέ. Observe that the antithesis is emphasised by the *chiastic* order.

4. ἐν συνουσίᾳ, 'in social life'; cf. Arist. *Clouds* 649 *κομψὸν ἐν συνουσίᾳ* 'clever in society.'

ὄψῳ, 'dainties'; see note on iii. 5.

τὴν ἐγκράτειαν—κρηπῖδα. The statement that 'self-control is the corner-stone of virtue' is not really inconsistent, as some have thought, with Socrates' fundamental principle that all virtue consists in knowledge (see Introduction, p. xxxviii); for, as Prof. Sidgwick points out, it is quite easy to interpret the ordinary notion of 'self-control' Socratically, as consisting in knowledge of the comparatively small value of the gratification of vicious appetite. Our passage will then simply denote that this conviction will precede all other moral knowledge.

κρηπῖδα. For the metaphorical use of this word cf. Pindar's *κρηπὶς ἐλευθερίας* (fragm. 93) and Euripides' *κρηπὶς γένους* (*H.F.* 1261).

5. ἀξιολόγως, 'to any extent worth mentioning.'

τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, accusatives of respect,—'reduced to a shameful state in body and soul.'

6. τοῦ τυχόντος. Cf. i. 14 *ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα.*

VI.

1. αὐτοῦ, possessive genitive, depending on *ἃ—διελέχθη*,—'I ought also to mention a conversation of the master....'

Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστήν. This Antiphon was also called *τερατοσκόπος* (soothsayer) and *ὀνειροκριτής* (interpreter of dreams). He is said to have been jealous of Socrates. He must not be confounded with the orator Antiphon, who took a leading part in the Revolution of the Four Hundred.

συνουσιαστάς, 'associates'; see note on and cf. § 3 *τοὺς μαθητάς* of others, *τοὺς συνόντας* of Socrates.

2. τἀναντία, cognate accusative,—'you seem to have got just the opposite kind of enjoyment out of your philosophy' (ironical).

ζῇς, emphatic and sarcastic,—'you exist,' 'you barely keep body and soul together.'

γοῦν, 'at any rate,' introducing, as often, a special instance of a general statement.

οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, more emphatic than *οὐδεὶς ἄν*,—'not a single slave would put up with living under a master.'

ἱμάτιον, a mantle or cloak consisting of a rectangular piece of cloth. The ordinary verb used to denote the putting on of the *ἱμάτιον* is *ἀμφιέννυμι*, as here; in the case of the *χιτών*, the tight-fitting tunic or shirt, *ἐνδύω* is the regular verb.

ἀνυπόδητος. Alcibiades in his panegyric of Socrates, recorded in Plato's *Symposium* (p. 220 B), speaks thus of his hardiness at Potidaea: *ἀνυπόδητος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ῥᾷον ἐπορεύετο ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑποδεδεμένοι.*

ἀχίτων. Cf. Aristoph. *Equites* 881 *ἄνευ χιτῶνος—χειμῶνος ὄντος*, on which Mr Neil remarks: 'This style was affected by Stoics like Cleanthes, and especially by the Cynics. Portrait-statues often have the *ἱμάτιον* alone, as the Lateran Sophocles; but probably this is owing to artistic effect, not to actual truth. The names *ἔσθος, ἱμάτιον, εἷμα* show that the upper garment was more essentially 'the dress' than the *χιτών*, and so *γυμνός* means 'without *the* dress,' wearing the *χιτών* only.'

διατελεῖς. Usually *ὤν* would be inserted; cf. § 9 *διατελῶ νομίζων.*

3. καὶ μὴν...γε, in its ordinary Xenophontean sense of 'and yet,' i.e. in spite of all your hardships. Cf. § 8.

εἰ—διαθήσεις. Mark the use of *εἰ* with the future indicative, when the speaker is menacing,—'if you *mean to* reduce your associates to a similar condition.' Cf. Arist. *Birds* 759 *αἶρε πλῆκτρον εἰ μαχεῖ* 'Up with your spur if you mean to fight.'

ἀποδεικνύουσιν, 'make,'—a sense which this verb not seldom bears, e.g. *Anabasis* I. i. 2 *στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν ἀπέδειξε.*

κακοδαιμονίας. Aristophanes has *ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης* (*Clouds* 104).

4. τοὐμοῦ βίου, partitive genitive,—'what you have seen so hard in my life.'

5. ἐμοῦ, added for emphasis, not necessary to the construction, as *μου* precedes; cf. the repetition of *τοὺς θεούς* in iii. 2.

ὡς χαλεπώτερα, accusative absolute; we must supply *ὄντα*, as is proved by *ὡς ἡδίω ὄντα* which follows. Translate: 'Or is it from the idea that the items of my dietary are harder to supply than yours?' Cf. ii. 20, iii. 2.

ὁ μὲν—ὄψου δεῖται. See note on iii. 5.

6. μᾶλλόν του, idiomatic. We say 'more than others.'

7. μελετήσαντες. We must supply the object, viz. *τὸ σῶμα.* So we use the verb 'to train' absolutely.

πρὸς ἃ ἂν μελετῶσι, 'in whatever direction they train.'

τῷ σώματι—πάντα, 'since I am always training myself to endure everything that may happen to the body.'

8. ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντα, 'by being in use'; cf. Plato *Phaedo* 87 C *ἱματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου.*

καὶ μὴν—γε. See § 3.

εὖ πράττειν—εὖ πράττοντες, a play on words; for one means 'to be prosperous,' the other 'being successful.' Our 'to do well' covers both meanings.

προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς, 'are progressing for them'; cf. Thuc. viii. 68 *τὸ ἔργον προὐχώρησε.*

9. ὡς σὺ μακαρίζεις, 'in the style which you count happy.'

ᾧ—ἀρκοίη. For the hypothetical optative with the relative see note on v. 1.

ἐκπολιορκηθείη, 'capitulate under a siege.'

εὑρεῖν—ἐντυγχάνειν, good illustrations of the datival character of the infinitive,—lit. 'hardest *for obtaining*...easiest *for lighting upon.*' See note on ii. 54.

10. ἔοικας οἰομένῳ, 'you seem to think,' lit. 'you are like one thinking.'

δέεσθαι, often left uncontracted by Xenophon.

11. οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, 'not at all'; cf. *οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν.*

γοῦν. Cf. § 2.

οὐδένα—ἀργύριον, double accusative; cf. ii. 60.

τῆς συνουσίας, 'for your society'; cf. ii. 60.

οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, 'you would never, I will not say give it to any one for nothing...,' Latin *nemini ne dicam gratis des.* After *μή* there is an ellipse of *εἴπω,*—'not to say.' Cf. *Hellenica* II. iii. 35 *διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα οὐδὲ πλεῖν, μὴ ὅτι ἀναιρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας* 'not to speak of picking up the men.'

ἀλλ' οὐδ'—λαβών, 'but not even if you received for it less than its value.'

12. ταύτης, 'for this.' The construction of this word is the same as that of *τῆς συνουσίας* above.

δίκαιος—ἐπιστάμενος, 'Upright you may be, for you do not cheat for mere covetousness; but wise you cannot be, if that is (*γε*) what you know is worthless.' The *μηδενός* shows that the participle is hypothetical, and the *γε* that it is by Socrates' own admission, as Antiphon holds; cf. *εἴ γε*=*si quidem*, e.g. iv. 4.

13. ὁμοίως μὲν καλῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρῶς. So Mr Herbert Richards reads for *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν* of the MSS. (*Classical Review*, vol. xvi. p. 270). This emendation sets right what was hitherto a very difficult passage. 'The point is not that it is equally creditable and discreditable

to dispose of the two things (beauty and wisdom), but that in both cases there is a creditable and discreditable way of doing it,—two possibilities with regard to each of them set forth with correspondence of *μέν* and *δέ*. It follows that we want adverbs, not adjectives,—*εἶναι* meaning *it is possible*. For the double adverb cf. Thuc. ii. 60 *οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι.*'

ἀργυρίου, genitive of price; cf. ii. 60 *πολλοῦ ἐπώλουν*.

σοφιστάς, not always used invidiously; see Introduction, p. xxvii.

ἀποκαλοῦσιν. Cf. ii. 6, 57.

ὅστις—ποιεῖν, 'But when a man, seeing the good disposition of another and therefore teaching him all the good he has, makes him his friend, we consider that such an one does what it is the duty of a fair and good citizen to do.'

14. δ' οὖν, 'However that may be.' Socrates clinches the matter by giving an account of his own practice.

ἄλλοις συνίστημι, 'I introduce him to others'; cf. *Anabasis* III. i. 8 *συνεστάθη* Κύρῳ 'he was introduced to Cyrus.'

καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς—γιγνώμεθα, a beautiful passage, more after the manner of the poetic Plato.

καλοκἀγαθίαν, 'beauty and nobility of soul' (Dakyns). See Introduction, p. ix.

15. ἢ εἰ—πράττειν αὐτά, 'or by devoting myself to fitting as many as possible to engage in politics.'

VII.

1. ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο, 'good in this,'—*τοῦτο* being cognate accusative; cf. ii. 46 *δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, Plato *Apol.* 22 E *σοφὸς τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν*, *Republ.* 490 D *κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν*.

2. αὐλητής. The profession of piper was well worth following. Pipers were employed at entertainments, funerals, and sacrifices. At the latter, part of the food offered was their perquisite; hence *to live like a piper* became a proverb. So also at Rome *dulcis erat mercede labor* (Ovid *fasti* vi. 661).

τὰ ἔξω τῆς τέχνης, 'in the externals of the art,'—accusative of respect.

σκεύη καλά, 'splendid paraphernalia,' i.e. the double pipe, the mouthpiece, and the long robe; cf. Ov. *fasti* vi. 653, 4.

ἔργον γε—ληπτέον, 'he must nowhere undertake an actual performance'; cf. the frequent antithesis of *ἔργον* and *λόγος*.

ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών, 'an impostor fellow,' 'a miserable impostor,'—*ἄνθρωπος*, as often, contemptuous; cf. the similar phrases *ἄνθρωπος γόης, ἄνθρωπος συκοφάντης*.

δαπανῶν—ὠφελούμενος, conditional participles, as is proved by the *μηδέν*.

3. οὓς ἥκιστα βούλοιτο. The optative is due to assimilation. Otherwise we should have had *βούλεται* (Goodwin, *M.T.* § 563). This use must be contrasted with that exemplified in v. 1, vi. 9.

ἀπαλλάξειεν, 'come off.' For this intransitive use cf. III. xiii. 6 *πῶς ἀπήλλαχεν ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ;* Herod. i. 16 *οὐκ ὡς ἤθελεν ἀπήλλαξεν*.

4. προστάττεσθαι—τυγχάνειν, 'For he warned them that thereby tasks beyond men's powers were laid upon them, and that, if they failed to accomplish tasks in which they had a reputation for ability, they would meet with no indulgence.'

5. ἀπατεῶνα, 'cheat,' a rare word, used again in *Cyropaedeia* I. vi. 27 and Plato *Republ.* 451 A.

σκεῦος, 'chattel,' generally used in the plural, as in § 2 above.

τοιάδε here refers to what has gone before. Generally, but not invariably, *τοιάδε* refers to what follows, *τοιαῦτα* to what precedes.

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